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This thesis is a study of the crisis-ridden social transition of the Thai state (1997-2010) 
by analysing the interrelations of social forces in the Thai historical bloc. The thesis 
argues that the recent political conflict in Thailand that reached its peak in 2010 
transcended the conflict between the Thaksin government and its social antagonists, or 
merely the conflict between the Yellow and the Red Shirt forces. Rather, the organic 
crisis of the Thai state in the recent decade should be seen as social reflections of the 
unfinished process of social transition. Furthermore, this transition contains features of 
‘crises’, ‘restructuring’, ‘transition’ and ‘other crises’ within the transition. The thesis 
employs a Gramscian account as a major theoretical framework because it stresses the 
importance of history, provides tools to analyse configurations of social forces, and 
offers a combined focus of political, social, and ideological matters. 
 
This thesis finds that the street fights and violent government repression in May 2010 
was only the tip of the iceberg and the incidents of 2010 themselves did not represent a 
genuine picture of Thailand’s organic crisis. The crisis, this thesis argues, was not 
caused only by the Thaksin government and its allies. The Thaksin social force should 
be seen as a part of a broader social transition in which it acted as a ‘social catalyst’ that 
brought social change to the Thai state in terms of both political economy and socio-
ideological elements. Therefore, the crisis of the Thai historical bloc resulted from the 
clash between the two distinct ‘social relations’―old and new―and the clash is still 
ongoing. In addition, this thesis has revealed the ‘three’ underlying crisis-ridden 
characters of the Thai state including social inequality, overwhelming roles of royalism-
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1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
1.1 Research Rationale 
The thesis analyses the violent conflict between the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts’ and the 
‘Red Shirts’ in 2010. Prior to this clash, the political economy of Thailand had already 
experienced a crisis-ridden process of socio-economic restructuring. It is argued here 
that the violent struggle of 2010 brought the unresolved nature of this process of 
restructuring into the open as a direct confrontation between the conservative social 
forces (Yellow Shirts) and the more progressive social forces (Red Shirts). This 
definition of the two contesting forces is somewhat vague concerning the Red Shirts.  
Indeed, whilst it is much easier to determine the conservative character of the Yellow 
Shirts social forces, it is much more difficult to determine with any degree of certainty 
the social forces of the Red Shirts. They are progressive in that they are clearly 
struggling for a new Thai political economy. Yet the Red Shirt movement comprises a 
coalition of many different interests from liberal capitalist forces to the subaltern. Their 
coherence as a social force to a large extent has to do with their opposition to the 
established interest. The Red Shirt movement only came to the fore in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis of 1997 and developed into a recognisable movement only since 
2006. Its emergence as a movement of opposition was triggered by the military coup of 
2006 that removed the Thaksin government from office and re-established the political 
dominance of conservative interests.  
The struggle between the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts manifests a sharpening of 
the crisis of the Thai state, which came about as a consequence of the economic crisis of 
1997. It is argued that the events of 2010 are a consequence of this crisis. In a most 
immediate sense, the violent struggles of 2010 were in response to the coup d’état of 
2006. This thesis holds that the Thaksin government, which was first elected to office in 
2001, amounted to a modernising political force that by and large represented the socio-
economic interests of what would later emerge as the Red Shirt movement. It is further 
argued that Thaksin’s government manifested a concerted political effort of socio-
economic restructuring in response to the economic crisis of 1997. It thus represented a 
break from the socio-economic interests that had governed Thailand until that crisis. 
That is, the crisis of 1997 manifests not just an economic crisis. Rather, it represents a 
2 
structural crisis of the whole political economy. It brought about a crisis-ridden process 
of restructuring, which to this day is fundamentally unfinished.1 It is therefore argued 
that the Thaksin government did not resolve the crisis-ridden process of restructuring. 
Rather it was part of this process of restructuring. The clashes of 2010 are therefore 
seen as a manifestation of the unresolved crisis-ridden process of resolving, one way or 
another, the structural crisis that beset the Thai political economy in 1997.   
The thesis takes the crisis of 1997 as its starting point. Its repercussions for the 
domestic relations in Thailand were fundamental, and my thesis examines on the 
manner in which it not only challenged the established social relations but, 
also  disrupted the status quo of the Thai social relations, leading to the long drawn 
own struggle between the social forces, culminating in the confrontation between the 
Yellow forces and the Red forces. That is to say, the economic crisis which was global in 
character manifested itself in the form of a political crisis of the Thai state. My analysis 
of the Thai social relations post-1997  will argue that the political crisis is the 
consequence of two interlinked phenomenon – firstly the crisis of 1997 undermined the 
old governing regime, at the same as which, secondly, it did not lead to the emergence 
of new regime capable of integrating Thai society on the basis of a new political 
consensus. Indeed, the crisis of 1997 led to a still fundamentally undecided process of 
restructuring by means of a bitter and times violent struggle between the social forces. 
My thesis analyses this process of restructuring and in this context I analyse the 
Thaksin governments (2001 - 2006) as a political force of restructuring the Thai 
political economy beyond its traditional balance of social forces towards a new 
constellation of socio-economic interests. The thesis will thus analyse the removal from 
office of the Thaksin government by a military coup in September 2006 as a political 
reaction against this attempt at reform by the forces of the old regime that had lost its 
political force as a consequence of the economic crisis of 1997. It will be held that the 
crisis of 2006 amounts to a ‘crisis within transition’. It removed the government of 
reform, brought the old interests back to power, and led to the formation of the Red 
Shirts, which established themselves as a reaction to the coup d’état of 2006. In the 
conclusion it is therefore argued that the clashes of 2010 manifest the still unresolved 
crisis of transition from what is conceived of here as the old Thai historical bloc that 
                                                             
1  Indeed, contemporary Thailand is paralysed by political conflict and political violence as 
evidenced by the continued mass demonstrations and violent clashes since December 2013. 
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was in place until 1997 towards an as yet undefined new historical bloc2. The struggles 
between the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts amount, it is argued here, to a struggle of 
hegemony to create a new historical bloc. That is, the events of 2010 are analysed as a 
manifestation of the still ‘unfinished business’ of the restructuring process that the crisis 
of 1997 brought about.  
The ‘crisis-ridden’ character of the Thai political economy is not just a matter of 
economics or politics. Rather, and as will be shown below, it amounts to a structural 
crisis of the whole political economy. The approach that this thesis takes is based on 
Gramscian political theory. In distinction to more traditional accounts of political and 
economic analysis, a Gramscian analysis does not privilege one aspect of society over 
another as the unit of analysis. Rather, it looks at the whole as a configuration of a 
balance of social forces. Analysing Thai political economy through a Gramscian 
perspective offers a comprehensive, historically based, and critical account of the events 
of 2010. It is the conviction of this thesis that a Gramscian account of Thai political 
economy is entirely ‘original’ in its theoretical approach and analytical perspective. 
Gramscian political theory has hardly, if ever, been applied to the analysis Thai political 
economy. This is surprising since Gramscian political theory focuses its analyses of the 
state as a configuration of social forces. It conceives of the social forces as changing 
coalitions of interests, that is, the interests of identifiable social groups, and argues the 
balance between the social forces is decisive for the understanding of social compromise 
and social strife. In the context of Thailand this Gramscian focus on the balance of social 
forces as the explanatory foundation for the understanding of periods of historical 
stability (historical bloc) and violent restructuring (struggle for hegemony) is in my 
view best place to analyse the turmoil of Thai society. 
Indeed, and as will be explained in detail in chapter two, conventional accounts of Thai 
political economy, analyse the various elements or aspects of the Thai political economy 
in isolation from each other, and thus fail to offer a comprehensive account of the crisis-
ridden process of restructuring the Thai political economy. For example, and in the case 
of Thailand, the political economy approach derives political developments from 
                                                             
2 It should be noted here that the term ‘bloc’ was used by Gramsci in two major ways; first, as a 
‘historical bloc’, when he means the concrete totality formed by the articulation of the material 
base and the politico-ideological superstructure; second, as a ‘social bloc’ or an alliance of social 
classes under a given regime (Coutinho, 2013: 97 n.12). In this work, I will refer to ‘bloc’ in both 
senses interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
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economic forces, the ideological explanation offered by Cultural Studies emphasises the 
importance of religion and the monarchy as means of social cohesion, and political 
science and institutional theory focus on the strength of political processes in regulating 
socio-economic forces. 
In distinction, this thesis argues that the troubled political landscape of Thailand cannot 
be reduced to the dominance of either economic, social, ideological, or political elements. 
Rather, these elements are all part of the explanation, that is, the crisis-ridden 
development of Thailand in post-1997 is not only a matter of economics or politics, or 
indeed culture. Rather, it is a matter of economics, culture and politics. These aspects 
are not distinct units of analysis. Instead, it is held that the precise nature of their 
interrelationship reflects a certain balance of social forces. It is this balance that 
establishes the historically specific configurations of socio-economic and political 
integration, which the thesis analyses in terms of the Gramscian concept of a ‘historical 
bloc’. The Gramscian account, which will be explored in chapter three, thus stresses the 
importance of history to the understanding of a crisis-ridden structure of social 
relations, which comprise a configuration of social forces. From a Gramscian 
perspective, then, the crisis of 1997 is a crisis of an historical bloc, and the developments 
since 1997 form part of the still unresolved restructuring of a new historical bloc. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the violent clashes of 2010, and indeed since, manifest 
the fundamentally ‘unfinished’ and indeed uncertain character of the crisis-ridden 
transition. The analysis is concluded by arguing that the crisis of 2010 is a 
manifestation of the unfinished character of transition―as the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born.  
This research analyses the politics of social transition in Thailand by first examining the 
old historical bloc that was fatally affected by the crisis of 1997 in chapter four. It then 
explores the crisis, transition, and crisis within transition to make sense of the events of 
2010 in chapters five to eight. Chapters two and three develop the theoretical account of 
the analysis.  
 
1. 2 Contemporary Thai Political Economy in Theoretical Perspective 
The Thai political economy, including the period between 1997 and 2010, has 
traditionally been examined in four broad approaches—Political Economy, Political 
Science, Cultural Studies, and Social Movement Theory. Although each of these 
5 
approaches contributes important insights to the understanding of Thai political 
economy, they do not deal with the complications of the crisis-ridden process of 
restructuring and transition. As will be argued below, each of these approaches picks up 
on a particular element and analyses it in isolation. They thus do not examine the 
interrelations between the various factors and processes that comprise the political 
landscape of Thailand since 1997.  
The Political Economy approach to the study of Thailand’s troublesome restructuring 
process mainly focuses on the economic consequences of political uncertainty. For 
example, Bhanupong (2009) argues that the coup of 2006 was detrimental to the 
stability of the economic structure and that it thus weakened the Thai economy to 
compete globally. In Bhanupong’s account the 2006 military coup thus had a negative 
impact on the economic conditions of the country, which lost global competitiveness. 
Similarly, Aekapol (2012) analyses the economic impact of the socio-political turmoil in 
2010 and argues that the struggles of the Reds Shirts contributed to a decrease in GDP 
growth of 1-2%. He concludes that many urban workers were made unemployed as a 
direct consequence of the Red Shirt protests. These works are paradigmatic examples of 
the kind of political economy research undertaken—it sets out to analyse the impact of 
the military coup and the Red Shirt protests on the Thai economy. Apichat (2007, 2013) 
also suggests that the weakness of Thai political institutions on the economy is not 
limited to the period 2006 to 2010. In his view, the economic crisis of 1997 was, in part, 
caused by a weak state that for him was characterised by a decline in the power of 
regulatory bodies and institutions, including particularly the Bank of Thailand, to 
provide firm governance.  
While the political economy approach focuses on the economic consequences of the 
socio-political rupture, Political Science studies the strength of the democratic 
institutions and analyses elections as the principal means of democratic representation. 
Here the general election of 2005 is of particular analytical interest in that it returned 
an existing civilian government to power for the first time in the history of modern 
Thailand (Nelson, 2008). The popular mandate of the re-elected Thaksin government 
notwithstanding, the new government only lasted for one year until it was removed by 
a military coup in 2006.  The analysis of the election made clear that the rural electorate 
that had hitherto not been politically active in the democratic processes, had in fact 
participated in the election with an enhanced level of political consciousness and activity 
(Bowie, 2008). For Bowie (2008) and also Sinpeng and Kuhonta (2012) who analysed the 
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general election in 2011, the Thai electorate, country and town, had become politically 
active to a degree that had been unknown only a few years earlier.  
The approach also looks at constitutional matters to understand the changing political 
landscape. Tamada (2012) examines the impact on the political process of the new 
constitution of 1997, which had been brought in the wake of the economic crisis. He 
argues the new constitution opened up the political system to challenges from new 
political parties, programmes, and political processes in distinction to the old-styled 
patronage politics that had dominated Thai politics before 1997. In this context, 
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) emerged as an entirely new configuration of 
political forces. The TRT incorporates a number of local political factions into a 
winning coalition. In comparison with the other Thai political parties it thus represents 
an entirely new political party formation, which burst upon the landscape with almost 
immediate political success (Chambers and Croissant, 2010). There is no doubt that the 
new constitution of 1997, which opened up the political system, had a catalysing effect 
leading to the election of the Thaksin government in 2001 and 2005. Nevertheless, the 
argument that a change in the constitution led to a change in political party formation 
and government does not explain the wider context that frames this development in 
terms of the socio-economic interests, political ideologies, and coalition of social forces 
that established the ‘newness’ of the TRT.  
The third approach that will be analysed is Cultural Studies. Traditionally, the study in 
this area focuses on Buddhism as a force of ideological-cultural cohesion in Thai politics. 
However, political conflicts in recent years focus much more strongly on the role of the 
monarchy as a factor of social cohesion in the old Thai historical bloc and as an 
ideological force in the Yellow Shirt movement. Despite the harsh application of the 
Thai lèse majesté laws, which make it very difficult to scrutinise the monarchy, several 
works have been published to examine its role in a critical manner. Handley’s (2006) 
book is, to some extent, the pioneer of the attempt to discuss the roles of the King of 
Thailand. However, his account offers a critical biography of King Bhumibol rather than 
a study of the significance of the monarchy for Thai political economy. In distinction Ji 
(2007) argues in his book, which was banned by application of the lèse majesté law, that 
the coup in 2006 asserted the interests of the rich and benefited especially the high-
ranking military and the monarchy at the expense of ordinary citizens. His argument 
thus denounced the monarch, undermining its ideological appeal as the manifestation of 
some overarching Thai national interest. Alongside Unaldi (2012) and Ockey (2005), 
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these works analyse the monarchy as an obstruction to democracy (Unaldi, 2012; Ockey, 
2005). 
In this context, the most distinct study on the monarchy in contemporary Thailand is 
the analysis of the monarchy as a ‘network monarchy’ (McCargo, 2005). This notion 
stipulates that in order to grasp the political practices of the Thai monarchy, it should 
be seen as a network of persons related to the King rather than the King himself. The 
network monarchy includes the privy councilors, the close network of high-ranking 
bureaucrats, and the military establishment. This area of study brings out many useful 
insights that establish the monarchy as a factor of conservative socio-ideological 
cohesion. As such the monarchy is seen to have contributed to the political tensions in 
Thailand as it and its network provide a socio-ideological base for the Yellow Shirt 
movement. The analysis in this thesis of the conflict of 2010 as a contest between the 
social forces in a crisis of transition incorporates this literature on the ideological 
significance of the monarchy into a wider argument about the crisis-ridden nature of the 
Thai restructuring process in which the old seems unable to die and in which the new 
social forces appear unable to resolve the crisis in their interests.  
The final perspective in the analysis of contemporary Thailand is Social Movement 
Theory. In this perspective the politics of the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts is 
understood as a manifestation of underlying socio-economic interests. Ammar and 
Somchai (2012) focus their study on the socio-economic background of the Yellow 
Shirts and the Red Shirts. They argue that there is no substantial difference in the socio-
economic backgrounds of their supporters. Their argument is based on a socio-economic 
survey that they conducted in 2011, which documents the profile of the activists 
according to age, gender, economic well-being, occupation, and region. In distinction to 
their work, Hewison (2012) argues that economic inequality is a decisive matter for the 
support of both the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts. He thus argues that the alignment of 
the social forces constitutes an antagonism between the social classes, with the Yellow 
Shirts representing mainly the wealthy and the Red Shirts the poor and disenfranchised 
(Hewison, 2012).  
8 
In distinction to these analyses of the economic basis of the contesting social forces, 
Salisa (2012) examines the meaning of the blood sacrificing ritual3 of the Red Shirt 
demonstrators in 2010. For Salisa this ritual has to do with establishment of political 
identity during the earlier stages of the protest in 2010. She argues that this ritual 
amounts to a challenge to the dominant state ideology centred on the monarchy. She 
thus sees the blood-sacrifice of the Reds Shirts as manifesting an alternative political 
ideology from that of the ruling ideology. Cohen (2012), too, views it as a manifestation 
of opposition to the old regime. Other studies in this area are offered by Dressel (2010) 
and Chairat (2012). Dressel employs a historical-institutional approach to study the 
construction and transformation of political legitimacy in Thailand. He argues that the 
political conflict in Thailand lies in the field of tension and conflict between the 
traditional sources of legitimacy, the King and his networks, and the new constitution 
that established democratically based forms of legitimacy, which go beyond the old 
system of patronage by establishing social desires as the foundation of a new democratic 
politics. Chairat (2012), too, concentrates his political analysis on the politics of desire. 
He argues that the recent conflict in Thailand should be seen as a tension between the 
old politics of desire of the old social elites constituted by the notions of consensus, 
reconciliation, normalcy, national unity and status, and the new politics of desire of the 
Red Shirt movement based on the notions of transgression, disagreement, and 
disintegration. The Social Movement perspective deals in a direct manner with the two 
contesting social forces of the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts. The shortcoming of this 
approach is its ‘ahistorical’ conception of the emergence of these forces. The fact that the 
forces are engaged in battle over the restructuring of the Thai political economy 
requires an analysis of the trajectory of the Thai political economy as the conceptual 
frame in which the forces of the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts operate. 
In conclusion, the four analytical accounts that are conventionally employed to examine 
the crisis-ridden character of the Thai political economy in the late 2000s contribute 
insightfully to the understanding of a variety of aspects such as the economic 
consequences of the political uncertainties and manifest social crisis, the question of the 
quality of Thai democracy, the significance of the ideological functions of the Thai 
monarchy, and the movements of the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts as contesting social 
                                                             
3 This ritual was employed as a symbolic struggle against the Abhisit government that 
succeeded the military government and amounts to a self-sacrificial act deployed by the Red 
Shirt protesters.  
9 
forces. This thesis does not reject the findings of these approaches. Rather, it utilises 
their findings in a framework of analysis that argues, firstly, that these fields of analysis 
do not exist in isolation from each other. Rather they exist through each other as 
elements of the crisis-ridden process of transition. Secondly, it is held that at the very 
least, the analysis of the social forces entails the analysis of the historical context that 
connects them. By history, this thesis means the sphere of human actions that contains 
social class struggle, alliances, and the balance of class forces.  
Without the attempt to historicise social relations, it is impossible to understand the 
crisis of the Thai historical bloc, which in the absence of such historical context would 
have to be analysed in separation from the social relations on which it is founded and 
which thus informs the character of its crisis-ridden process of restructuring. The thesis 
argues that the crisis of 2010 has to be seen in the context of the crisis of the old 
historical bloc, which was brought about by the economic crisis of 1997. Since then the 
Thai political economy has experienced a crisis-ridden process of restructuring that 
remains fundamentally unresolved and manifests itself in the form of violent clashes 
between the forces of restoration and progress. This thesis analyses the crisis and 
restructuring in Thai political economy since the 1997 economic crisis as a process of 
transition from the old historical bloc towards a new, as yet uncertain historical bloc. 
The violent clashes of 2010 are a manifestation of a struggle between the social forces to 
achieve the requisite hegemony for the creation of an historical bloc. The Gramscian 
analytical framework of this thesis establishes an ‘original contribution’ to the 
contemporary analysis and understanding of  Thai political economy.  
For the Gramscian framework, historical context is fundamental to the analysis of the 
balance and conflict between the social forces that comprise a distinct political economy. 
Gramscianism conceives of history as the sphere of human actions. It thus does not 
approach the social, political, economic, and ideological manifestations of society as 
discreet elements. Rather, it grasps all these elements together as distinct expressions of 
a whole political economy. Finally, the Gramscian perspective develops the concept of 
hegemony and its related notions of war of position and passive revolution as 
explanatory tools for the analysis of specific configurations of power between the ruling 




1.3 Overview of the Core Chapters: History, Crisis, Transition, and Crisis within 
Transition  
Chapters two and three introduce the theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter two 
presents and assesses the conventional accounts of the study of Thai politics in greater 
depth and detail, and chapter three introduces and expounds the Gramscian approach 
that this thesis employs. The remaining chapters analyse the trajectory of Thai political 
economy from the crisis of 1997 to the analysis of violent clashes in 2010. Throughout 
the presentation of these chapters, the four main themes of the argument will be 
developed—that is history, crisis, transition, and crisis within transition. The history of the 
old historical bloc will be explored in chapter four. The crisis of the Thai state in 1997 is 
analysed in chapter five. Chapter six explores the crisis-ridden transition of the Thai 
historical bloc during the Thaksin government. Chapter seven and eight examine the 
crisis within transition from the military coup of 2006 to the uprising of the Red Shirts in 
2010. 
Chapter four establishes the features of the old historical bloc that governed Thailand 
until its rupture in 1997. It provides the historical background to the thesis. The 
chapter considers the American influence in Thai political economy during the Cold 
War as crucial for the development of modern Thailand, which goes back to the 
American-led economic development plan that was first developed and implemented in 
1961. It transformed the Thai mode of production from largely agricultural production 
into a capitalist economy. Between 1960 and the 1990s the social forces that most 
benefited from this development were the big domestic industrial capital groups, the 
banking and financial sector that was largely controlled by citizens of Chinese origin, 
the military dominated state enterprises, and monarchical capital (such as the Siam 
Cement Group). The development of the Thai political economy also led to the 
emergence of a new middle class and, importantly, to the creation of an urban working 
class which was created by the transformation of a rural agricultural labour-force into 
an urban industrial labour-force. During this period of capitalist transformation, the 
traditional peasantry had, however, been ignored by the forces of capitalist 
industrialisation. The productivity of the peasantry improved very little. The peasantry 
remained under the patronage of authoritarian government as part of the monarchy’s 
developmental project. Industrial development thus paved the way for the ‘polarisation’ 
of society into distinct social groups, comprising the capitalist class relations between 
capital and labour and also between city and countryside. The pattern of 
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industrialisation led to uneven development in which the differentiation between the 
rural and urban living conditions increased hugely. These features of the Thai political 
economy are crucial because they eventually led to increased social tensions and 
conflicts. The historical bloc that was formed as a consequence of industrialisation 
includes the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology. Indeed in the late 1950s, the Sarit government 
revitalised the monarchy from the period of abandonment after the overthrow of the 
absolute monarchy in 1932. From the late 1950s, the revitalised royalism established a 
royal nationalism based on the King and his network as a ‘factor of cohesion’ that tied 
social groups together.  
Chapter five analyses the economic crisis of 1997, which led to the rupture of the old 
historical bloc. Holloway (1992) once stated that the concept of ‘crisis’ is not only 
economic, but it presents itself as such. The crisis expresses the ‘structural instability’ of 
capitalist social relations, the instability of the basic relation between capital and labour 
on which capitalist society is founded (Holloway, 1992: 159). This thesis therefore 
develops the understanding of the economic crisis of 1997 as a crisis of capitalist social 
relations in Thailand. It was a crisis of all economic, political, and socio-ideological 
forces together. It is thus held that the crisis of 1997 is fundamental for the 
understanding of the crisis-ridden restructuring processes and the struggles between 
the social forces in Thailand in the post-1997 period. In fact, the crisis demolished much 
of the financial-banking capital that was largely owned by citizens of Chinese descent. It 
also adversely affected the capital that was operated by the Thai army and the 
monarchy. That is, the crisis affected the main social forces of the then historical bloc. 
Furthermore, the crisis showed that the Thai state did not have the power to protect 
and safeguard the economic interests that were governed through the state. The crisis 
also affected the working class in the form of unemployment. The earlier migration 
from the countryside to the urban centres reversed as many unemployed workers left 
the cities. Unemployment also affected the middle class, especially in the urban areas as 
banks and offices closed down. For the sake of securing the economic interests and 
arresting the economic downturn, there was thus a call for a strong state as a means of 
crisis-resolution.  
Chapters six and seven explore the political consequences of the crisis and the crisis 
ridden transition from the initially strong Thaksin government to the military coup of 
2006, and the emergence of the Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt movements as irreconcilable 
social forces of contestation. Chapter six analyses the politics of the first Thaksin 
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government from 2001 to 2005. It argues that Thaksin’s government had taken the 
leading role in Thai politics as a ‘catalyst of social change’ beyond the old historical bloc. 
In other words, this thesis considers the Thaksin/TRT government as a coalition of 
various social forces for change. The Thaksin coalition included an alliance between 
capitalists, salaried middle classes, labour, and peasantry, forming a broad configuration 
of power. The Thaksin government asserted itself as a powerful political actor that 
attempted to restructure the Thai historical bloc. However, it should be noted that the 
Thaksin-led coalition of social forces did not include the ‘old’ ruling social groups of the 
royalists and military forces, which had dominated modern Thai politics for decades. 
These excluded social forces eventually organised the reaction against the Thaksin 
coalition, a development that was aided by realignments of some forces that had 
originally sided with the Thaksin government, which for them did not meet their 
political and economic interests. These forces transformed later into the Yellow Shirt 
movement, which is analysed in chapter seven. 
Chapter seven focuses on the crisis within transition of the Thai state by critically 
examining the attempt by the old social forces to ‘balance’ what appeared for a time as a 
Thaksin-led hegemony. From late 2005, the old social forces reformed themselves as the 
‘People’s Alliance for Democracy’ (PAD) or the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts movement’. This 
chapter considers the emergence of the opposition to the TRT/Thaksin hegemony as a 
manifestation of the crisis-ridden restructuring of the Thai state. It will be argued that 
the emergence of the Yellow Shirts brought to the fore and exploited to its advantage a 
number of contradictions that existed in the broad coalition of social forces that 
provided the social base for the TRT party. Most noteworthy was the growing conflict 
of capitalist groups from the Thaksin coalition in late 2005. Furthermore, and as will be 
shown, it was not only the forces that lost out during the Thaksin government that 
realigned with the old regime in the form of the Yellow Shirt movement. Sections of the 
middle class and the working class that had benefitted from the Thaksin government 
also decided to rally against TRT by joining the Yellow Shirt movement. These 
developments weakened the Thaksin government at its core. As the Yellow Shirt forces 
gathered momentum, supported by the old social elites such as the Democrat party and 
the army, a condition was created akin to Gramsci’s notion of a ‘passive revolution, which 
eventually led to the military coup in September 2006. The formation of the ‘United 
Front for Democracy against Dictatorship’ (UDD) or the so-called ‘Red Shirts movement’ 
is a direct consequence of the military coup. The Red Shirt forces comprise a coalition 
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consisting mainly of elements drawn from the middle class, large sections of the urban 
working class, and rural peasants. The Red Shirts are analysed as a subaltern social 
group in both economic and ideological senses.  
Chapter eight analyses the violence of 2010 as a manifestation of the ongoing, crisis-
ridden restructuring of the Thai political economy. It expressed a stalemate in the battle 
between the social forces in that ‘the old is dying’ at the same time as which the ‘new 
cannot be born’. Chapter nine concludes the thesis and summaries the findings in 
analytical form.  
 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research Aims  
This research aims to examine the political and social transition of the Thai state 
between the 1997 economic crisis and the government crackdown on the Red Shirts 
movement in 2010 by focusing on interrelations among social forces as protagonists of 
social change. Furthermore, the thesis also aims to unravel the underlying 
interconnections among each social force that constitute the formation, crisis, and 
transition of the Thai historical bloc.  
2.2 Central Research Questions 
How can we grasp the complexities of the politics of transition of the Thai state over the 
last decade in Thailand? And how can we construct an understanding of the 
antagonistic relationships among social forces, their material connections, socio-
ideological cohesion, and their contributions towards the crisis and the transition of the 
Thai historical bloc? 
2.3 Methods of Inquiry 
Regarding the methodology of this research, the Gramscian approach does not rely on 
the scientific mode of inquiry such as the observation of human behaviour, nor is it 
based on statistical and mathematical analyses. Rather, this critical approach to social 
and political phenomena employs some ideas of the ‘interpretive approach’ by focusing on 
critique and unravelling the complexities of the politics of social transition in 
contemporary Thai politics. The methodologies that this research will adopt are related 
to ontological anti-foundationalism and epistemological interpretivism (Furlong and 
Marsh, 2010: 200; Hay, 2002: 61-65). Therefore, this research needs to employ 
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‘qualitative methods’, including content analysis focusing on documentary research as the 
major method of inquiry (Vromen, 2010; Burnham et al., 2008). 
2.4 Unit of Analysis 
As mentioned earlier in the first section, this thesis is a study of the social transition of 
the Thai state by looking through various social forces as protagonists of social change. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis of this study is the various social forces in the Thai state. 
Gramsci’s notion of social class consists of two main classes including the dominant 
class or the ruling class, and the subaltern, subordinate, or the dominated class. 
However, it is worth noting here that Gramsci rarely uses the term ‘class’ in his prison 
notebooks. Rather, he prefers to use the terms ‘social group’ and ‘social force’ when he 
mentions each social and political agency in order to avoid prison censorship (Nemeth, 
1980: 86; Pozzolini, 1970: 67–75). However, it should be noted here that even Gramsci 
himself uses the term social force and social group interchangeably without distinction 
in his prison notebooks. Indeed, there is a little difference between these two terms as 
this thesis employs the term ‘social group’ in regarding to represent distinct interest of a 
given social actor. Whilst the term ‘social force’ will be used in a more flexible manner 
as a combination and coalition of class interests of several social actors.  
For the case of Thailand, the ruling/dominant social forces include the monarchy and its 
network, the military, and the capitalists. The hegemonic power of each social force in 
this class is varied depending on the changing political structure through different 
periods of time. In addition, in order to grasp the complexity of the politics of transition 
of the Thai state, this research also focuses on the analysis of the politics of what 
Gramsci called ‘subaltern’ or dominated social forces, which include the middle class, the 
labourers/working class, and the peasantry. The theoretical discussion of the Gramscian 
notion of social forces will be provided in chapter three.  
2.5 Period of Study  
The period of study is mainly focused on the period between the late 1990s, which is the 
pre-1997 economic crisis stage, and the bloodshed of the government oppression of the 
Red Shirt movement in 2010.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
WITHOUT HISTORY, THERE IS NO CRISIS, AND THERE IS NO 
TRANSITION: EXPLORING TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THAI 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores traditional accounts of Thai political economy. The chapter 
argues that conventional approaches are unable to deal with all ‘four’ features—history, 
crisis, transition, and crisis within transition—of contemporary Thai political economy. 
This chapter will critically examine existing works on Thai politics in relation to the 
overall picture of contemporary Thailand by offering below analysis of ‘four traditional 
categories’―Political Economy, Political Science, Cultural Studies, and Social 
Movements. 
The first category, Political Economy, normally considers economic matters in its 
different aspects separately from social structure. Looking through several theoretical 
approaches—such as modernisation theory, political economy, and economic 
Marxism—the studies in this category deal with some features of contemporary Thai 
political economy such as the explanation of the transition of Thai society through 
modernisation theory, nevertheless, they fail to cope with the history and crisis of the 
state. The second category deals with Political Science through several theoretical 
positions such as Behaviouralism and Institutionalism. Behaviouralist approaches 
explain a given social action of any social actor, but do not consider relationships among 
social actors. Meanwhile, the institutionalist framework only concentrates on the roles 
of various legal-political institutions and their engagement in the democratisation 
process of Thailand. Both Behaviouralism and Institutionalism are unable to provide the 
proper theoretical space to deal with the aspect of crisis and transition of the state.  
The third category is Cultural Studies. Studies in this category show the roles of culture 
(Thainess), religion (Buddhism), and ideology (the cohesive function of the monarchy) in 
Thai politics. 1  Studies in this category deal with two main features of Thai 
politics―history and crisis. Some existing works provide the notion of hegemonic 
apparatus and its social practices, such as the application of the royalist-nationalist 
ideology, that tie social forces in the Thai historical bloc. Likewise, some works could 
                                                             
1Thainess, Buddhism, and the monarchy are the three most distinct features of modern Thai society 
that have been shaped by the dominant discourse of the ‘three pillars’―the nation, religion, and 
the monarchy. The construction of the hegemonic ideology in Thai politics will be discussed in 
chapter four.  
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offer the perception of the crisis of the country in terms of the crisis of hegemony. 
However, this category fails to connect to economic elements of the Thai state; 
therefore, it is insufficient to cope with the aspect of the transition of the state. The last 
category is Social Movements, which mainly analyse the demonstrations of the Yellow 
and Red Shirts in their various aspects. Studies in this category concentrate on the ‘non-
state social actors’ from both the conservative Yellows and the liberal Reds camps 
through different theoretical perspectives. They are able to deal with the aspect of crisis 
of Thai politics; however, most of these studies could not offer an understanding of the 
transition of the state because they perceive the crisis in Thailand from 2006 to 2010 
without considering history and the social relations among social classes that 
constituted the Thai historical bloc prior to that period.  
 
2. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
The first category of traditional accounts of Thai politics is Political Economy. This 
category includes two major theoretical stances; modernisation and political economy. 
Existing works in this category contribute some crucial understandings of Thai political 
economy, especially the relationship between economic activities and political 
consequences and vice versa. These works provide a picture of economic development in 
relation to some social groups. However, the inefficiencies of these conventional 
approaches lie in the failure to grasp the crisis of the state, including all economic, 
political, and ideological elements, apart from the economic crisis. They also fail to 
provide an account of the relationship between social actors in Thailand’s political 
economy. Therefore, these approaches could not cope with the crisis, restructuring, and 
transition of the Thai state over the recent decade.  
 
2.1 Modernisation  
The first traditional theory in this category is modernisation. This approach has a 
central belief that social change is a linear process involving the transformation of 
traditional, agrarian societies into modern, industrial societies (Rush, 1992: 223). In 
addition, the approach has the basic idea, based on Rostow (1960), that addressing 
‘economic growth’ is a process to bring a given society to the stage of modern or 
industrialised society. This idea of economy-led development has flourished in the study 
of Thai political economy since the late 1950s.  
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During the age of the Cold War, scholars generally tied their work to aspects of anti-
communism, national security and development. Throughout the period from the 1950s 
to the 1960s, funding and aid from the US government in order to support the anti-
communist project and democratic enhancement in Thailand was largely donated to the 
Thai armed forces and the Thai government (Sharp, 1950; Darling, 1962; Darling, 1963; 
and Girling, 1969). Nevertheless, along with the politics of security in the Cold War 
period, the matters of economic growth and economic development were the central 
concerns of the modernisation approach. Many works in this category concentrate their 
studies on the sources of income and income per capita in developing countries (Long, 
1966), foreign direct investment (FDI), and patterns of investment from international 
capital in Thailand.  
These were major features that could be found in the state of knowledge in Thai studies 
between the 1950s and 1960s (Yoder, 1957; Hough, 1969). On the contrary, while some 
studies of Thai political economy in this approach in the 1950s and 1960s focused on 
economic growth and the pattern of increasing wealth in developing and developed 
countries, research in the following decades was centred on the consequences and 
difficulties of development in terms of different aspects (Bell and Resnick, 1970; 
Limqueco, 1970), including the problem of patron-client relationships in Thailand, 
which was a major obstacle to becoming a modernised country (Rubin, 1973; Neher, 
1975); the loose characteristic of the Thai social structure and the concept of tradition 
(Embree, 1950; Rhum, 1996); centralisation of political power in the bureaucratic 
organisations in Thailand (Ramsay, 1976; Evers, 1966; Riggs, 1966); the problem of 
poverty as a consequence of Thailand’s industrialisation in the 1950s (Warr, 2002) and 
the problem of urbanisation, which emerged from Western development (Ayal, 1992).  
Studies in this category between the 1950s and the 1970s did contribute some useful 
understandings of Thai political studies; firstly, they opened up the linkage between 
economy and politics. Economic development through American security aid from the 
late 1950s opened up a new political landscape in Thailand that created a chance to 
understand later political actors in Thailand since the age of US-led economic 
development. Secondly, this modernisation approach also pointed out the related 
problems derived from enhancing modern economic development in Thailand between 
the 1960s and 1970s. This is a basis for further study on Thai political economy to 
consider when conducting research in this area. However, in order to grasp the 
complexities of the politics of social transition in the post-1997 era, the modernisation 
approach fails to cope with interconnections among social forces in Thailand. Moreover, 
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in this concept of history, there is no room for political and ideological crises, which are 
the two crucial features of Thai political economy over the past decade. 
 
2.2 Political Economy  
Since the 1980s, the political economy approach, including various schools of thought, 
has become another important theoretical perspective in the study of Thai political 
economy. Contrary to the modernisation approach discussed above, which draws heavy 
attention to the economy as an independent variable in the development of political 
systems in Third World countries, the political economy approach concentrates on the 
relationship between politics and the economy in a more complex manner compared to 
the determinist modernisation theory. One aspect of Thai politics, which the political 
economist attempts to grasp, is the problem of land and land reform in Thailand. 
Ramsay (1982) studies the landlord–tenant conflict that was a hardship for peasants and 
a major cause for protest in Thailand during the 1970s. He investigates the linkage 
between tenancy and political conflict and hypothesizes that tenancy was the main 
economic condition underlying farmers’ protests in Bangkok at that time.  
Additionally, the study of capitalism and capitalist modes of production was one of 
several aspects that political economists paid attention to. Witthayakorn (1983) 
attempts to analyse the specificities of the capitalist transformation process in the 
central region of Thailand during the 1960s and 1980s. He aims to find out how the 
integration of this social formation took place and has determined the emergence of the 
new social class in Thailand. He employs the concept of the social relation of production 
and class contradiction as his main framework. 
However, from the late 1980s the focus of study in the field of political economy 
towards Thai politics had turned to the relationship between the process of 
industrialisation and its consequences on Thai politics. Girling (1986) studies the 
viability of small-holder businesses in Thailand during the 1970s and 1980s, whilst 
Hewison (1988) focuses his research on the development of industrialisation in Thailand 
from the early 1800s to the 1940s. Hewison provides a critique of dependency theory 
and a semi-Marxist perspective, which he sees as neglecting domestic class relations 
during the early stages of industrial development in Thailand. He argues, in contrast to 
the dependency school, which focuses on external factors, that the internal or domestic 
industrialists played important roles in Thai politics. In addition, Hewison (1986) 
studies the linkage between the farmers’ protest and small industries such as sugar 
industries in Thailand. He focuses on sugar industries as a ‘fraction’ of the capitalist 
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class in the Thai countryside, as an example of operations of domestic capital in the 
rural areas of Thailand. Correspondingly, Ramsay (1987) also focuses his study on the 
political economy of sugar industries in Thailand as he sees that sugar farmers are 
unlike other farmers in Thailand because they are extremely well organised and have 
strongly influenced Thai politics during the 1980s. These existing works did indeed 
contribute some vital knowledge on the development of industrialisation policies in 
Thailand during the period between the 1970s and 1980s as causes of many social 
phenomena and processes. These works provide a picture of capitalist social groups in 
Thailand in the pre-1997 economic crisis era that is important to the study of the 
history of class struggle in Thailand that is offered in chapter four of this thesis.  
Furthermore, some newer studies in this area were conducted from the late 1980s, such 
as Cohen and Pearson (1998) who employ anthropological ideas in their study on 
political economy to deal with the relations between community, state, and capital. They 
argue that the changing political economy at the national level influenced the 
relationships of the rural community in general. This is similar to Anek (1988), who 
offers the Corporatist model, which at that time was quite a new pattern of business 
participation in politics and policy-making in Thailand, and which focused on the 
relationship between the government and business groups. Anek’s work is crucial as he 
pioneered by offering the landscape of social relations between elite business groups and 
the state in terms of policy determination in Thailand in the 1980s.  
However, more recently, some political economists paid attention to the political 
economy under the Thaksin/Thai Rak Thai government in Thailand in the 2000s. For 
instance, Glassman (2004) studies the economic nationalism of the Thaksin government 
and argues that economic nationalism of the Thai Rak Thai party was not only an 
economic policy but also a scale politics which attempted to gain massive support from 
the Thai people, while Pasuk (2004) compares Thailand’s political economy under the 
Thaksin government with Malaysia and Singapore. Nevertheless, as the Thaksin 
government is a crucial part of this research, more emphasis has been placed upon 
studies of the Thaksin government in chapters six and seven of this thesis.  
Another important framework in the political economy category —although one that is 
not a strongly favoured theoretical perspective on the part of Thai scholars—is Marxist 
political economy. It was Bell (1978) who was one of the initial authors who employed 
the Marxist approach to study Thai political economy. He clarifies the nature and 
history of US imperialism and the manner in which it transformed Thai society through 
a series of cycles of struggle. He argues that the return of military rule in 1976 was 
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necessitated by the inability to control the growing intensity of the class struggle, 
which posed increasingly serious challenges to the existing social order. 
Correspondingly, the study of Ji (1995) points this out in his study employing the 
Marxist idea of class struggle to offer the history of labour struggles in Thailand since 
the mid 19th century to early the 1990s. Ji Ungpakorn is the most prominent Marxist 
scholar in modern Thailand and his controversial book A Coup for the Rich, banned in 
2007, led to his exile in the UK because he argues against the lèse majesté law and holds 
that the coup d’état in 2006 against the Thaksin government was a coup for the rich and 
political elites authorised by the monarchy and that it was a coup against the interests of 
the poor or ordinary people.  
One of the vital features of the Marxist approach is that it provides a dialectical 
relationship between bourgeoisie and labour as a basis of capitalist accumulation. 
Hewison (1981) concentrates on the study of the roles and importance of the Thai 
bourgeoisie by focusing on the social groups who base their accumulation on the Thai 
banking and finance industries—one of the crucial capitalist forces in Thailand since the 
1960s. Hewison offers knowledge of the complicated web of business and familial 
interconnections of the Thai financial bourgeoisie from the early 1930s to the 1980s 
which is also crucial for this thesis as a basis for the analysis of the formation of the 
modern Thai historical bloc since the late 1950s. Likewise, the study of Brown (1997) 
examines the consistency of organised labour and its political roles by suggesting an 
alternative theoretical perspective on Thai labour and offers the history of the role of 
the working class in expanding the political space in Thailand. He argues that labour 
relations in Thailand have been a microcosm of wider struggles over the representative 
form of politics. Moreover, Brown (2004) and Brown and Hewison (2005) pay their 
attention to the aspect of labour politics during the Thaksin era. They aim to consider 
the ways in which the Thaksin government attempted to achieve two contradictory 
tasks, including maintaining the political subordination of labour and also mobilizing 
workers and their organizations behind the restructuring of Thailand’s economic and 
political regime of capital accumulation. 
These existing literatures, especially the recent works from the year of 1997, did make 
important contributions to the understanding of the relationship between Thai labour 
and the state in modern Thai politics which is also beneficial for this study of the politics 
of social forces. Most Thai Marxist scholars follow classical Marxism, which typically 
concentrates more on class/class struggle, bourgeois–labour relations, the capitalist 
mode of production, and capital accumulation. However, the ideological and cultural 
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practices of social groups in Thailand, which are also crucial, have been ignored in these 
existing studies.  
As shown above there are several traditional approaches that deal with the development 
of Thailand’s economy and politics from the 1950s to the 2000s. For the recent political 
conflicts from post-2006 coup to the crisis in 2010 there a few main works on which 
scholars tend to rely, for example, the study of Bhanupong (2009) who focuses his study 
on the Thai economy in the post-2006 coup period and argues that the recent coup in 
Thailand destroyed the democratic underpinning of the stability of economic structure 
and subverted the strength of Thailand’s economy by losing an opportunity to compete 
in the world market economy. This study is important as the evidence to prove that the 
highly regarded military coup in 2006 had, in fact, negative impacts on the country in 
terms of economic stability and competition at the world scale. Likewise, Aekapol (2012) 
also attempts to grasp the recent crisis in 2010 by concentrating on the economic 
impact of the Red Shirt movement upon the Thai economy. He argues that the 
demonstrations of the Red Shirts between April and May 2010 contributed to a decrease 
in GDP growth by 1-2% and many urban workers were made unemployed because of 
the Red Shirt uprising. In addition, Apichat (2007, 2013) argues in his attempts to grasp 
the Thai state between 1997 and 2006 that the degree of state weakness and strength 
are important variables in understanding the political economy of Thailand. He found 
that the decline of the technocratic macroeconomic agencies, such as the Bank of 
Thailand, was a strong cause of economic crisis in 1997. 
 
In sum, existing studies in the category of Political Economy through applying the 
political economy approach bring out an understanding of the relationship between 
economic and political elements of Thai political economy. The approach also 
emphasises some crucial notions that are central to understanding contemporary Thai 
political economy, such as the concept of the domestic and international capital 
relationship, industrialisation and rural industries, the labour and capital relationship, 
capital accumulation, social fractions of Thai capital, and their influence on policy 
making in Thailand from the 1970s to the 1990s. Studies in the political economy 
approach transcended the determinist character of the modernisation approach that 
focuses only on producing economic growth in order to develop social and political 
affairs or the so-called trickle-down effect in social development. Additionally, political 
economy can deal with the interrelationship between labour and the political-economic 
practices of the Thai political economy.  
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However, in order to grasp the politics of social transition of the Thai state from the 
1997 economic crisis to the crisis in 2010 this thesis argues that the employed 
theoretical lens should handle the features of social class struggles, the crisis of the 
state, and the transition of the capitalist state altogether. Existing works in this 
category did contribute to some extent towards these three mentioned features of the 
Thai state. Political economy frameworks, in various schools of thought, are sufficient to 
cope with the aspect of crisis in capitalist society as they consider the relations of 
production along with other social problems such as poverty and income distribution 
that might be causes of the crisis of the Thai state. In addition, studies in this approach 
could also deal with the transition of the state. However, these works have limitations 
because they do not take the elements of ‘ideology’ and ‘hegemonic project’ into account. 
Development of the Thai state over the recent decade cannot deny that the ideological 
clash between the conservative-royalist and the other ideologies was crucial in shaping 
the struggles of the Yellow and the Red Shirt movements. Dismissing the ideological 
struggles in the politics of social forces means that we cannot perceive the genuine 
picture of the transition of the Thai state. 
 
3. POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
The second category of traditional accounts of Thai political economy includes 
Behaviouralism and Institutionalism. These two approaches deal with the development 
of Thai democracy through different unit of analyses. While the Behaviouralist 
framework deals with voting behaviour and related problems, the Institutionalist 
approach concerns the politics of political parties and bureaucratic system as part of 
democratic development in Thailand. Studies in these conventional approaches can 
provide the picture of some crucial social actors in Thai politics; civil society, politicians, 
and bureaucrats. However, what the approaches do not cope with is the configuration of 
social power among each political institution.   
 
3.1 Behaviouralism 
Behaviouralism has been a mainstream paradigm in American political science since the 
late 1950s and 1960s (Burnham et al., 2008: 19; Sanders, 2010). This approach 
concentrates on a single major question—why do people behave the way they do? And 
the most distinct aspect of the Behaviouralist framework in comparison with other 
theoretical perspectives is that it only focuses on ‘observable’ political behaviours, 
whether it is at the level of the individual or the collective social actor. This approach 
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assumes that any observed behaviours should be available for empirical testing (Sanders, 
2010: 23). In addition, Behaviouralism pays the most attention to the so-called ‘predictive 
science of the political’ (Hay, 2002: 11). This positivist character of Behaviouralism does 
not consider the underlying social relations of each unit of analysis and ignores 
historical features in the context of the studied actor. Rather, it only focuses on social 
and political action of the studied actor in a specific moment. Behaviouralism has been 
used to study political behaviour in Thailand as a result of American influence in Thai 
political science since the late 1950s. Although this approach claims that it considers the 
level of analysis at both individual and social aggregation, it is argued here that the 
approach is mainly employed to analyse an individual’s political decision especially in 
terms of his or her decision on how to vote in elections.  
Democracy itself does not entirely equal the holding of elections. However, as one of the 
major tools to achieve democracy, elections and its related problems such as vote buying 
have been studied by the Behaviouralist school in Thai politics for decades. Early works 
in this field of research can be traced back to the 1950s, such as the works of Pickerell 
and Moore (1957) who attempted to study the general elections under the nationalist 
Phibun era of the 1950s. However, Neher (1970) attempts to study the general election 
under the 1968 constitution and the military regime under an authoritarian atmosphere.  
Meanwhile Nicro (1993) presents an analysis of the electoral experience of Khon Kaen 
province, in the Northeast region, the poorest region, and the region widely assumed as 
the easiest vote-buying site of Thailand. He considers that elections during three 
historical periods involved (1) the election under the bureaucratic polity, (2) the 1975 
and 1976 Constitutions, and (3) the election in 1980. Nicro concludes that the pattern of 
vote-election in the Northeast region of Thailand changed from the 1979 election in 
that there was a fall in terms of the number of long-term local people as Member of 
Parliaments (MPs) and a concomitant rise of the political tycoon and cooperation 
between local business men.  
Up to the 1990s, Murray (1996) concentrates on the 1995 general election, which he 
argues was a step backward for Thailand’s democracy. He also provides the historical 
background of Thai politics under the Chuan government (1993–1995) and an analysis 
of the 1995 election through various factors, including political parties, issues of policy, 
political and social campaigns, vote buying, and the results of that election. 
Correspondingly, Callahan and McCargo (1997) also study the 1995 general election 
and argue that the bureaucratic polity model of Riggs (1966)—as the bureaucrat plays a 
central role in policy making of the country—has been challenged owing to the rise of 
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civil society and local provincial power, which have come to be strongly influenced by 
the rise of local business elites. They suggest that vote buying in Thailand cannot be 
seen as an isolated activity but must be placed in the context of political order, and that 
up to that time, money was not the only dominant factor for people’s decisions, rather 
that the outcome and charisma of the candidate were also contributing factors. These 
traditional studies of elections as the crucial political process show a high level of 
influence on Behaviouralism in Thai political studies. These works claim to show causal 
relationships between the studied factors and the pattern of voting in elections in Thai 
politics through different historical settings. However, these works do not deal with 
other elements of political economy of Thailand. 
In short, this approach contributes some understanding to the development of Thai 
political studies in terms of employing mathematical and statistical tools to quantify 
people’s political behaviour in a special relationship with the study of voting during 
elections and vote buying. The major concern of this perspective is to examine the 
individual’s social/political action, in particular their voting behaviour. Studies of Thai 
political economy through the Behaviouralist position have a narrow vision of a single 
issue of study because they neither consider the relationship between the studied social 
action of a given social actor and other social groups, class or social structure that 
constitute that actor. Therefore, existing works in this category even if they are able to 
explain some patterns of social action do not provide a space for the broader interaction 
with social structure. 
 
3.2 Institutionalism  
Institutionalist frameworks offer another dominant concept that is widely accepted by 
many Thai scholars. Institutionalism has been the dominant theoretical perspective 
towards Thai politics since the 1960s. Although the Institutionalist tradition nowadays 
can be distinguished between new and old Institutionalism, the dominant 
Institutionalist approach in Thai political science over the recent decades was the ‘old’ 
or ‘traditional’ Institutionalism rather than new Institutionalism (Rhodes, 1995; 
Lowndes, 2002). Traditional Institutionalism can be described as a notion covering the 
rules, procedures, and formal organisations of government as factors constituting 
people's political behaviour (Rhodes, 1997: 68 cited in Lowndes, 2002: 92). In this 
section, some existing studies of Thai political economy will be examined through the 
traditional Institutionalism including aspects of bureaucracy, political parties, and 
democratisation. 
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Bureaucracy and bureaucratic administration was a major area of interest for Thai 
scholars for several decades because they once played a central role in the politics of 
decision-making under military rule. One of the earlier works in this area is Shor (1960) 
who studies the structure of the Thai bureaucracy, which manifests the cultural 
uniqueness of Thai society. He attempts to grasp the point of authority as a relationship 
structured in Thailand’s bureaucratic polity by focusing mainly on personal cliques and 
groupings. However, Krannich and Krannich (1979) seek to study the problem of 
bureaucracy by concentrating their study on anonymous letters as a form of intra-
organisation political communication. They argue that the anonymous letters take place 
from jealousy, envy, and vindictive power relations, and conclude that this kind of 
political communication was an important dimension of bureaucratic political behaviour 
that prevents the organisation from becoming highly rational, competent, and apolitical.  
Furthermore, even the study of Thai bureaucracy as part of democratic development has 
declined in its popularity, but the recent work of Painter (2005) provides some 
important knowledge as he focuses on the major bureaucratic reformation of the 
Thaksin government in 2002. He argues that the reason for that reform was to 
centralise the effective day-to-day power over strategic arms of the bureaucracy so as to 
harness its resources to the ends of his party and its support. The first facet of an 
institutional approach is the study of Thai politics through formal organisations like the 
bureaucracy. These institutionalist works via the study of bureaucracy as part of Thai 
democratic development did contribute basic notions that the bureaucrats in Thailand, 
both civil and military, are still important in Thai politics and should not be overlooked 
in analysis of the politics of social transition because following the 2006 coup they 
offered support to the conservative Yellow Shirts social force.  
Alongside the approach to bureaucracy, the study of Thai political economy in the area 
of political parties is another important research area within the Institutionalist 
framework. Early works in this area include the study of Wilson and Phillips (1958) 
who draw their attention to the difficulties of putting together a stable and permanent 
national party organization. They argue that there are various factors contributing to 
the stability and permanence of a political party, including first, money; second, very 
slow growth of local electoral bodies; and third, weakness of the party itself. In addition, 
Darling (1971) argues that the roles of the political party in Western and non-Western 
societies are different. While Western society performs interest aggregation by 
amalgamating large coalitions among diverse organised and semi-organised social 
groups seeking to control formal government activities, non-Western societies, 
especially Thailand, have formed their political parties from the obstacles of powerful 
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traditional forces, the large Thai peasant class, and domination of the national economy. 
More recent works in this field of study include Ockey (2004), who argues that it is 
important to examine continuities of political parties in Thailand by focusing on the 
relationship between parties and their class factions. He finds that change has come in 
policy platforms, coalition building, and patronage, and that important continuities exist 
in electoral networks and vote buying. In addition, Chambers (2008) seeks to address 
the question of the relationship between Thai political parties, factions, and coalition 
durability during the period 1979 to 2001. He suggests that while political parties in 
Thailand are less cohesive, informal institutions within parties have considerable 
importance for Thai political parties. Existing works in this group do offer a picture of 
the different nature of Western and Thai political parties. As a very crucial aspect of 
parliamentary democracy, Thai political parties failed to institutionalise themselves as 
part of civil society. Thai political parties normally have a short lifespan, are newly 
established for each general election and do not have a clear ideological platform in their 
policy and social activity. These existing works point out the weakness of party politics 
in Thailand which is helpful in understanding the reasons why TRT attempted to 
overcome this matter in 1998.  
The problem of democratisation and democratic consolidation is another dominant 
aspect of the study of Thai politics through the traditional Institutionalist framework. 
The major contribution of works in this category is the study of the improvement of 
formal political institutions in order to enhance the quality of parliamentary democracy. 
Neher (1995: 201-202) studies the democratisation process in Thailand and offers a brief 
historical background of Thai politics since the 1932 revolution critiquing the highly 
centralised political parties in which he sees the real problem of democratic development 
in Thailand. He focuses on the factors that are engaged in the building of democracy in 
Thailand, such as the leadership of political leaders, the middle class, education system, 
state, king, and media. In addition, Englehart (2003) and Lynch (2004), attempt to argue 
that external factors such as global capital and international forces could shape the 
democratisation process in Thailand, along with domestic factors.  
Additionally, later work in this approach has focused on the aspect of democratic quality 
rather than focusing on the factor of engaging democracy. For instance, in the study of 
Ganesan (2006) which focuses on democracy and political transparency in Thailand he 
argues that it has been subverted since 2001. He sees that the Thaksin government was 
the obstacle to democratic development in Thailand; although they came to power by 
democratic means, the democratic consolidation has been held in discontinuation 
(Fredman, 2006). Further, the author hypothesizes that there has been a structural 
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weakening of Thailand’s democracy under the TRT government since 2001. However, 
Case (2007) concentrates his study on Thailand’s democratic quality and attempts to 
assess Thai democratic quality by measuring the form of electoral mandate, policy 
responsiveness and accountability, limits on civil liberties, gross violations, and human 
rights.  
In order to explain causes and consequences of the crisis in 2010, some recent studies 
have paid attention to the 1997 constitution as part of the political institutions that 
paved the way to the crisis. Hicken (2006) and Tamada (2012) argue that the 1997 
constitution2 created the new system in which political parties began making campaign 
pledges and creating the politics of public policy instead of the old-style patronage 
politics. The 1997 constitution had created the chance to have a strong executive and 
this led to the coalitions of political cliques. The TRT as a combination of local 
politician factions was unique amongst other parties as evidenced by their political 
success. Their management style along with the benefit of the 1997 constitution 
enhanced TRT’s power and was a cause of other conflicts after that (Chambers and 
Croissant, 2010). This thesis shares the emphasis on the importance of the constitution 
as a regulatory factor that empowered the Thaksin government in the post-1997 period. 
Nevertheless, this conventional approach does not provide understanding of the 
dialectical relationship between the constitution and social forces in a wider sense.  
In sum, the Institutionalist framework has dominated the study of Thai politics for 
several decades. It contributes some way towards a deep understanding of Thai political 
economy in its various aspects; however, most of these mainly focus on legal-political 
institutions, for example, the Thai bureaucracy and political parties. The existing 
studies showed the importance of political institutions in Thai politics as it is a basis of 
democratic development. Existing works in this category provide understanding of the 
Thai historical bloc in terms of identifying the roles of vital social actors—both 
bureaucrats and political parties—in Thai politics.  
The works in this category, firstly, are similar to the Behaviouralist position mentioned 
above in terms of their unawareness of history or the social relations that shaped the 
social-political context of their object of study. Secondly, studies in this area have a 
narrow unit of analysis that focuses on any single actor in a specific time of study. 
Thirdly, the Institutionalist approach could not deal with the crisis of the state. Even if it 
could grasp some causes of the crises of the Thai state such as the weakness and 
                                                             
2The relationship between the 1997 constitution and the consequences upon social forces in 
Thailand will be discussed in chapter five. 
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corruption of bureaucrats or inabilities to protect people’s interests through political 
parties, it has little to no room for enabling the crucial analysis of the political and 
ideological crisis of the state. As most works in this area failed to historicise the issue of 
their study and provide no room for a whole crisis of the state it should therefore be 
seen that works in these two approaches could not offer a dialectical picture of social 
transition in Thailand. The next section will analyse another category of the study of 
Thai politics—Cultural Studies. 
 
4. CULTURAL STUDIES 
The third conventional account of Thai politics is Cultural Studies―including two 
distinct approaches; the Religious and Cultural approach and the Ideological approach. 
This category of existing studies offers different perspectives on Thai political economy 
in comparison with the other approaches mentioned above. This account provides 
theoretical spaces for ideological and cultural elements in political analysis. As will be 
shown in chapter four, the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology has been constructed by the 
ruling social classes through the ‘three pillars’ of the Thai nation; nation, religion, and 
monarchy. This political ideology has been employed as a major tool in various 
hegemonic projects since the late 1950s. This account, the importance of Buddhism, 
culture, and ideological functions of the monarchy have been offered. Nevertheless, the 
limitations of these approaches lay in the abandonment of political economy and they 
could not deal with social forces in the Thai historical bloc.  
 
4.1 Religious and Cultural Approach  
Studies in the religious and cultural approach mainly deal with ideological and cultural 
functions of Buddhism as a crucial mode of thought in Thailand. Buddhism and 
Buddhist perception of the world have been employed by the Thai social elites as forms 
of social and political regulation for decades. The Thai ruling classes had constructed a 
Thai historical bloc—a set of social relations that fused both ideology and economic 
terrains—with a combination of Buddhism, nationalist projects, and royalist hegemonic 
projects (Saichol, 2005). These elements all contributed to the emergence of the 
dominant ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology and its maintenance as a factor of social 
cohesion for Thai social forces for decades, although one that was eventually contested 
by the conflict in Thailand in the post-2006 coup period. Former studies in this category 
contribute to the politics of Buddhism and nationalist projects and the section below 
will deal with studies of monarchy and its ideological cohesive function.  
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Religion, more specifically Buddhism, has been playing very important roles in Thai 
politics for a long time. It is one of the invented tripods of the country, involving the 
nation, the religion, and the king.3 Within the Buddhist conception of the world, the 
religious leader—the Buddhist monk—has been spiritual and moral leader for Thai 
people alongside the leadership provided by centralised state bureaucrats. For that 
reason, the relationship between religion and political behaviour in Thai politics is 
another approach which has been employed to study some aspects of Thai studies. This 
group of studies of Thai politics attempts to explain the role of religion as a legitimised 
tool in order to determine social and political roles of political elites and political 
leaders.  
One important study in this category is the study of Sombun (1979) who examines the 
roles of the Sangha (Buddhist monk) in the Thai state during the 1970s, particularly in 
the period between 1973 and 1976. He argues that the Sangha at that time played very 
crucial roles in order to construct political legitimacy for the Thai political/military 
elites and had been employed to assist the military government in social control over 
the Thai people (Sombun, 1979: 364). Correspondingly, the work of McCargo (2004) 
confirms the argument of Sombun that religion has a vital role in legitimising the 
political power of political leaders. McCargo argues that the Thai state has manipulated 
Buddhism in order to ‘subordinate’ their citizens by employing an officially sanctioned 
form of religion to provide a source of legitimacy to their political premier (McCargo, 
2004: 167). 
In addition, existing studies in the religion approach to Thai politics have been distinct 
from other dominant approaches because rather than focusing on economic and political 
factors, it provides space for matters of ideology, belief, and cultural systems in Thai 
society. Some studies have paid attention to the Buddhist doctrine spreading roles of 
two major Buddhist fractions in Thailand—Santi Asoke and Dhamakaya (Taylor, 1990; 
Mackenzie, 2007). They argue that both Santi Asoke and Dhamakaya as are the two 
dominant Buddhist services for the Thai middle class. The Thai middle class in 
Bangkok as a result of the changing of modern socio-economic development in Thailand 
is the main target of these two dominant Buddhist organisations. The hegemonisation 
process of Santi Asoke and Dhamakaya created the middle class as a political subject 
whose main mode of being ‘passive, moderate, and compromise’ characterises its social 
and political life. The studies of Santi Asoke and Dhamakaya as religious institutions 
playing important roles establishing a passive conception of the world are helpful in 
                                                             
3This myth was created by the King Rama VI in the 1920s in order to unite the countries and 
against imperialist powers. 
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order to understand part of the conflicts during the recent crisis of the Thai state from 
late 2005. These works point out one of the many crucial deep rooted problems in 
Thailand that form the basis for political conflicts over the recent decade; that is that 
the ‘perception of the world’ of Thai people closely coheres to the elements of being 
loyal to the monarchy, making compromises, being passive to the ruling power, and 
holding nationalist beliefs. These deep-rooted elements have been hegemonised over 
Thai social groups through a number of strategies; however, Buddhism is one of the 
leading tools building these conceptions amongst the Thai people. These elements will 
be contentious among debates on Thailand’s crisis and it will be discussed in more detail 
in the core chapters of this study.  
Although the existing works in the religion approach did contribute towards 
understanding of the relationship between the roles of Buddhism and hegemonic 
projects of producing the mainstream conception of the world for Thai people, they still 
have some limitations in their studies. These works consider religion (Buddhism) as a 
crucial ideological apparatus in Thai politics. The strength of this notion is to open up 
broader perspectives beyond major focuses on individual’s political behaviour, as 
Behaviouralism provides, and legal political institutions―as Institutionalism and the 
Modernisation approach offer. Even though it takes ideology into account this approach 
cannot deal with political and economic dimensions of the Thai historical bloc. In 
addition, these existing literatures cannot grasp the aspect of ‘transition’ of the Thai 
state because they only consider ideological elements without interactions with various 
social groups. However, as is argued earlier in this thesis, the crisis of the Thai state 
over the recent decade is complex and it is composed of several elements related in 
dialectical ways. As studies in this category ignored the importance of economic and 
political matters, they could not see the whole picture of the politics of the transition of 
the Thai state.  
Along with the studies on Buddhism and its ideological functions, cultural studies in 
relation to state power and cultural monitoring are major topics in this area of study. 
There are several studies concerning various cultural issues in Thai politics such as a 
study that seeks to compare Thai-Chinese white-collar workers in their work culture 
(Deyo, 1975). This work argues that Chinese workers are normally more hard-working 
than Thai labour. More recently, the study of Lysa (2000) focuses on the politics of 
culture in 1980s and the 1990s Thailand looking through the Sinlapa Watthanatham, a 
prominent longstanding cultural academic magazine in Thailand. This study argues 
that the existence of the Sinlapa Watthanatham has been offering space and materials for 
comment and reflects on the production of popular history in Thailand. The making of 
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Thainess through the mainstream historical narrative is significant to understanding 
the conflicts between the Yellow and the Red shirt forces during the post-2006 military 
coup. This work is helpful as it points out that ‘Thainess’ in Thai people’s perception has 
been constructed by someone, that it did not naturally emerge and also that it is able to 
be contested. 
 
 In addition, some other authors also focus on the politics of culture from several aspects 
such as Jonsson (2001) who focuses his study on aspects of minority culture dynamics 
and national integration in Thailand. His work shows the attempt of the Thai state to 
construct the sense of loyalty to the monarchy and enforce order and hierarchy amongst 
the Thai marginal upland peoples in the northern area of Thailand through the leading 
roles of school teachers and social activities such as sport fun fairs. These cultural 
practices of the Thai state applied to the marginal hill tribes helped to maintain the 
significance of the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology of the Thai state and construct a single-
irresistible dominant ideology shared by Thai people in all regions of the country. In 
order to preserve this hegemonic ideological perception, the Thai elites chose to employ 
state power to monitor the matters of Thai culture by establishing the Ministry of 
Culture in 2002.  The study of Connors (2005) is prominent in this area as it examines 
this aspect of monitoring culture by the Thai Ministry of Culture in the first term in 
power of the Thaksin government. Connors argues that the Thai state—working 
through the Ministry of Culture—has been producing national identity through a 
number of state apparatuses in order to protect and maintain the hegemonic royalist-
nationalist ideology of the Thai state. Insights from Connors and other studies in this 
area are significant as they help us to see the basis of ideological struggle of social forces 
in Thailand, that tie to questions of being loyal to the monarchy and being Thai, after 
the 2006 military coup.  
 
4.2 Ideological Approach: Thai Monarchy and its Ideological Functions 
Another crucial framework in this traditional category is the Ideological approach. The 
most prominent area of study in recent years has been research on the ideological 
functions of the Thai monarchy. 4  Grasping the ideological function of the Thai 
monarchy in this approach is divided into two major aspects; the making of the 
                                                             
4Under the harsh circumstances of the lèse majesté laws, study on the Thai monarchy, its 
existence, and its political and ideological practices has been difficult. Therefore, this area of 
academic study has been absent from critical research in Thai academia for a long time. 
However, the crisis in 2006 and 2010 has urged scholars to critically examine more in this area.   
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ideological sacredness of the monarchy and the practicing of the ideological cohesive 
role of the king.  
 
The first aspect is the study of the making of the ideological sacredness of the monarchy. 
The divinity and sacredness of the monarchy is not automatically emergent in nature. 
Rather, it is an outcome of the ruling class created to preserve their own class interests. 
The Thai monarchy had been sidelined and without any real power in politics after the 
1932 revolution. It was a revitalisation of the monarchical power by the Sarit military 
government in 1958 that brought the monarchy back to the pool of power (Thak, 2007; 
Kershaw, 2001). Significant about existing studies in this area is that they are able to 
explain that the building of the monarchy’s sacredness in Thai politics is derived from 
several state and hegemonic projects. In the study of Fong (2009) on the sacred 
nationalism of the Thai monarchy, he argues that the holy power of the present King 
Bhumibol does not naturally happen, but was built by the royalists through many 
primordial rituals that were revitalised by the Sarit government along with the 
promotion of the King as the moral leader of the nation (Thongchai, 2008).  
 
In addition to the study of the sacralising of the Thai monarchy, Jackson (2009, 2010) 
argues that the status of the King Bhumibol is like a ‘god-king’ and it is called ‘an actual 
deity’ as it has been supported by a popular religious culture that has been significantly 
impacted by new media technologies. He argues that the Thai elites were successful in 
harmonising different religious doctrines of Buddhism and Brahma to serve the royalist 
interests. In the early Bangkok era (from the late 1780s), the king of Siam had never 
been seen as an actual deity; it is only under the reign of the present king since the 
1960s that the Thai social elites employed developed mass media to sacralise the king 
and maintain its ‘god-king’ hegemony. These works did provide a very significant 
contribution to the field of Thai ideological studies as they can show that the holy 
power of the monarchy is, indeed, created by the elites. It means that this form of social 
power is also contested and overcome.  
 
The second aspect of this approach is the study of the practicing of the ideological 
cohesive role of the king. As already mentioned, criticisms of the political roles of the 
Thai monarchy have never been widely advanced because the dominant royalist-
nationalist hegemony still works very effectively. It was not until the second term in 
office of the Thaksin government that debates on the Thai monarchy were opened up.  
The study of Ji (2007) argues in his banned book on the political practices of the Thai 
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monarchy that the coup in 2006 was not conducted in a good manner in order to oust 
the corrupted Thaksin government from power as most of the middle class believe. 
Rather, he argues that it was a coup conducted for the rich that was operated by the 
army in order to secure the profit of the high-ranked military and the monarchy.  
However, the most powerful theoretical proposition regarding the cohesive role of the 
monarchy in contemporary Thailand is the notion of ‘network monarchy’ offered by 
McCargo (2005). This framework proposes that in order to grasp ideological and 
political roles of the Thai monarchy, it should be seen as a ‘network of persons’ related 
to the king rather than the king himself. The network of monarchy includes the privy 
councilors, the close high ranked bureaucrats, and some military officials. In addition, 
some prominent studies by Ockey (2005), Chanida (2007), Unaldi (2012), Nattapol 
(2013) have examined the ideological roles of the monarchy in order to create political 
stability in Thai politics from various points of view. These existing literatures are 
helpful to portray the picture of Thai politics over recent years. These works confirm 
that the Thai monarchy is not operating above politics, in the manner that the 
conservative social groups normally claim. Rather, it is an active political agency that 
acted as a cohesive force in Thai politics in many times, especially after the crises of the 
state in 1973, 1976, 1992, and 2006.  
In conclusion, existing literatures in this category provide some crucial ideas on the 
study of political ideology, religion, and cultural practices in Thai politics. This is 
helpful in order to understand ideological elements that constituted the dominant 
‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology that constraint people’s conception of the world. In 
addition, the serious studies on the monarchy and its politico-ideological practices in 
Thailand have been increasing as it has been shaped by political uncertainties in recent 
years. Framing the monarchy as part of the social forces in Thailand’s political economy 
that are connected to other forces in the period of transition is crucial and this thesis 
will incorporate the monarchy into the account―which is the missing aspect of the 
existing works―along with other social groups in relation to the study of crisis and 
restructuring of the Thai historical bloc.  
 
5. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
The last category of literatures on Thai political economy is Social Movements. Existing 
works in this group are most influenced by the New Social Movement (NSM) approach 
while recent studies are more vibrant and look at several non-state social forces from 
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different perspectives. The NSM approach was initiated in US political studies during 
the 1960s and 1970s (Della Porta and Diani, 2006) emerging as a reflection of the failure 
of formal political institutions such as parliaments and governments in solving and 
grasping the complexities of social and political problems. The NSM and the traditional 
Group approach—interest group and pressure group—shared a philosophical root of 
pluralism, which sees politics as an ‘open space’ of a variety of social actors. Pluralism 
claims that the state should only act as an arbitrator of interest among various social 
and political actors (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 13-71). Therefore, existing studies in 
this category have the same premise and mainly look at the ‘non-state’ social actors in 
relation to various problems of Thai political economy.  
There are a number of studies on social movements in Western countries and Latin 
American countries over the last few decades; however, employing the NSM approach 
to the study of Thai politics is relatively new for Thai scholars until the 1990s. The 
pioneer work in this field of research in Thailand is the study of Prapas (1998) which 
employed the NSM framework to study the emergence of and reason for protesters 
called the ‘Assembly of the Poor’ who rallied against the Chuan government between 
1997 and 1998 (see also Missingham, 2002). This work argues that the formal political 
institutions in Thailand had failed to solve popular grievances. Bureaucratic red-tape 
and political bribery were two major obstacles to solving people’s problems. Therefore, 
the Assembly of the Poor needed to protest the government and demonstrated their 
troubles to the public in order to gain broader support from the public. 
Correspondingly, there are a number of works following Prapas’s initiated attempt to 
explain Thai politics from the perspective of the NSM approach (Prapas, 2009).  
The NSM approach insists on the roles of non-state actors in political affairs as its 
major concern. The most fashionable usage of the NSM approach is the study of the 
environmental movements in rural Thailand against many state projects, for instance, 
the case of the people’s movement in order to control the watershed in Chiang Mai 
(Pinkaew, 2000); the roles of Buddhist monks in teaching people to be aware of the 
environment in Thailand (Darlington, 1998); and the movement against the Nam Choan 
dam project of the villagers and environmentalists in Kanchanaburi, central Thailand 
(Rigg, 1991). Moreover, the NSM had been used to open up the politics of the 
marginalised, such as the politics of race, gender, and identity in Thailand. For example, 
the study of Callahan (1995) uses the feminist notion of oppositional consciousness to 
understand the characteristics of the Thai state’s political strategy during the Dark May 
protest in Bangkok in 1992, while Tomalin (2006) focuses his study on the roles of 
Bhikkuni (female Buddhist monks) in empowering women in Thai society. The Bhikkuni 
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movement challenges social attitudes about male stream oppression over other genders 
in Thai politics.  
In addition, the NSM approach is not only interested in the specific topics of political 
and social grievances, such as environmental, race, and identity movements, but also 
focuses on the reformulation of the notion of civil society (Nelson, 2007; Pasuk et al., 
2002; Nualnoi et al., 2004, and Seksan, 2005). The works using the NSM based their 
focus on political activities in the realm of non-state inter-relationships. They believed 
in the importance of ordinary people in articulating their own benefits rather than in the 
top-down order of the state. The approach also attempts to challenge mainstream 
political science, that is, the Institutionalist notion of the formal institution in 
facilitating social and political interests of the people (Kengkij and Hewison, 2009). In 
addition, the more recent and important study of Kanokrat (2012) also employs the 
NSM approach to analyse the roles and politics of network building of the former 
student activists in the 1970s or the so-called ‘Octobrists’ social forces in contemporary 
Thailand. These works did contribute towards understanding the complexities of Thai 
politics as they can point out the failure of formal political channels and relationships 
among other ‘non-state’ actors.  
However, the more recent studies in the Non-State Actor category mostly focus on the 
politics of the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts movements from different perspectives. 
The examinations of the politics of both the Yellows and the Reds are a major debate in 
contemporary Thai political economy and have been approached by various theoretical 
perspectives with different focuses. The first group of work frames the politics of the 
Yellows and the Reds as the appearance of underlying socio-economic matters. Ammar 
and Somchai (2012) focus their study on the socio-economic background that 
constituted the emergence of the Yellows and the Reds. The conclusion of Ammar and 
Somchai is interesting as they argue that there is no substantial difference in socio-
economic backgrounds of people who support the two social forces. They conducted a 
socio-economic survey in combination with statistical analysis based on age, gender, 
economic well-being, occupational status, and region as criteria.  
However, this work could not offer the reason behind the movements and their 
relationship to other social groups as part of the Thai state. On the contrary, another 
conclusion that differs from Ammar and Somchai is that ‘economic inequality’ really 
matters and is important to the emergence of the antagonism between the Yellows and 
the Reds as a class war (Hewison, 2012).  
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However, the second group of work in this area is the most active amongst studies on 
the politics of the Yellows and the Reds and employs post-modernist theoretical tools to 
grasp both social forces. In order to deal with the blood sacrificing ritual of the Red 
Shirt demonstrators in 2010, Salisa (2012) focuses her analysis on the political identity 
of the Red Shirts movement through the blood-sacrificing rituals performed by 
protestors in an early stage of the rally in 2010. She argues that this ritual had 
challenged the dominant state ideology that centred on the monarchy. Blood-sacrificing 
of the Reds demonstrators expressed an alternative political ideology affirming the need 
for emancipation from the ruling class ideology.  
Moreover, the blood sacrificing also constitutes a reflective move to counter the main 
regime in Thai society (Cohen, 2012). Accordingly, the work of Taylor (2011) follows a 
similar pattern of analysis to Salisa and Cohen. He focuses his study on the conflict in 
Thai politics by looking at the cultural meaning and political implications of the arson 
of the Central World shopping centre in May 2010. The destruction of the biggest 
department store in the country should be seen, he argues, as a tactic by the elite regime 
to reaffirm its moral justification over the Reds as rural people who are alienated from 
the area.  
Further, a study of Dressel (2010) employs a historical-institutional approach to study 
the construction and transformation of political legitimacy in Thailand. This work 
argues that the political conflict in Thailand lies in the tension and conflict between the 
traditional sources of legitimacy, the king and his networks, and the constitutionalist 
basis of legitimacy. Likewise, Chairat (2012) concentrates his political analysis on the 
politics of desire amongst both the old and the new social groups by using the notions of 
Deleuze and the post-structuralist approach. He argues that the recent conflict in 
Thailand should be seen as a tension between the old politics of desire of the old social 
elites constituted by the notions of consensus, reconciliation, normalcy, unity, and 
integration and the new politics of desire of the Red Shirts movement which is based on 
the notions of transgression, disagreement, and disintegration. In addition, the notion of 
the politics of desire also reveals the severe complex of conflicting and overlapping 
claims to representation, capitalism, and class mobility (Sopranzetti, 2012). In sum, the 
research in this area of study deals with different perspectives on the Yellows and the 
Reds movements. However, these works frame the Yellow and the Red Shirts in an 
absolute sense, without its history in some approaches, and could not provide the 
relationship between each other in relation to the transformation of the Thai state in a 
broader sense.  
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In conclusion, a study of Thai political economy via the perspective of NSM is relatively 
new compared to the other dominant approaches mentioned earlier. However, this 
approach is increasingly popular in Thai studies since the 1990s onwards. It contributes 
an alternative way of seeing political problems in Thailand’s political economy. The 
NSM approach transcends the formal-legal function of Institutionalism and transcends 
Behaviouralism and the Modernisation approach by looking at the groups of social and 
political actors and their interaction outside the sphere of parliamentary politics. 
Furthermore, the approach also considers the marginal aspect of some social groups, 
such as the identity problem of race and gender issues. Nevertheless, even though the 
existing literatures in this category could deal with the non-state social forces in 
politics, they ignore historical features that constrain each social actor. These works 
could also grasp the matters of ideology and politics in their political analysis, but they 
fail to deal with the crisis and transition of the state. Therefore, the studies from the 
perspective of Social Movements still have some missing features that could dialectically 
deal with the elements of the history of class struggle that constitute social structure, the 
crisis of the historical bloc, and the transition of the state. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has critically explored the current state of knowledge on Thai political 
economy through four traditional categories; Political Economy, Political Science, 
Cultural Studies, and Social Movements. Each group of study did contribute different 
elements towards an understanding of Thai political economy. However, this chapter 
found that there are ‘three’ missing features from these conventional categories that 
made them insufficient to cope with the politics of social transition of the Thai state. 
Firstly, the traditional approaches consider social, economic, political, and ideological 
elements of Thai political economy separately. To grasp the complexity of 
contemporary Thai politics, all these features should be taken into account altogether. 
Secondly, most existing works could not cope with the crisis and transition of the Thai 
state because they do not provide historical features―human interactions that 
constitute social change―in their political analysis. History as a sphere of human 
interaction, and social class struggles, should be provided in order to cope with the 
crisis and transition of the Thai state. Lastly, most existing works did not analyse the 
configuration of social power among social forces. Grasping dialectical relationships 
among social actors could crucially portray the picture of crisis and transition of the 
Thai state. In order to overcome these failures of traditional approaches, a Gramscian 
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approach is offered here which contains all these features as a major framework for this 




GRAMSCIANISM: HEGEMONY, CRISIS OF HISTORICAL BLOC,                
AND SOCIAL TRANSITION 
1. INTRODUCTION  
As shown in the previous chapter, traditional accounts of Thai political economy analyse 
the various aspects of Thai political economy in isolation from each other. This chapter 
therefore offers a Gramscian framework that will overcome the insufficiencies of 
dominant approaches. As was argued in the first chapter, the troubled political 
landscape of Thailand cannot be reduced to the dominance either of economic, social, 
ideological, or political elements. Rather, these elements are all part of an explanation 
that enables understanding of the crisis-ridden development of the Thai historical bloc 
in the post-1997 period. A Gramscian account provides ‘three’ distinct features in this 
study: a combined focus on social, economic, political, and ideological elements; an 
account emphasising the significance of history―human interactions that constitute 
social change; and analysis of the configuration of social power.  
The first and second features of the Gramscian approach can be seen in the first two 
sections of the chapter while the third feature will be in the third section. The first 
section begins with the very important ‘way to see the world’—which Gramsci usually 
terms as the ‘conception of the world’—by offering the Gramscian notion of the critique of 
economism. This section shows the epistemological position of the theoretical 
framework as based in the argument against positivism in political analysis. Following 
the discussion of the critique of economic determinism, the Gramscian notion of the 
‘structure and superstructure relationship model’ and the concept of the ‘integral state’ 
are analysed. This section offers the point of departure for political analysis throughout 
this thesis, which based on the idea that the crisis of the Thai state could not be reduced 
to any isolated social element but rather that various elements all contribute to social 
transition.  
In addition, this section argues that there is no possibility of an automatic social 
transition without human practices. This led to the second section—Man as the maker of 
history—as this thesis will offer Gramsci's notions of social forces as the crucial agency 
of social transition. In addition, the notions of ‘balance of class forces’—war of position 
and passive revolution—and the analysis of relations of forces are also provided. The 
third section deals with the central idea of Gramsci, which is the concepts that address 
the ‘configuration of social power’. Hegemony is a major power configuration that each 
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social class struggles to attain in order to build its own historical bloc. Along with the 
concept of hegemony and historical bloc, this section further provides the concept of the 
organiser of the historical bloc or the intellectuals. Then, in the fourth section the 
Gramscian notion of the crisis of authority will be examined, in other words, crisis of 
hegemony/historical bloc. Finally, the last section demonstrates how each Gramscian 
concept will be employed in the following chapters.  
 
2. CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD: GRAMSCIAN CRITIQUE OF ECONOMISM 
In order to grasp the four features of contemporary Thai political economy, which are 
history, crisis, transition, and crisis within transition, this section is the point of departure by 
dealing with ‘history’ of Thai political economy. This thesis conceives of  history as the 
human-led process by which through the class struggle people attempt to achieve 
hegemony in any specific time and space. The section below offers the concept of the 
critique of economism in order to construct a perspective that the history of human 
society cannot be automatically transformed by any single factor and that it is rather 
‘human practice’ that creates change in a given historical bloc. 
 
2.1 Critique of Economism 
Among the various social and political thoughts of Antonio Gramsci, his critique of 
economism is one of the most crucial ideas of his contribution to both Marxism and 
explanations of ‘social change’. Critique of economism is the starting point of this 
theoretical chapter as a theoretical tool to open up the following Gramscian theories in a 
proposal to resolve the problem of economism. This section will discuss the question of 
what is economism. The section then provides Gramsci’s resolution to economism, 
which is the concept of hegemony. Nevertheless, in order to understand Gramsci’s 
hegemony it is important at this stage to ground the analysis in a theoretical basis by 
considering the concept of the base and superstructure relationship, the concept of the 
integral state, and the combination between two terrains in superstructure, which are 
civil society and political society. This grounding section leads to an understanding of 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and historical bloc, which will be discussed in the 
section below.  
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Economism was, in fact, first developed by Lenin (Bottomore, 1991: 168; Cammett, 
1967: 205). He defined economism as a separate trend in the social democratic 
movement with a vulgarisation of Marxism, which downgraded the conscious element 
in social life. Lenin’s main argument against economism was found in What is to be done? 
And while he mainly used the term economism in the context of practical politics 
economism also has a theoretical significance, as elaborated in Gramsci (Bottomore, 
1991: 168–169). For Gramsci, economism has been used in various terms such as 
finalism, fatalistic, mechanistic, automatism, and determinism, almost without distinction (see 
Gramsci, 1971: 410, 412, Q11§52; Kolakowski, 1978: 231; Bocock, 1986: 40–46). The 
term economism can be defined as an interpretation of Marxism holding that political 
developments are the expressions of only ‘economic development’ (Simon, 1999: 14).  
Gramsci created the idea of ‘anti-economism’ in order to oppose and critique the 
deterministic character of some Marxists (Sassoon, 1987: 187; Bellamy, 1987: 121; 
Merrington, 1978), for example, the theoreticians of the Second International such as 
Kautsky and Bernstein, who had a passive perspective, which can be argued to be a ‘wait 
and see’ position, in other words, theoretical perspectives about social change/social 
transition of this kind of Marxism awaited the automatic evolution of the situation 
(Sassoon, 1987: 188). This kind of mechanical determinism tends to promote a ‘passive 
attitude’ towards social agents to wait for the inevitable economic collapse (Simon, 1999: 
15; Callinicos, 2007: 111–115; Dimikratos, 1986: 466–474). Rather than to wait and see 
that things and situations have changed automatically, Gramsci proposes the more 
comprehensive and dialectical theoretical perspective by allowing a place for other 
elements, e.g., history, ideology, and roles of the human being (as the concept of 
intellectuals) in the analysis of social change/social transition (Boggs, 1984: 24, 27; on 
Gramsci and logic of dialectic see Finocchiaro, 2005).  
After his imprisonment in 1926, Gramsci wrote a number of studies in his 33 notebooks 
(on the Prison Notebooks see Ruccio, 2006; Francese, 2009). His ideas against 
economism or ‘mechanistic determinism’ and his effort to unravel the political language of 
everyday ideology were presented in several places throughout the notebooks (Boggs, 
1984: 28). For example,  
Mechanical historical materialism does not allow for 
the possibility of error, but assumes that every 
political act is determined, immediately, by the 
structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in 
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the sense of achieved) modification of the structure. 
(Gramsci, 1971: 408, Q7§24) 
Gramsci shows that the determinist Marxists made a theoretical error in the 
explanation of social change/social transition because they absolutely concentrate on 
the economic base and neglect the other elements in their consideration of social 
transformation. Gramsci argues in the passage below that instead of the creation of an 
automatically general rule for explanation of social reality, the more important task is to 
identify the ‘deep relations of forces’ (will be discussed in the next section) within society.  
It is from these considerations that one must start in order to 
establish what is meant by “regularity”, “law”, “automatism” in 
historical facts. It is not a question of “discovering” a 
metaphysical law of “determinism”, or even of establishing a 
“general” law of causality. It is a question of bringing out how 
in historical evolution relatively permanent forces are 
constituted which operate with a certain regularity and 
automatism (Gramsci, 1971: 412, Q11§52) 
Therefore, in order to construct a more comprehensive framework for explaining the 
world of social relations, Gramsci proposes to combat economism by offering the 
concept of hegemony which relies more on the complex relations of social, cultural, 
political, and economic elements in its explanation of social transition (Bertramsen et al., 
1991: 19-25; Coutinho, 2013: 61-66). The passage below illustrates Gramsci’s position 
against economism. 
It is therefore necessary to combat economism not only in the 
theory of historiography, but also and especially in the theory 
and practice of politics. In this field, the struggle can and must 
be carried on by developing the concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 
1971: 165, Q13§18) 
As stated above, Gramsci proposes the concept of hegemony for solving the mechanical 
explanation of social change held by some Marxists of the Second International. 
However, before examining the concept of hegemony which will be discussed below, 
there are several crucial Gramscian concepts to consider for understanding Gramsci’s 
hegemony, including superstructure and its relationship to base which will be analysed 
in this section. After that, the following sections will focus on Gramsci’s ideas of 
subaltern social classes, social forces, relations of forces, and passive revolution. These 
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concepts are needed as the grounding ideas for fulfilling the main theoretical framework 
of this thesis.  
 
2.2 Gramsci’s Solution: Structure and Superstructure Relationship 
Gramsci’s idea of rejecting economism is based on the need to reformulate Marxist 
theory and the problem of relations between structure and superstructure. In order to 
analyse the balance of class forces at all levels, we can only culminate in the sphere of 
hegemony and ethico-political relations (Gramsci, 1971: 167,408, Q13§23*, Q7§24; 
Merrington, 1977: 139). However, to understand the sphere of hegemony, it is necessary 
to consider the concept of superstructure in Gramsci, which is the terrain of two 
important elements in superstructure, civil and political society. 
One of Gramsci’s theoretical distinctions is that he was one of the first Marxists who 
weighted the importance of ideological factors, which emerge in the superstructure, in 
the analysis of social transformation. Marx, in his Preface to A Critique of Political 
Economy, presents the materialist conception of history by arguing that the mode of 
production of material life conditions social, political, and intellectual life processes in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx, 2000[1859]: 
425). Moreover, he argues that the opinion of an individual is not based on what he 
thinks of himself, so we cannot judge such a period of transformation by its own 
consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained instead from the 
contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive 
forces, and the relations of production (Marx, 2000[1859]: 426, 427). For Marx, with 
the change of the economic foundations the entire immense superstructure is more or 
less rapidly transformed (Marx, 2000[1859]: 426). 
Gramsci’s conceptions of the relations between structure and superstructure is different 
from Marx’s. Bobbio (1979) points out that in Marx the structure is primary and 
superstructure is secondary and subordinate, while in Gramsci, the opposite is true 
because he was aware of the complexity of the superstructure (Bobbio, 1979: 33–34). 
Gramsci concentrates on the important roles of ideology as a factor of driving social 
transformation. For Gramsci, not only material conditions—he did not deny the 
importance of the economy—in the structure determine human conditions, but 
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ideological elements in the superstructure are also significant to social change/social 
transition. 
 
2.3 The Integral State: The State = Civil Society + Political Society 
2.3.1 Civil Society in Hegel and Marx 
One of the most original ideas of Gramsci is the elaboration of Hegel’s and Marx’s 
conceptions of civil society. For Hegel, civil society includes not only the sphere of 
economic relations and the formation of classes, but also the administration of justice as 
well as the organisation of the police force and that of the corporations. In Hegel’s 
trichotomic system, civil society constitutes the intermediate stage between the family 
and the state, and therefore, does not include all the relations and pre-state institutions.  
In short, civil society, for Hegel, is the sphere of economic relations together with their 
external regulations according to the principles of the liberal state, and it is at the same 
time a bourgeois society and bourgeois state (Bobbio, 1979: 28–29; Femia, 1981: 26). 
This is similar to Marx’s conception of civil society, which is the set of institutions that 
transmit a monolithic bourgeois ideology (Jones, 2006: 32). As Marx states, the form of 
intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical 
stages, and in its turn determining these, is civil society. Civil society embraces the 
whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of development of 
productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage, 
and insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand, it must 
assert itself in its foreign relations as a nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as 
a State (Marx and Engels, 1974: 57). 
 
2.3.2 Civil Society and Political Society in Gramsci 
Gramsci elaborates the conception of civil society of Hegel and Marx by focusing more 
on the terrain of ‘superstructure’ rather than the economic base or structure. For 
Gramsci, civil society is the terrain upon which social classes compete for social and 
political leadership and consent or hegemony over other social classes (Thomas, 2009: 
137). Gramsci argues that civil society has become a very complex structure and one 
resistant to the catastrophic incursions of the immediate economic element (crises, 
depressions, etc.). The superstructure of civil society is like the ‘trench-systems’ of modern 
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warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 235, Q13§24). In Gramsci, his idea of superstructure is not only 
the sphere of civil society, but also the sphere of ‘political society’ or ‘state’ (Femia, 1981: 
26–29). The state in this sense is a narrow sense by which Gramsci means a 
superstructure sphere of ‘domination’. In this terrain a dominant class oppresses the 
subaltern class through coercion rather than consent (Forgacs, 1988: 429). However, in 
Gramsci’s political thought he also provides the conception of the state in a broader 
sense in what he called the ‘integral state’ and which will be analysed below. 
Civil society and political society are not clearly separate, rather, they are each 
composed basically of social relationships which are ‘force/coercive’ in the case of political 
society and ‘consent’ in civil society (Simon, 1999: 81–82) as Gramsci states that civil 
society is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’ and that of ‘political 
society’ or ‘the state.’ These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 
‘hegemony’, which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other 
hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the state and 
‘juridical’ government (Gramsci, 1971: 12, Q12§1*).  
 
2.3.3 The Integral State (Force+Consent)  
Gramsci’s outstanding idea on superstructure is that he offered the conception of the 
integral state. As he states: 
We are still on the terrain of the identification of State and 
government-an identification which is precisely a 
representation of the economic-corporate form, in other 
words of the confusion between civil society and political 
society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of 
State includes elements which need to be referred back to the 
notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that 
State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony 
protected by the armour of coercion) (Gramsci, 1971: 262–
263, Q6§88) (emphasis added) 
Gramsci sees the state in the ‘integral sense’ that combined two superstructure terrains of 
civil and political society. In this sense, the state is a balanced and self-compensating 
equation between ‘force and consent’ (Greaves, 2009: 163). In Gramsci’s view, these two 
societies are related to each other and have never been detached as he argues that in 
actual reality civil society and the State are one and the same (Gramsci, 1971: 160, 
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Q13§18). The term integral state is used by Gramsci to oppose the state in the ordinary 
sense which focuses on coercive apparatuses, as he sometimes refers to the state as 
government (Fontana, 2006: 32–35). Simon (1999) notes that Gramsci’s integral state is 
to suggest that the social relationships of civil society are ‘relations of power’ just as much 
as the coercive relations of the state. He argues that Gramsci gives a far-reaching 
modification of the classical Marxist theory of the nature of power by arguing that a 
hegemonic class exercises power over subordinate classes in civil society in addition to 
the state power that it exercises through its predominance in political society. For 
Gramsci, power is diffused through civil society as well as being embodied in the 
coercive apparatuses of the political society or the state (Simon, 1999: 83–84). 
Gramsci’s conception of the integral state, like his other concepts, is derived from the 
philosophy rooted in the idea of Machiavelli’s Centaur—half animal and half human—to 
which Gramsci compares his concepts as dual perspectives, such as the level of force and 
of consent; authority and hegemony; violence and civilisation of the individual moment 
and of the universal moment; of agitation and of propaganda; of tactic and of strategy 
(Gramsci, 1971: 170, Q13§14; Joseph, 2002: 22; Hoffman, 1984: Ch.3). Therefore, the 
significance of the concept of the integral state is to confirm that in order to analyse a 
given social transformation, we should consider both the aspect of ‘force’ or coercion in 
political society and the aspect of ‘consent’ or hegemony in civil society at the same time. 
This is the outstanding idea of Gramsci that provides a comprehensive idea of the state 
in political analysis. 
In short, this section analysed the Gramscian concept of the critique of economism in 
order to reject the ‘mechanistic explanation’ that is based on economic and material 
element but neglects other crucial factors and was held by some Marxists, especially 
Marxist thinkers of the Second International (Adamson, 1980: 112-120). Gramsci 
himself, in order to overcome economistic determinism, weighs more of his political 
analysis towards the superstructure. However, what is important is that Gramsci 
himself did not abandon the significance of political economy in his political analysis 
(Texier, 1979: 60; on Gramsci and critical economy see Kratke, 2011). Furthermore, in 
his conception of superstructure, he offers the two crucial terrains of political struggle—
civil and political society—as the concepts of the integral state that are important as the 
point of departure in his analysis of social transition and as the grounding idea to grasp 
his conception of hegemony. The next section will deal with the concept of social forces 
as the agency of social change. 
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3. MAN AS THE MAKER OF HISTORY: SOCIAL FORCES AS PROTAGONIST OF CHANGE  
It has been shown above that the way to conceive of ‘history’ in a Gramscian sense is 
that it means the anti-deterministic character of social change. In addition, it is a 
manner in which social relations in a given society are considered from both the 
‘coercive and consent’ aspects of power through the integral state. This section will deal 
with the concepts of social forces/social classes/social groups and political strategies i.e. 
war of position and passive revolutions. These concepts are significant to understanding 
the social and political roles of ‘man’ as the history maker or the ‘agency of social 
transition’ in the form of ‘social forces’ in the Thai historical bloc. 
 
3.1 Social Forces 
Although Gramsci’s prison writings address various topics, the main aim of Gramsci is 
to discuss the problem of capitalist society and how to solve it. Gramsci’s unit of analysis 
in his political ideas in order to explain the capitalist society has been defined in various 
terms such as social forces, dominant class, subaltern, subordinate, or instrumental 
(Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971: xiv; Landy, 1994: 21-26). In Gramsci’s writings, he 
usually refers to ‘social forces’ in a similar way to ‘social groups’ or ‘social classes’ and he 
uses them interchangeably (Green, 2002; 2012). Gramsci’s focus on the relation of each 
social force as political agencies in the politics of social transition is the central theme of 
this section. The purpose of this section is to examine Gramsci’s concept of social 
groups/social forces, the balance of class forces as strategies of war of position and 
passive revolution, and the analysis of situation. These Gramscian concepts are crucial 
because they provide spaces to see ‘fractions’ of class and their social contributions to the 
social transition of the Thai historical bloc.  
 
3.1.1 Defining Social Forces   
One of Gramsci’s major concerns in his political thought is the social relations of social 
groups and classes. He concentrates on this social relation rather than on individual 
behaviour. Gramsci’s concept of social classes consists of two main classes including the 
‘dominant social class’ or the ruling class, and the ‘subaltern’, subordinate, or the 
dominated class. It is worth noting that Gramsci rarely uses the term ‘classes’ in his 
prison notebooks. More often, he prefers to use the term ‘social groups’ when he refers to 
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each social and political agency in order to avoid prison censorship1 (Nemeth, 1980: 86; 
Pozzolini, 1970: 67–75). 
 
3.1.2 The Ruling Social Classes 
In Gramsci’s thought, the dominant class is a group of people who can become a ‘state’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 53, Q25§5), that is, the group of people who can maintain their force 
and consent over an entire set of socially dominated groups. Gramsci argues that the 
ruling class or the dominant class wishes not only to lead other groups or classes but 
also to dominate people. They want a new force independent of every compromise and 
condition to become the arbiter of the nation (Gramsci, 1971: 105, Q15§59).  
In Gramsci's historical context, the emergence of the ruling and the subaltern social 
groups/classes in Italy in the early nineteenth century was the result of capitalist 
economic development in Northern Italy and the effects of World War I (Gramsci, 1977: 
135-141). The ruling class, in other words, the ‘propertied class’ in Gramsci’s idea is not 
the entire group of people within one class. Rather, the dominant class in Gramsci's 
thought—considered in the terms of Poulantzas’ concept of class fractions (1973: 77-
85)—consists of ‘three major’ fractions of the ruling class including the capitalist, the 
landowner, and the rural capitalist.  
The capitalist class owns the means of production and exchange and possess the 
instruments of production (Donaldson, 2008: 5-6) and the source of their wealth is 
‘profit’. The landowner class or the landlord holds ownership over land; therefore, the 
source of their wealth derives from rent. Donaldson (2008: 6) argues that both the 
capitalist and the landlord sometimes are in conflict with each other such as conflicts 
over tariffs. Relationships between these two ruling social classes were further 
strengthened by the emergence of the third propertied class, the rural capitalist or the 
petty bourgeoisie. Gramsci points out that this new class was different from the old 
landowner due to it receiving its profit less in the form of land rent and more in the form 
of surplus value. Investing in large tracts of land, rural capitalists relied on specialised 
equipment, scientific technique, fertilisers and wage labour to boost output per hectare, 
opening the way for the further penetration of finance capital into the countryside 
                                                             
1 See this thesis’s position on the difference between ‘social group’ and ‘social force’ in page 13 of 
chapter 1.  
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(Gramsci, 1978 cited in Donaldson, 2008: 6). Moreover, the interesting aspect of the 
rural or petty bourgeoisie is that they could join together through other social groups 
such as the national bureaucracy, state services, or the armed forces. They play an 
important role in influencing the peasantry to support the ruling classes in rural areas 
(Misra, 1991: 185).  
 
3.1.3 The Subaltern Social Classes  
Nevertheless, the more important social groups to which Gramsci pays attention in his 
political analysis are the ‘subaltern’ or ‘subordinate’ social groups/classes. Gramsci’s 
notion of the subaltern social group and the ruling group is similar to other Gramscian 
concepts that are unsystematic, scattered and diffused throughout his prison notebooks 
(Green, 2002: 2). Marcus Green (2002; 2012)—who is the pioneer in the field of 
Gramscian subaltern studies—explains that the Gramscian concept of the subaltern is 
rarely systematically presented in English because most Gramsci scholars usually refer 
to Gramsci’s selection from prison notebooks (1971) which contains few essays 
concerning the subaltern (Green, 2002: 1; 2012). Green argues that the most systematic 
concern with the subaltern in Gramsci’s prison notebooks was presented in notebook 25 
in which he identifies slaves, religious groups, women, people in different races, peasants, and 
proletariat as subaltern social groups (Green, 2002: 2; Bellini et al., 2010: 15).  
In Gramsci’s Some Aspects of the Southern Question (1926), his last writings prior to his 
sentencing by Mussolini's fascist regime, he outlined some preliminary ideas about the 
subaltern social groups before later proposing this again in his prison writings. In Some 
Aspects of the Southern Question, Gramsci stipulates, throughout this short paper, that the 
subaltern social groups are to include ‘peasant and proletariat’ in a broader sense, 
including, e.g., metalworker, joiner, building worker, priest, and intellectuals (Gramsci, 
1978: 441–462). In addition, Donaldson notes that the subaltern social classes in 
Gramsci’s thought were the ‘propertyless’ and the ‘common people’ who were constituted 
by their subjugation to the laws of capitalism, by their exclusion from the exercise of 
power and by their purposelessness (Donaldson, 2008: 8).  
In short, the term subaltern/subordinate not only means the ‘oppressed social groups’ but 
also the groups which through their ‘lack of autonomy’ are subjected to the influence or 
hegemony of other social groups, and do not possess one’s own hegemonic position 
(Sassoon, 1982a: 16). Moreover, the subaltern social groups, for Gramsci, have no 
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history of their own in the sense that official historical documents do not notice them, or 
submerge them in the ‘master-narrative’ of the conquerors. From Gramsci's perspective, 
the subaltern cannot be considered separately from the totality of social relations at any 
specific historical conjuncture (San Juan, 2009: 4). This means that the subaltern should 
always relate to other social groups in any given political society. 
For Gramsci, in any society any number of social groups could be the 
subaltern/subordinate classes, but the only two groups of people who should play the 
key role in the transformation of the state are the only two social forces who are 
essentially national and bearers of the future—the proletariat and the peasantry (Gramsci, 
1978: 462). Following Gramsci, the proletariat or the worker is a person who is totally 
without property in terms of the means of production, is condemned to have no 
property, and is never likely to anyway. They are forced to become traders in their only 
property—their ‘labour power’ (Gramsci, 1977: 98-102; Marx, 1992: 98-104, 309-314). 
Workers/labourers are those employed in factories such as manual workers, clerical 
workers and technicians,  as  well  as  servants,  coachmen,  tram-drivers,  railwaymen,  
waiters, road-sweepers, private employees, clerks, intellectual workers, farmhands, 
hodmen, cab-drivers and others, who together make up the whole ‘working class' 
(Gramsci, 1977: 103-108; Donaldson, 2008: 15). The intrinsic power of the working 
class is that it is indispensable and irreplaceable and the most important factor of 
production. That the working class is the only source of surplus value means that it is 
the only class essentially and permanently revolutionary, the only class capable of 
reorganising production and therefore all the social relations that depend on the 
relations of production (Marx, 1992; Donaldson, 2008: 15).  
Another key subaltern social force in Gramsci's thought is the peasant. In fact, the 
peasantry itself can divided in to three types of peasant. Firstly, the rich peasants who 
owns their own land and gain benefit from ground rent and share cropping. Secondly, the 
middle peasants who generally produce for the market who make up the small holders 
who mainly consume what they produce, share-croppers, tenant farmers and sub-tenant 
farmers, husbandmen and herdsmen. Lastly, the poor peasant endures poverty and 
prolonged labour with much suffering and exists in a chronic state of malnutrition 
(Gramsci, 1978: 441-462; Donaldson, 2008: 10). In short, for Gramsci, the worker and 
the peasant need to be allied in order to challenge the hegemony of the ruling classes 
and establish their own historical bloc. Later, in his prison notebooks, Gramsci argues 
that the history of subaltern social classes is intertwined with civil society, and thereby, 
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with the history of the state and group of the state (Gramsci, 1971: 52, Q25§5). 
Moreover, he argues that the subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of 
ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up (Gramsci, 1971: 55, Q25§2). This means 
that in order to analyse the subaltern social groups in the Gramscian sense, it is 
necessary to pay attention to the ‘integral state’ (as discussed above) both in the terrain of 
civil and political society altogether.  
 
3. 2 Balance of Class Forces: War of Position and Passive Revolution   
3.2.1 War of Position 
In the social and political struggles of each social group a variety of strategies are 
utilised in order to acquire their goals. The importance of Gramsci’s idea appeared in the 
note on Political Struggle and Military War in which he describes how each social force to 
assert itself into the class struggle provides the crucial political strategy for each social 
group or  the so-called the ‘war of position’ (on the study of metaphoric usage of ‘war’ in 
Gramsci see Egan, 2013). Gramsci argues that there are three types of war including 
war of movement (manoeuvre), war of position, and underground warfare (Gramsci, 
1971: 229, Q1§134). The first two types of war are the only important ideas upon which 
analysis needs to focus at this stage. War of movement, according to Gramsci, is a kind 
of strategy that is appropriate where the state and civil society are less developed so that 
political power is more fragile, and mass trade unions, pressure groups and party 
organisations are not yet developed (Sassoon, 1982a: 16). This is not a suitable strategy 
for each social force being deployed as a major tool to gain a hegemonic position over 
other groups within society. While this war of movement in the sense of a violent 
struggle may still occur in order to take control of state power employing only war of 
movement is not sufficient nor can it be sustained to gain hegemony.  
Hence, Gramsci offers an alternative perspective that the subaltern/subordinate group 
should employ in order to gain the hegemonic position, that is, the ‘war of position’ (Buci-
Glucksmann, 1980: 250–253; Jessop, 1990: 210). The war of position is a political 
strategy on the cultural front, metaphorically related to the military term. This strategy 
requires steady penetration and subversion of the complex and multiple mechanisms of 
ideological diffusion. The point of the struggle is to conquer one after another, all the 
agencies of civil society, for instance, the schools, the universities, the church, the mass 
media, and the trade unions. (Gramsci, 1971: 235, 342, Q13§24, Q11§12; Femia, 1981: 
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52). Moreover, Femia (1981) argues that the Gramscian notion of the war of position is 
the abandonment of the hallowed Bolshevik model. Gramsci placed much emphasis on 
distinction between the two types of social situations (see section below) as the organic 
and conjunctural dimensions of social change. Gramsci sees that the organic type of 
situation in social reality refers to the shift in the ‘balance’ of social and cultural forces, 
which corresponds to the war of position. Nonetheless, the conjunctural situation refers 
to the realm of contingency, to the momentary period of crisis in which political forces 
contend for the state power that is the arena of political combat and military 
confrontation; therefore, this is equivalent to the war of movement (Femia, 1981: 53).  
 
3.2.2 Passive Revolution 
Furthermore, Gramsci offers another concept that is helpful in explaining the 
relationship between the dominant/ruling social groups and the subaltern/subordinate 
forces, which is the conception of ‘passive revolution’. Gramsci was inspired by the 
concept of passive revolution from Vincenzo Cuoco (Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971: 59 
n.11). According to Gramsci, he develops the concept of passive revolution in order to 
take into account the phenomenon whereby a dominant class maintains its power by 
promoting its adversary’s weakness (Sassoon, 1982b: 130). In addition, he uses this 
concept of passive revolution in order to indicate the constant reorganisation of state 
power and its relationship to the dominated classes to preserve dominant class 
hegemony and to exclude the masses from exerting influence over political and 
economic activities (Carnoy, 1984: 76).  
Passive revolution (in another formulation, ‘revolution-restoration’) is an attempt to 
promote change that is not based on a positive, concrete hegemony, and can be a 
technique or a programme for the bourgeoisie (Sassoon, 1987: 205). Passive revolution is 
a revolution without mass participation or a ‘revolution from above’, involving elite-
engineered social and political reform while lacking a national popular base (Morton, 
2010: 317, 2011; Thomas, 2006, 2013). Moreover, passive revolution can be a technique 
of statecraft which an emergent bourgeois class may deploy by drawing in subaltern 
social classes while establishing a new state on the basis of the institution of capitalism 
(Morton, 2010: 318; Sassoon, 1982b: 133; Buci-Glucksmann, 1979: 211–216; Schecter, 
2007: 40–41). 
53 
The importance of Gramsci's concept of passive revolution is that this concept is crucial 
in order to explain how the bourgeoisie or the ruling class survives in capitalist society 
even though there are political and economic crises. As Carnoy (1984) points out, the 
bourgeoisie attempts to employ a passive revolution strategy whenever its hegemony 
cannot deal with the need to expand the forces of production. Moreover, passive 
revolution is helpful to make explicit the difference between reformist and revolutionary 
politics, where Gramsci argues that ‘reformism’ is a version of the passive revolution 
(Carnoy, 1984: 77). The concept of passive revolution could be useful for this thesis as a 
theoretical tool to grasp the roles of the Thai ruling social groups during the period of 
study of the research.  
This subsection on the ‘balance of class forces’ aims to argue that the dominant and the 
subaltern social classes are always antagonists and always attempt to ‘balance’ their class 
forces in order to establish and maintain their hegemonic position through various 
levels, moments, and strategies (Poulantzas, 2008: 166-171). War of position is a major 
strategy that the subaltern social groups possess and apply in their social and political 
movements. The ultimate target of this war of position is not the concrete spatial terrain 
in the military sense; rather, it is the ‘politics of superstructure’ that is going to conquer the 
ideological struggle in the sphere of civil society through various institutions. Class 
alliances among various social forces and fractions within classes could take place 
through this war of position strategy. Nevertheless, at the same time, the 
dominant/ruling class always maintains its power through the so-called tactic of ‘passive 
revolution’ in order to decrease, obstruct, or disunify the strength of the subaltern. This 
is the crucial attempt to prevent the subaltern social forces from challenging the power 
of the ruling class. In order to take advantage of the balance of social class, Simon (1999: 
57) argues that in the political transition to socialism or a fairer society, the working 
class must have the character of ‘an anti-passive revolution’ on the basis of an extension of 
class struggles and build up a national-popular base so as to mobilise wider sections or 
groups of people in their political movement.  
 
3.3 Gramsci’s Analysis of Relations of Force  
 In order to analyse social and political situations, Gramsci wrote in his note Analysis of 
Situations. Relations of Force that there are two types of situations that need to be 
distinguished. The first type is what Gramsci called ‘conjunctural phenomena’ which 
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appear as occasional, immediate, and almost accidental (Gramsci, 1971: 177, Q13§17). 
The term conjuncture is what Lenin used to call the current situation or the balance of 
political forces existing at the present moment (Simon, 1999: 43). The second type is 
organic movement or ‘organic situation’; this is relatively permanent and a crisis occurs 
sometimes lasting for decades (Gramsci, 1971: 177–178, Q13§17). Gramsci argues that a 
common error in historical-political analysis consists in an inability to identify the 
correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. He concludes that the 
distinction between organic movements and conjunctural or occasional ones must be 
applied to all types of situations and not only with regressive development, but also to 
those in which there is progressive development (Gramsci, 1971: 178, Q13§17; Martin, 
1993: 122–131). 
As shown above, Gramsci defines two important kinds of situations that need to be 
analysed. This leads to the other important idea in the same note on Analysis of 
Situations. Relations of Force, which is the analysis of ‘relation of forces’, which Mouffe 
(1979) sees as one of the key texts for an understanding of the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony (Mouffe, 1979: 180). Gramsci categorises the relation of forces into two broad 
moments, which are 1) fundamental moment, consisting of the relation of social force, and 
2) subsequent moments, comprising the most important relation of political force and 
politico-military force (Gramsci, 1971: 180–185, Q13§17; Adamson, 1980: 159–161; 
Joseph, 2002: 35–36; Morera, 1990: 150–151). 
Regarding the fundamental moment, the relation of social force, Gramsci holds that this 
relation of social force is closely linked to the structure, objectives, and independent 
human will. This is the level of development of the ‘material forces of production’ which 
provides a basis for the emergence of various social classes and each one of which 
represents a function and has a specific position within production itself (Gramsci, 1971: 
180–181, Q13§17). Following the subsequent moments, Gramsci argues that this includes 
the relation of political force and relation of military force. The political force is the most 
important moment that should be considered in order to understand the concept of 
hegemony (which will be discussed in the next section). Gramsci distinguishes this 
political moment into ‘three’ vital levels; the first level, the primitive economic level in 
which consciousness of a group’s own professional interests are expressed but not as yet 
their interests as a social class (Mouffe, 1979: 180; Gramsci, 1971: 181, Q13§17); the 
second level, the political economic moment in which the consciousness of class interests 
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is expressed, but only at an economic level; and the third and most important level of 
hegemony, which as Gramsci explains is that: 
...in which one becomes aware that one’s own corporate 
interests, in their present and future development, transcend 
the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and 
must become the interests of other subordinate groups too 
(Gramsci, 1971: 181, Q13§17) 
 For Gramsci, this is where the specifically political moment is situated and is 
characterised by an ideological struggle, which attempts to forge unity between 
economic, political intellectual, and moral unity and poses all the questions around 
which the struggle rages not on a corporate level but on a universal plane, and thus 
creates the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups 
(Gramsci, 1971: 181–182, Q13§17; Mouffe, 1979: 180). In addition, the last moment—
military force—is, according to Gramsci, the decisive moment. There are two different 
levels of relations of military force that are purely military and politico-military. 
Gramsci sees that this type of relation of force is a relation involved in a State’s military 
oppression of a nation seeking to gain its national independence, in which, according to 
Gramsci, the combination between purely military and politico-military is required in 
order to receive national independence (Gramsci, 1971: 183, Q13§17; Howson, 2006: 18-
22). 
The important point of this Gramscian notion of the relation of forces is, as Simon 
argues, that the subaltern/subordinate class needs to transcend and overcome the economic-
corporate phase and succeed in combining the interests of other classes and social forces with its 
own interests in order to be a hegemonic one (Simon, 1999: 36, emphasis added). In short, 
these of Gramsci’s arguments on the analysis of relations of force, as shown above, are 
the crucial point to create a framework to analyse social and political interactions of 
social forces in Thai political economy. The section below will deal with the concept of 
hegemony and historical bloc as two central concepts of the configuration of social 
power. 
 
4. CONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL POWER: HEGEMONY AND HISTORICAL BLOC 
As was explained in the first chapter, this thesis is a study of the politics of social 
transition in Thailand analysing social forces as protagonists of social change. Two 
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sections above have examined the paths to social transition in the non-deterministic 
sense and provide analysis of the concept of agency behind change in the form of social 
forces/social groups/social classes. In this section, discussion will focus on two of the 
central concepts of Gramsci’s writing—hegemony and historical bloc. These two 
important notions will be helpful in order to consider the configuration of social power 
between the dominant and the subaltern social groups in Thai political economy.  
 
4.1 Hegemony 
Hegemony has become the most notable theoretical and political term of Antonio 
Gramsci. Gramsci and Hegemony become synonymous and many books have been 
written on this subject (Joseph, 2002: 19; Thomas, 2013). This concept is the centre of 
several of Gramsci’s ideas in order to understand the ‘relations of social classes’ in modern 
capitalist society. As mentioned above, in order to grasp Gramsci’s conception of 
hegemony, it is necessary to struggle with some of Gramsci’s basic theories that are all 
connected and related to the concept of hegemony. This section will begin with the 
definition of the term hegemony and the various ways in which Gramsci employed the 
concept. Lastly, the section moves on to discuss Gramsci’s idea of historical bloc, which 
is closely linked to the concept of hegemony and is vital to understand contemporary 
Thai politics, which will be discussed later. 
 
4.1.1 Hegemony before Gramsci 
The concept of hegemony, in fact, is not an original idea that emerged in Gramsci’s 
thoughts. Rather, hegemony has been ascribed a number of meanings and used in 
various ways throughout different periods and historical circumstances. Fontana (2006: 
24–27) argues that the concept of hegemony can be traced back to the ancient Greek 
period. Hegemony, in ancient Greece, generally means the pre-eminence or supremacy 
that a state, social group or even an individual may exercise over others. Later, 
hegemony has been known as ‘gegemoniya’, one of the most central political slogans in 
the Russian Social Democratic movement from the late 1890s to 1917. The idea first 
emerged in Plekhanov and Axelrod in the late 1880s where the concept concentrated on 
the necessity for the Russian working class to wage a political struggle against Tsarism 
(Anderson, 1976–77: 15; Anderson, 1979: 79; Bates, 1975: 352; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 
ch.1; Ransome, 1992: 133; Joseph, 2002: Ch.2; Hoffman, 1984: 52).  
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In addition, Lenin—as Gramsci always credits him as the great theoretician of the 
philosophy of praxis (Haug, 2000:2)—used the term ‘gegemoniya’ in various writings 
when discussing how the proletariat should assume a leading or hegemonic role in the 
bourgeois democratic struggle against Tsarist absolutism (Femia, 1981: 25 Fontana, 
2006: 26). However, Hoffman (1984) argues that Lenin's concept of hegemony was 
central in ‘What is to be Done?’ in which he emphasises the role of party and posits that 
the proletariat must be the leader in the struggle of the whole people for a fully 
democratic revolution. Hoffman concludes that, for Lenin, the concept of hegemony 
implied the organised and disciplined proletarian leadership of a broadly based 
movement extending to all classes and strata so that the vanguard party acts as a 
tribune of the people (Hoffman, 1984: 52). In short, hegemony in the sense of the 
Russian Social Democratic movement and in Lenin has a purely instrumental, strategic 
significance, but there is no room for the cultural and ideological aspects in their 
concept of hegemony.  
 
4.1.2 Gramsci’s Hegemony 
As mentioned above, the concept of hegemony is not an entirely new concept, however 
it was used in various senses before Gramsci. Nevertheless, there is at least an aspect 
that makes Gramsci's concept of hegemony distinct to his predecessor. That is the 
injection of cultural, moral, and intellectual emphasis in his perspective (Hoffman, 1984: 
55). Gramsci’s hegemony is the developed form of the previous usage in the Russian 
Social Democratic movement. Although the concept of hegemony in Gramsci had been 
the most developed in his prison notebooks, Boothman (2008), Mouffe (1979: 178), 
Clark (1977: 225), and Santucci (2010: 103–104) argue that there has been an attempt to 
provide a basic idea of the concept in his pre-prison writings at Ordine Nuovo (1919–
1920) and more clearly stated in Some Aspects of the Southern Questions (1926) where 
Gramsci states that: 
The Turin communists posed concretely the question of the 
‘hegemony of the proletariat’: i.e. of the social basis of the 
proletarian dictatorship and the worker’s state. The proletariat 
can become the leading (dirigente) and the dominant class to 
the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of alliances 
which allows it to mobilise the majority of the working 
population against capitalism and the bourgeois state. In Italy, 
in the real class relations which exist there, this means to the 
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extent that it succeeds in gaining the consent of the broad 
peasant masses. (Gramsci, 1978: 443;) 
Hegemony in this sense (pre-prison) is a political alliance, but later, in his prison 
notebooks, hegemony becomes a complete ‘fusion of economic, political, intellectual, and 
moral objectives’ which will be brought about by one fundamental group and groups 
allied to it through the intermediary of ideology (Mouffe, 1979: 178–181). Furthermore, 
in his prison notebooks, Gramsci discusses various topics on the concept of hegemony. 
The following passage shows a quite straightforward definition of hegemony: 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major super 
structural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that 
is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and 
that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on 
the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command 
exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government. The 
functions in question are precisely organisational and 
connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s 
‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony 
and political government (Gramsci, 1971: 12, Q12§1*). 
As mentioned in this passage, Gramsci shows that hegemony is not an isolated concept, 
but it is a concept that is always related to other concepts. As explained earlier in this 
chapter in the analysis of the relationship between civil and political society, hegemony 
will emerge in the terrain of superstructure because of the leading roles of intellectuals 
(Gramsci’s concept of intellectual will be provided in the historical bloc section below). 
Intellectuals as an organiser of hegemony and historical bloc will play vital roles to 
articulate each social force and combine the collective will of each force as unity in a 
given period. 
It is worth noting that, in fact, Gramsci himself never provides a systematic meaning of 
the term hegemony; however, in order to provide the most general meaning of Gramsci’s 
hegemony, it is necessary to follow Gwyn A. Williams (1960) who argues that 
hegemony seems to mean a socio-political situation, in his terminology a ‘moment’ in 
which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse and are in equilibrium, an order in 
which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing 
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with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious belief, and political principles, and 
all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation (Williams, 
1960: 587).  
Following the general definition of hegemony summarised by Williams, Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony has two crucial aspects worth considering, that is, firstly, the unity 
between philosophy and practice, and second, Gramsci’s notion of common sense. 
Concentrating on the first important aspect of hegemony is that it is based on what 
Gramsci called ‘the philosophy of praxis’—the combination of philosophy and practice of 
the concept—as stated in the following passage: 
Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a 
struggle of political ‘hegemonies’ and of opposing directions, 
first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in 
order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one’s own 
conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a 
particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political 
consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive 
self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be 
one. Thus the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter 
of mechanical fact, but a part of historical period (Gramsci, 
1971: 333, Q11§12). 
Gramsci means philosophy is identical with history and politics (Nemeth, 1980: 83–86). 
This aspect of hegemony shows that the ultimate aim in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis 
is to combine philosophy—including the sphere of history and politics, in other words, 
the sphere of human actions and social relations—and practical political activities 
(Loftus, 2013: 183; Haug, 2000; Joseph, 2002: 27). Gramsci’s hegemony provides the 
picture of the combination between ideas, ideology, thought, and consciousness on one 
hand, and materials and practical movement on the other. 
Secondly, another crucial aspect of hegemony is the Gramscian notion of the critique of 
common sense. According to Gramsci, ‘common sense’ is the ‘philosophy of non-
philosophers’, or in other words, the ‘conception of the world’ that is uncritically absorbed 
by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the 
average man is developed (Gramsci, 1971: 419, Q11§13). In analysing ways of thinking 
and acting, Gramsci uses a variety of terms, but many of these are equivalent, for 
example, ‘philosophy’, ‘ideology’, ‘conception of the world’, ‘mode of thought and action’, and 
‘world view’. All of these terms refer to the general way of thinking and acting which 
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determines the specificity of a social class, social group, or historical formation 
(Robinson, 2005: 473; see more discussion on Gramsci's common sense in Liguori, 2009; 
on Gramsci’s conception of the world see Wainwright, 2013).  
Common sense is the conception of the world that is established by the ruling class in 
order to secure the ‘class interests’ and control subaltern’s worldviews (Bocock, 1986: 46; 
Green, 2006: 284-300). This process of building common sense operates through the 
functions of intellect in the sphere of civil society. The vital point is, according to 
Gramsci, that in order to become autonomous and be able to change the existing social 
relations, the subaltern/subordinate groups need to ‘develop a new conception of the world’ 
that is not dependent on ruling class ideology (Robinson, 2005: 473). To overcome 
hegemonic common sense, the subaltern needs to replace it with what Gramsci called 
‘good sense’ or a new conception of the world raised by the autonomy of subaltern classes 
in order to raise the intellectual level of the people (Gramsci, 1971: 340, Q11§12; 
Greaves, 2009: 172; Green, 2006). 
In conclusion, although there are a number of ways to identify Gramsci’s hegemony, 
this thesis argues that there are two major important senses of Gramsci’s hegemony 
that will be usefully employed to analyse Thai politics. Firstly, Gramsci uses the concept 
of hegemony in the sense denoted as consensual and ideological, as opposed to 
coercive/force, as the basis of all political systems (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993: 112; 
Femia, 1981: 24; Anderson, 1979: 79). Secondly, it is in the sense of ‘intellectual and 
moral leadership’ which concentrates on aspects of cultural and educative tasks (on 
Gramsci and critical education in various views see Borg et al., 2002) of the party and 
ultimately the revolutionary state in the formation of coherent moral awareness and 
political will amongst the proletariat in order to ‘overcome’ the economic-corporate 
level of people’s consciousness (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993: 112: Femia, 1981: 24; 
Adamson, 1980: 171). 
 
4.2 Historical Bloc  
Along with the concept of hegemony, Gramsci’s notion of historical bloc is closely 
related to the concept of hegemony (Landy, 1994: 49). It is very crucial to understand 
social transition in the Gramscian sense. The term historical bloc can be defined so as to 
describe the complex way in which classes and fractions of class are related in society 
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and in the complicated relationship between economic, political, and cultural aspects of 
reality (Sassoon, 1982a: 14; Joseph, 2002: 31–32). According to Gramsci: 
Structures and superstructures form an “historical bloc”. That 
is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of 
the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the 
social relations of production. From this, one can conclude: that 
only a totalitarian system of ideologies gives a rational 
reflection of the contradiction of the structure and represents 
the existence of the objective conditions for the revolutionising 
of praxis; the conception of historical bloc in which precisely 
material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, 
though this distinction between form and content has purely 
didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable 
historically without form and the ideologies would be 
individual fancies without the material forces (Gramsci, 1971: 
366, 377, Q10§12, Q7§21). 
Gramsci’s idea of historical bloc provides the comprehensive understanding of the 
complex relation among the political, social, cultural and economic elements. This 
concept of historical bloc is the evidence to show that Gramsci himself was a Marxist 
who never neglected the matter of the structure or material forces of production, even 
though his major concentration was on the cultural and ideological elements of the 
superstructure. 
In addition, Sassoon (1987) argues that historical bloc is the site joining together two 
levels of analysis, the first, theoretical, in which the concept helps to describe the 
relationship between two areas of abstract reality—base and superstructure—in order 
to concretise in the description of the linkage of these two areas in real society. The 
second use of the concept, Sassoon argues, is the crucial part of the analysis of the 
concrete social formation. Gramsci’s conception of historical bloc shows the way in 
which various social classes and fractions of class are related in a situation in which 
implicitly one mode of production is dominant but articulated with other modes of 
production. Furthermore, it must be emphasised whether the way in which a given 
historical bloc is articulated is organically related to the ability of a new, progressive 
class to construct an alternative historical bloc (Gidwani and Paudel, 2013: 275; Short, 
2013). In short, historical bloc describes the configuration of power in which different 
social forces relate to each other in a particular time frame (Sassoon, 1987: 121; Joll, 
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1977: 85–87; Morera, 1990: 139–142). The next section will provide another crucial 
idea; Gramsci's concept of intellectuals as the organiser of the historical bloc.    
 
4. 3 Gramsci’s Conception of the Intellectuals 
It could be argued that Gramsci was really the first Marxist to confront the problem of 
intellectuals directly, as a theoretical issue (Boggs, 1984: 220). Intellectuals from 
Gramsci’s perspective are different from the common definition, which usually refers to 
a person possessing or supposed to possess superior powers of intellect (Crehan, 2002: 
131). Rather, Gramsci sees intellectuals both in individuals and the ensemble of the 
system of relations (Crehan, 2002: 133). Sassoon (1982a: 14) provides the general 
meaning of Gramsci’s uses of the term intellectuals to indicate all those people who have 
an organisational or ideological-cultural role in society, e.g. school teachers, factory 
technicians and managers, civil servants, social workers, university professors, and 
journalists. 
For Gramsci, intellectuals have a responsibility in society to ‘produce knowledge’ and/or 
to instil that knowledge into others. Gramsci states that ‘all men are intellectuals, one 
could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 9, Q12§3). This is important because the point Gramsci is concerned 
with is the ‘function of intellectuals’ as he stated that: 
The most widespread error of method seems to me that of 
having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic 
nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of 
the system of relations these activities have their place within 
the general complex of social relations (Gramsci, 1971: 8, 
Q12§1*).  
Generally, intellectuals in Gramsci play the role to ‘transform’ the incoherent and 
fragmentary ‘feelings’ of those who live in a particular class position into a coherent and 
reasoned account of the world as it appears from that position. Intellectuals also have 
the job of producing knowledge, but knowledge must be based on a genuine 
understanding of the conditions of life experienced by the popular element (Crehan, 
2002: 130–131). In addition, another important function of the intellectual is to be an 
organiser of the mass of men in both the terrain of production in order to gain the 
confidence of investors in a given business and customers in the product (Gramsci, 
1971: 5, Q12§1*), and the terrain of superstructure in order to exercise ‘consent’ of the 
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great masses of the population to the general direction (Gramsci, 1971: 12, Q12§1*) 
towards the aim of building their own historical bloc and challenging the dominant 
hegemony of the ruling class. Further, intellectuals in Gramsci are the social actor who 
combine theory and practice (Landy, 1994: 30).  
The crucial aspect worth noting here is that in Gramsci’s thought there is a link 
between the emergence of intellectuals and the socio-economic base. He advances this 
idea in Some Aspects of the Southern Question (1926) by distinguishing three social levels 
including, firstly, the ‘great amorphous, disintegrated mass of the peasantry’ who do not 
produce their own intellectuals because the mass is incapable of giving a centralised 
expression to their aspirations and needs. Secondly, the intellectual of the petty and 
medium rural bourgeoisie and thirdly the big landowners and great intellectuals 
(Gramsci, 1978[1926]: 454–455). This leads to the conclusion by Crehan (2002: 137) 
that there is a close link between economic realities and intellectuals, which is that the 
rise of the new social classes is associated with the emergence of new types of 
intellectuals.  
Regarding aspects of different types of intellectuals in Gramsci’s thought, it can be seen 
that Gramsci himself distinguishes intellectuals into two different types, organic and 
traditional. Sassoon (1987: 138) argues that there are two elements that define certain 
groups of intellectuals as organic. The first is to consider that they belong as a category 
to the same historical time as a new class that creates and elaborates them. Secondly, 
these intellectuals give this class ‘homogeneity’ and awareness of its own function not 
only in the economic, but also in the social and political field. Furthermore, Crehan 
(2002) argues that Gramsci uses the term ‘organic’ to describe any relationship he saw 
as fundamental and structural, not merely fortuitous. Therefore, following Crehan, 
‘organic intellectual’ in Gramsci are those with fundamental, structural ties to particular 
classes (Crehan, 2002: 137). In addition, organic intellectuals are those specialists who 
functioned more or less directly in the interests of a specific class. For the capitalist 
class, these included political economists and industrial technicians whose concrete 
tasks were of sufficient rank in the economic division of labour to permit them an 
‘organisational role’ over others. Gramsci designates the status of organic intellectuals 
as cultural leaders in that they are in the peculiar position to promote the collective needs of 
a class (Martin, 1998: 74; Boggs, 1984: 220–227).  
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On the contrary, another strain of Gramsci’s thought on the intellectual is the 
‘traditional intellectual’, which is the intellectual that no longer functioned ‘organically’ as 
an existing class and granted them a certain ‘autonomy’ by which they could present 
themselves as being above class interests. This category of intellectuals included 
ecclesiastics and academics whose distance from the technical functions of an economic 
group permitted them a seemingly ‘cosmopolitan’ status over and above social 
movements. However, their status as bearers of ‘universal’ rather than ‘particular’ 
interests belied their actual tendency to complicity with sections of the ruling class 
(Martin, 1998: 74).  
To sum up, this section provides two central concepts in Gramscian political thought, 
that is, the conceptions of hegemony and historical bloc. Preliminary concepts which 
were analysed earlier, such as the concept of the critique of economism, ideas of the 
relation between structure and superstructure, and social forces and relations of forces 
are all important for understanding the concept of hegemony and historical bloc. This 
chapter argues that historical bloc—the combination between the structure and 
superstructure—is the main aim for the dominant social groups to construct in a given 
historical period. In order to achieve that historical bloc, each social group under 
leading roles of their political agency, the intellectuals, need to challenge the dominant 
ideology, in other words, the existing common sense, by building hegemony and uniting 
the fragile interests of each social group into the ‘collective will’ of a given social group 
(on Gramsci and the concept of will see Coutinho, 2000, 2013).  
 
5. THE ROUGH TRANSITION: CRISIS OF AUTHORITY AND UNFINISHED SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION   
History of social class struggles in a given political society could normally lead to the 
clash between the dominant and subaltern social forces. Class antagonism always exists 
in a capitalist society and if it last for a long period then it shows the character of 
structural instability of that society and leads to a crisis. This section addresses another 
main feature of contemporary Thai political economy—history, crisis, and transition—that 





5.1 Crisis of Hegemony   
One of the most significant political concepts of Gramsci is that he sees the relationship 
of each social force in reality from a ‘dialectical perspective’. Hegemony of the dominant 
social class and current historical bloc do not always last forever. Nevertheless, 
hegemony and historical bloc could be in a situation called ‘crisis’—challenged from 
other subaltern social groups—and the replacement of hegemonic position could take 
place at any chance. Gramsci himself uses the term ‘crisis’ interchangeably among 
organic crisis, crisis of hegemony, crisis of historical bloc, and crisis of authority (Salamini, 
1981: 59). Gramsci provides a general idea about the crisis of authority as shown in the 
passage below:  
In every country the process is different, although the content 
is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s 
hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has 
failed in some major political undertaking for which it has 
requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad 
masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially 
of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed 
suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, 
and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not 
organically formulated, add up to a revolution. A ‘crisis of 
authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, 
or general crisis of the state (Gramsci, 1971: 210, Q13§23*). 
Following Gramsci, the crisis of authority could take place in two ways. Firstly, the 
ruling class can lose the consensus of their power over other social groups, and secondly, 
rather than from a weak dominant class the subaltern/subordinate social groups can 
overcome political passivity and begin to articulate their own demands to the ruling 
class (Reed, 2012). In addition, Salamini (1981: 59) argues that organic crisis in Gramsci 
occurs as a result of contradictions which accumulate over time within a specific 
historical bloc, offsetting the institutionalised equilibrium of forces.  
Moreover, Gramsci offers an important idea that is beneficial for understanding 
contemporary Thai politics in the passage below: 
The ‘crisis of authority’- if the ruling class has lost its 
consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant’, 
exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the 
great masses have become detached from their traditional 
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ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe 
previously, etc. The crisis precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great  
variety  of  morbid  symptoms  appear. (Gramsci, 1971: 275–
276, Q3§34 , emphasis added). 
The ‘crisis of authority’, in other words the crisis of hegemony and historical bloc, occurs 
when the common sense that dominated the subaltern is no longer working. It is a 
situation in which the subaltern social forces under the leading and organising roles of 
the intellectuals of each social force could challenge the existing conception of the 
world. Nonetheless, as Gramsci writes ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born’; the 
situation of hegemonic crisis is a circumstance of the society in which confusion occurs 
because there is no obvious hegemonic position among social forces during the time of 
crisis. 
 
5. 2 Hegemony, Historical Bloc, and Crisis of Authority: Dialectical Relations  
The importance of Gramsci’s political ideas is that all concepts are related and 
significant to understanding each other. As is mentioned above in this chapter, 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is a central idea of his political thought. As Morton 
(2007: 97) argues, the existence of hegemony is necessary for the emergence of a 
historical bloc. In addition, hegemony is inextricably tied to the notion of historical bloc 
(Landy, 1994: 49). The concept of historical bloc as discussed earlier is the dialectical 
relationship between base and superstructure at a particular historical moment. 
Moreover, it is a theoretical tool to grasp the complex way in which social classes and 
fractions of class are related in society and the complicated relationship between 
economic, political, and cultural aspects of reality (Sassoon, 1982a: 14; Joseph, 2002: 31–
32).  
Hegemony is a moment of power (see discussion on relations of force in section two) 
that each social class/group/force aims to achieve. Hegemony is significant to both the 
dominant social class and the subaltern in order to construct their own historical bloc, 
in other words, the ‘hegemonic bloc’. The formation of the hegemonic bloc—the historical 
bloc of the dominant social class—has to build upon the conquering of both economic 
base and ideological superstructure. Following Gramsci, the intellectuals would play 
the crucial roles in order to organise and gain consent from various social groups. The 
leadership of the ruling class in its hegemonic bloc is established and maintained by 
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both state and hegemonic apparatuses in the terrain of ideological superstructure. 
Moreover, social relations of production in the structure should be controlled at the 
same time. While the dominant social groups are in a hegemonic position, they will use 
the strategy of so-called ‘passive revolution’ or the politics of reform to obstruct and 
prevent any insurgencies from other social groups. Conversely, the hegemonic bloc’s 
stability at each historical moment could be contested through the power of other social 
classes. In order to balance the dominant power, the subaltern should, following 
Gramsci, employ the strategic movement of the so-called ‘war of position’ to conquer the 
sphere of superstructure over various subordinate social groups.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Gramsci himself sees social reality in a dialectical 
way and is against the deterministic idea of social transition. Therefore, the hegemonic 
bloc of the ruling class may feasibly be destroyed and replaced by an alternative 
hegemonic bloc of the ‘new dominant social class’. The clash between the hegemonic 
group and the challengers paves the way to the condition referred to as the ‘crisis of 
historical bloc’ or the ‘crisis of hegemony’ which could take place due to two major reasons; 
either the ruling class loses the consensus behind their power over other social groups 
or the subaltern/subordinate social groups overcome their political passivity and begin 
to articulate their own demands to the ruling class. The crisis of historical bloc opens 
up chances for each social force to challenge and balance their class power/class 
interests with the hegemonic class and attempt to construct an alternative hegemonic 
bloc. It is argued here that these relationship between hegemony, historical bloc 
(hegemonic bloc), and crisis of authority is crucial to understand in order to portray the 
configuration of social power among social groups in the Thai historical bloc. The last 
section below will explain the way in which all these Gramscian political theories are to 
be employed towards contemporary Thai political economy.  
 
6. CONCLUSION: EMPLOYING GRAMSCIAN THEORIES TOWARDS CONTEMPORARY THAI 
POLITICS 
In order to cope with the question of ‘how to apply’ these Gramscian theories towards 
contemporary Thai politics, this section will begin with Gramsci’s notion of the ‘critique 
of economism’ as a general perspective to frame the social transformation in Thailand, 
especially over the recent decade. Under Gramsci’s non-deterministic framework of 
social change, it is argued here that political conflicts that emerged from late 2005 in 
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Thailand were not an automatic social transition. Rather, they had been constituted by 
the interconnections among social forces. Following Gramsci’s solutions to the problem 
of economism or economic determinism—theories based on economic matters that 
neglect the importance of other elements—the concept of ‘relationship between structure 
and superstructure’ is employed here because it is helpful for the analysis of social 
transition in Thailand in order to provide theoretical spaces for other factors in the 
sphere of superstructure, e.g. ideology, philosophy, and culture. However, it should be 
noted that political economy is still important along with other factors in the analysis of 
Thai political economy. The thesis will analyse the importance of political economy in 
its constitution of social groups in all chapters alongside consideration of ideological-
cultural struggles.  
In addition, one of Gramsci’s many significant ideas is the concept of the ‘integral 
state’—civil society + political society. The idea of the integral state offers the 
combination between ‘force and consent’ and ‘authority and hegemony’. This idea offers a 
more comprehensive framework than some traditional frameworks in order to provide 
room for an integrated analysis of the apparatuses of hegemony and coercion. 
Regarding the aspect of ‘agencies’ of social and political change, this study will employ 
Gramsci’s views of social forces in which he sees each social groups/classes as fractions 
of broader social classes. The significance of this idea is to provide a non-static view in 
order to perceive the relationship among each social actor. Gramsci’s notions of 
‘dominant and subaltern’ groups will be applied to categorise and conceive of class 
fractions in Thai political economy. Then, each social force or fractions need to ‘gain its 
own interests’; therefore, this thesis brings Gramsci’s ideas of ‘relation of forces’ (which 
includes other related strategic concepts such as the concept of ‘war of position’ and 
‘passive revolution’) to create a framework to explain the relationship and power 
configuration of several social forces in Thai political economy. War of position will be 
employed as a strategy for subaltern social groups in order to win consent over other 
groups of people; on the contrary, passive revolution is a political strategy that the 
dominant or ruling class uses as a method to exclude people from politics. These 
Gramscian concepts will be used in all chapters throughout this thesis.  
Among the basic ideas, as shown earlier, the central theme of this perspective is the 
conception of ‘hegemony and historical bloc’. The main aim of each social force is to 
construct its own historical bloc—in order to secure its own class interest in both 
political economy and ideological-cultural senses—which combines the conquest of 
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economic matters in structure and ideological sphere in superstructure at a specific time 
in history. In order to achieve this goal, intellectuals (as individuals, groups, parties, 
institutions) of each social force will play the leading roles to build hegemony by 
constructing their own ‘common sense’ or ‘collective will’ over other social groups. In 
addition, as Gramsci sees social relations dialectically, a given hegemony and historical 
bloc led by any ruling social groups could inevitably be contested by other competing 
social forces. The concept of the crisis of hegemony provided in the last section―in 
which the old is dying and the new cannot be born―will lead to the conclusion of this 
study in chapter eight. In short, all these Gramscian concepts provide pathways to 
analyse power relations of each social actor in contemporary Thailand and are helpful to 
open up the more comprehensive perspective which concentrates on the complex 
relationship of political, economic, ideological, and cultural factors in political analysis. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This research argues that Thailand’s political crisis over the recent decade should be 
historicised by considering various historical features of the modern political and 
economic development of the Thai state since the late 1950s. The ‘old historical bloc’, in 
other words, the Thai state, from the late 1950s to the 1997 crisis was constructed in 
terms of political economy by the powerful authoritarian ‘Sarit government’ along with 
the ideological cohesive role of the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology. This chapter is divided 
into two parts; part one addresses the changing conditions of the political economy of the 
Thai state since the post-1932 revolution. In addition, it also provides the general 
picture and economic nature of four major social classes in the old historical bloc as a 
basis for understanding the politics of social transition in the following chapters. Part 
two provides analysis of the hegemonic ideology of ‘royalism-nationalism’ that was 
constructed during the Phibun and Sarit eras of the 1940s and the 1950s. This ideology 
configures the ‘mode of thought’ of social forces and coheres all social forces as a 
historical bloc. This ideology limited the social relations of each social force within the 
‘economic-corporate’ phase because they never contested the governing regime but rather 
economic interests.    
 
 
PART ONE―POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL FORCES IN THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL 
BLOC  
 
2. CHANGING IN STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC 
The crisis-ridden transition of the Thai state between 2006 and 2010 has been, to some 
extent, an inheritance of the history of the old historical bloc. Changing structural 
conditions of Thailand’s political economy since the 1932 revolution 1 led to the 
                                                             
1The absolutist regime of King Prachadhipok (Rama VII) was overthrown by the People’s Party 
(Khana Ratsadon), a combined group of young blood civilians and military, on 24 June 1932. 
The revolution was the crucial point of departure for the new era in modern Thai politics which 
was entirely different from the ancient regime as the supreme power no longer belonged to the 
absolute monarchy, but rested with ordinary people (Batson, 1985; Nakarin, 1992; Charnvit, 
2001; Nattapoll, 2008, 2010, 2013). However, Thailand did not transform itself to become a 
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emergence of various social forces in the Thai state. However, modernisation projects of 
the Thai state, especially a great leap from 1957, led to two major features of the Thai 
historical bloc; the reinforcement of the bureaucratic state and socio-economic 
disparities. These two main characters of the Thai historical bloc collapsed and were 
restructured in the post-1997 economic crisis.2 This section will deal with changing 
conditions of political economy that constituted social forces in the old historical bloc 
from the 1932 revolution to the pre-1997 economic crisis. The section posits itself as a 
platform to grasp social relations among social forces in the next section.  
 
2.1 Nationalist Political Economy: 1932-1957 
 
Siam3, from 1932 to 1957, had been regulated by the radical right nationalist projects 
led by Field Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkram (Phibun). In terms of political economy, 
Phibun’s government, through the period of World War II, employed ‘economic 
nationalism’ as a major framework and proposed the national agenda of ‘made by Thai, 
used by Thai and with Thai labour’ to Thai society to strengthen national unity (Pasuk 
and Baker, 1997: 118-120; Schmidt, 1993). During this period, the rightist government 
established a huge number of state enterprises—as part of their nationalist projects—in 
order to compete with rising Chinese and Western merchants from the early 1900s. A 
number of state factories emerged during the Phibun era to compete with foreign capital 
such as cigarettes, matches, lighters, glass, beer, textiles, paper, rubber products, and 
sugar (Hewison, 1988: 69, 71).  
The anti-Chinese policy of the Phibun government limited Chinese entrepreneurs from 
competing in various key business sectors by preserving jobs for Siamese/Thai. They 
accommodated themselves to survive this political-economic circumstance by forming 
their business alliances with the military top men. These alliances laid the foundation 
for ‘business-bureaucrat’ relationships that existed throughout the economic development 
of the Thai state and this pattern of relationship would later dominate the old historical 
bloc in the post-1960s period. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
republic after the 1932 revolution, rather the People’s Party invited King Prachadhipok to be 
the king under the first ever Constitution of Siam in December 1932. 
2This subject will be dealt with in chapters five and six.  
3Siam had been governed by an absolute monarchy for more than seven hundred years within 
three periods—the Sukhothai, Ayudhaya, and Bangkok eras. For historical background on 
ancient Siamese politics see Kullada, 2004; Chaiyan, 1994.  
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In terms of social relations of the Siamese/Thai state4 in this era, the monarchy and 
royal family were not a dominant social group in the country. King Rama VIII (the 
present king at that time) and King Rama IX in his earlier stage had been removed from 
their social, political, and ideological functions by the fascist Phibun regime through 
various means, for instance, the freezing of many ancient royal rituals and the 
promotion of himself as an absolute leader whom the people should depend on.  
Therefore, under the rightist authoritarian circumstances between 1932 and 1957, the 
ruling social classes that govern the Thai historical bloc had been the authoritarian 
military faction led by Field Marshall Plaek and some military cliques. However, 
regarding the subaltern social groups, the peasantry were the major social force in 
terms of mass even though agricultural economic activity began declining in national 
economic importance. Vice versa, the number labourers who worked in state-owned 
industries was rising (Warr, 1993: 62). What is interesting in this era is that the 
capitalists, especially the Chinese capitalists, were suppressed under the nationalist 
political economy of Phibun’s government. It was not until the post-1957 period that 
the Chinese capitalists had successfully established themselves as a major capitalist 
social group and dominated the Thai state along with the rising bureaucrats as the 
middle class.  
 
2.2 Americanism and Modernisation:1957- the 1990s  
 
The crucial milestone that marked a significant change in modern Thai political 
economy emerged after the 1957 military coup against the rightist Phibun government 
led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. In a period of five years, Sarit established the so-
called ‘Sarit regime’ that can be described as the rule of despotism. Massive 
transformations in politics, economics, and social development had taken place in 
Thailand’s historical bloc in this era under the stream of Americanism and international 
organisations e.g. the World Bank. Field Marshall Sarit once gave a speech in which he 
stated that ‘we should not follow the Western democracy. We are Thai, so we should have a 
Thai style Democracy’ 5  (Connors, 2007: 34-52; Thak, 2007: 102). The authoritarian 
                                                             
4 The country changed its name from Siam to Thailand by the enforcement of the Statist Act no. 
1 in 1939.  
5The ‘Thai-style’ democracy of Sarit was entirely contrary to the universal known democracy, it 
was, actually, despotism and combined with paternalism. This combination of two features is 
called by Thak (2007) as a ‘despotic paternalism’, which was the social relationship that centralise 
of all power to the leader, provided some concrete economic benefit to nation’s people and claim 
that the government took care of people like a ‘father-son’ relationship (Thak, 2007: 111-145). 
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Saritism was secured by exercising ‘force’ through a number of state apparatus’ 
centralised around Sarit by the ‘Article 17’ of the 1959 temporary Constitution6 which 
provided absolute power to the Prime Minister. Under Article 17, Sarit could operate 
everything without permission from parliament. A consequence of the usage of Article 
17 was the elimination of political opposition by labelling them as communists and 
decisively punishing them (Kobkua, 2003: 54-58). 
 
In addition, along with maintaining force, Saritism also created a paternalistic character 
of the Sarit government via various hegemonic projects such as the decreasing in fares 
of electricity and water, providing free transportation, and lowering prices in various 
markets by the government in order to reduce the cost of living for Thai people. 
Moreover, one of the most admired policies was a social policy that maintained order. 
Saritism had banished beggars, prostitutes, tri-cycle taxis, hooligans, and local 
godfathers to build, what they called, a ‘well-ordered’ society (Thak, 2007: 111-145). 
With a number of hegemonic projects combined with the absolute power provided by 
the 1959 Constitution, Sarit successfully established a new historical bloc that differed 
from the pre-1957 social relations. This new bloc had two main features, as shown 
below; creation of the bureaucratic state and American-led economic development. 
 
2.2.1 Creation of the Bureaucratic State 
The authoritarian Sarit regime constructed one of the major social forces in the old 
historical bloc—the bureaucrat—in both civilian and military spheres. The dominant 
role of bureaucrats and technocrats in Thai politics is known as the so-called 
‘bureaucratic polity’.7 Riggs (1966: 11) argues that Thai politics up to the 1960s was a 
system that was neither ‘traditional’ nor ‘modern’ in its character. Rather, it was limited 
to the roles of ‘bureaucracy’ with no outside social forces capable of establishing the 
parameters of bureaucratic prerogative and action. In Riggs’s view, the bureaucrats 
dominated political activities rather than other social forces (Hewison, 1997: 4). In the 
old historical bloc, the high-ranked bureaucrats made choices on allocation and 
distribution in public policy. They controlled political decisions by forming a so-called 
‘government party’ and by gaining appointments to the upper house of parliament 
                                                             
6Charter for the Administration of the Kingdom 1959. 
7The term ‘bureaucratic polity’ was initiated by Riggs (1966) who invented it as a model to 
describe Thai society during the period of his study, the 1950s–60s. This model is 
fundamentally based on the Western theories of society and politics and specifically on 
modernisation theory (Hewison, 1997: 3). 
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(Girling, 1981: 160). The Thai bureaucracy, with both military and civilian components, 
had controlled the state and its apparatuses and the Chinese and Sino-Thai business 
leaders were obliged to seek the ‘patronage’ of this elite to protect and further their 
business interests (Arghiros, 2001: 17; Girling, 1981: 139). 
 
The domination of the bureaucrats both in military and civil administration shaped 
some characteristics of social relations in Thailand’s historical bloc that lasted for 
decades. Firstly, bureaucrats, as the centre of political and economic power, were 
targeted by businessmen at both local and national levels in order to gain any support 
for their businesses. This ‘patron-client’ relationship had dominated Thai society for a 
long time.8 Secondly, bureaucrat social forces had been the crucial state apparatus for the 
military government in order to support each coup d’état. Thirdly, the centralised power 
of the bureaucrats without public inspection had brought Thailand to the stage of high 
corruption (Pasuk and Sangsidth, 1995). Lastly, it should be seen that the bureaucrats 
had been employed to reinforce the hegemonic role of the Thai monarchy in various 
ways. In Thai language, bureaucracy means ‘Kha Rat Cha Karn’ which can be translated 
as the ‘servant of the king’, not of the ordinary people. Bureaucrat social forces, in other 
roles, exist as social agencies that maintain the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology.9 
 
2.2.2 American-Led Economic Development  
Apart from authoritarian politics and the creation of the bureaucratic state of Saritism, 
the Thai historical bloc from the late 1950s was also significant in terms of political 
economy as American hegemony massively transformed social relations of the Thai 
state. From the early 1950s, Thailand was chosen by the US as a military base in 
Southeast Asia to be a strategic site against the communist movement during the time 
of the Cold War (Baker and Pasuk, 2009: Ch.6; Girling, 1981: 232-240). Thailand under 
the military regime of the Phibun and Sarit governments received a huge amount of 
American aid, both military and economic. Military aid sharply increased from US$20 
million in the 1950s to around US$250 million in the early 1970s (Fineman, 1997). US 
                                                             
8  However, this patron-client relation between the bureaucrats and business had been 
challenged and transformed in the period of Thaksinism between 2001 and 2006. The Thaksin 
government attempted to bypass the ‘old’ patron-client relationship by setting up the Thai Rak 
Thai government as a new ‘patron’ and directly secure interests of social groups or the ‘client’ 
bypassing the ‘old’ bureaucratic social forces. This issue will be discussed and analysed in 
chapter six. 
9This is helpful for discussions of the emergence of the Yellow Shirts movement in chapter 
seven as it can be understood why the middle class i.e. the bureaucrats, mainly tend to support 
the conservative Yellow Shirts and the Democrat party.  
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military bases in Thailand had boosted the Thai economy in the form of both legal and 
illegal senses. There was a rising number of foreign tourists especially Americans many 
of whom spent their vacations in bars, nightclubs, brothels, and massage parlours 
(Baker and Pasuk, 2009: 149). The coming of the US military base stimulated Thailand 
to develop more in terms of major infrastructure including roads, highway, airports, and 
harbours for the sake of private enterprise developments (Girling, 1981: 81).  
 
As mentioned before, the coup d’état of 1957 was a decisive turning point in modern 
Thai politics. It opened up a chance for American hegemony to regulate Thailand in 
various aspects. In the sense of political economy, the country had been turned towards 
the stream of modern industrialisation and free market economy (Thak, 2007; Somboon, 
2012: 22-51). The years 1957 and 1958 were crucial as Sarit’s government welcomed 
the World Bank mission to Thailand after the coup in September 1957. This visit 
brought the recommendation of setting up a new coordinating agency for national 
planning. In 1959, the NEDB (National Economic Development Board) was set up to 
provide tight centralised national planning. Eventually, from 1961, planning became an 
established feature of the modern Thai political economy (Somsak, 1993: 139-145). The 
first five-year plan (1961-66) was launched as a result of the newly established NEDB in 
1961. This first plan essentially stimulated the national economy with the clearly stated 
aim of maximising economic growth. The fostering of the manufacturing sector was 
central to this plan. There were heavy investments in infrastructure, particularly 
transport, power generation, and agricultural irrigation (Ayal, 1962).  
 
There is no doubt that the development in infrastructure especially road construction 
brought increasingly more areas of the country into the market economy for rice and 
new export crops such as maize and kenaf (Dixon, 1999: 82). Whilst the second plan 
(1967-71) was a considerable technical improvement over the first plan, there was more 
concentration on regional and agricultural sectors than the previous plan. However, 
during the period of this second plan economic growth began to slow down in response 
to world conditions. Thailand remained dependent on a narrow range of primary 
exports with uncertain prices. The economic slowdown was compensated by the 
increased aid from the US because of the strategic reason to operate in Vietnam through 




The first two five-year plans urged Thailand to facilitate a free market economy 
through improvement in several important features including industrial promotion, the 
population control policy and development in education (Dixon, 1999: 88). Industrial 
promotion was operated by the Board of Investment (BOI) via many campaigns such as 
tax holidays, tax concessions, and infrastructural investment. As a result of the 
industrial promotion, in the 1960s there was a sharp increase in the manufacturing 
sector. Nevertheless, in the period of the first two plans, the Thai industrial economy 
was under the ‘Import Substitution Industrial’ (ISI) scheme. That is the expansion and 
diversification of production resulted in the substitution of finished goods for the import 
of raw materials, components, and machinery (Somsak, 1993; Somboon, 2012: 12-15).  
 
In addition, the population control policy and the improvement in basic and higher 
education were also necessary to economic development. The Sarit government, 
following their predecessor Phibun, had set the target to increase the population in 
order to accelerate economic growth. This transformation of population took place as a 
result of the improvement in the effectiveness of the national network of medical clinics 
and hospitals (Dixon, 1999: 88-89). Further, education was another important factor in 
economic development. During the 1960s, there had been an emphasis on primary and 
secondary schools. By the 1970s a number of universities were founded. 10  Newly 
established universities provided higher education in order to prepare skilled labour for 
manufacturing processes and Science and Technology were identified as the highest 
priority subjects to be developed (Von der Mehden, 1970: 328-329).  
 
From the 1970s until the period of the third (1971-76) and the fourth (1977-81) 
economic development plans, the Thai economy turned to emphasise the development of 
the ‘Export-Oriented Industrialisation’ (EOI) 11  sector (Dixon, 1999: 94). Thailand’s 
economy was affected by the general slowdown of the world economy and the instability 
of the US dollar. Nevertheless, the devaluation of US dollar boosted the already 
extremely buoyant Thai export sector. Between 1972 and 1974, Thailand experienced 
an export boom led by the rice sector. The rate of export growth increased from 10.7% 
in 1971 to approximately 34.9% between 1972 and 1974. Moreover, GDP similarly 
                                                             
10For example, the two major open institutions Ramkhamhang and Sukhothai Open University 
and provincial universities in strategic provinces involved Chiang Mai University in the north, 
Khon Kaen University in the northeast and Prince of Songkla University in the south. 
11More detail is provided in the next chapter.  
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accelerated from 5.4% in the 1950s to approximately 8.5% in the pre-1997 period (see 
table 4.1 below).  
 
 Table 4.1: Main Economic Indicators of Thailand from 1950 to 1999 
 
 Source: Jansen, 2001: 344.  
 
The changing conditions of political economy from the late 1950s tremendously 
changed the Thai state in various ways. However, the old historical bloc inherited two 
features from this period; rising social disparities and changes in social classes. Firstly, 
the issues of poverty and social disparity are two vital consequences of modernisation of 
the Thai state since the 1960s (Schmidt, 2002: 94). This is despite the country’s 
economic development contributing significantly to reduced poverty as a GNP per 
capita―which roughly tripled from US$ 625 in 1975 to US$ 1,831 in the late 1990s. 
Furthermore, from 1962 to 1992, the Thai population under the poverty line declined 
from 57% to 23.2%, then 11.4% in 1996. Nevertheless, inequality worsened as the 
country’s Gini coefficient index increased from 0.414 in 1962/63 to be 0.525 in 1994 
(see table 4 below; Doner, 1999: 38). This led Thailand to become one of the most 
inegalitarian countries in the world in terms of income distribution and most poor 
inhabitants are from rural areas (Glassman, 2004: 152; Warr, 2002; Medhi, 2002).12 The 













                                                             
12Knowledge on this social inequality of the old historical bloc is important as a platform to 
understand the rise of the Red Shirts social forces in the post-2006 military coup which is 
analysed in chapter seven.  
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Table 4.2: Poverty and Inequality Indicators 
 
 Source: Jansen, 2001: 362.  
 
Secondly, alteration in political economy since the 1960s contributed to the emergence of 
several new social groups in the Thai historical bloc; the new middle class and new local 
influences. 13 Infrastructural improvements since the late 1950s, including higher 
education expansion and especially road development, offered opportunities for domestic 
and foreign investors to establish industrial sites in suburbs and some leading rural 
provinces. Many local businessmen gained advantage from land-selling and continued 
to accumulate wealth in their various local businesses (Nishizaki, 2006). A new Thai 
middle class emerged alongside the reduction in the number of state bureaucrats in the 
1980s, but increased in new careers such as professionals, technicians, executives, and 
managers in commercial companies (Baker and Pasuk, 2009: 207-208; Pasuk and 
Sungsidh, 1994: 83-84).  
 
In addition to the emergence of a new middle class, Thailand since the 1960s also has a 
number of local influences or ‘Jao Pho’.14 Pasuk and Sungsidh (1994: 98) explain that 
they emerged from the extreme centralisation of the Thai state, on the one hand, and 
the sudden growth of provincial wealth on the other. Jao Pho in rural areas refers to the 
influential person who can employ his economic wealth and illegal power to afford 
himself the status of extra-legal protection from others. Jao Pho’s power comes from 
various means such as patronage, bribery, or violence (Pasuk and Sungsidh, 1994: 59). 
Jao Pho or locally influential social groups is an important character in Thai politics. 
                                                             
13 By this term this thesis means a person or group of people in rural areas in Thailand that gain 
superior social status in his/her own areas because of wealth and sometimes illegal activities.  
14In the Western sense the terms means ‘God father’ or ‘Mafia’.  
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They constitute the system of ‘patron-client’ social relations towards Thai local society 
and even in the present this social relation still exists in rural provinces in Thailand.15 
  
Nonetheless, the importance of noting the role of ‘Jao Pho’ relates to the issue that 
Thaksinism attempted to change the old social relations between Jao Pho and their local 
clients while it was in power. To do so, Thaksin’s government tried to subordinate the 
old rural Jao Phos and their networks through the creation of new hegemonic projects 
that circumvented the old Jao Pho and became the new patrons with hegemonies over 
social groups in rural areas. This matter is crucial as the emergence of the Yellow Shirts 
forces in late 2005 was partly due to the support of some rural Jao Pho and state 
bureaucrats who had been impaired by Thaksin’s hegemonic project. The section below 
will offer more detail on social forces/social classes and their relations towards each 
other in the old historical bloc. 
 
3. SOCIAL FORCES IN THE ‘OLD’ HISTORICAL BLOC 
The section above discussed the changing political economy conditions of the old 
historical bloc since the 1932 revolution. The American-led modernisation projects had 
constituted the emergence of social forces and shaped the social relations in the bloc 
since the 1960s. 16 The old historical bloc contained ‘four’ major social forces; the 
capitalists, labour, the middle class, and the peasantry. The ruling social forces were 
formerly the military (belonging to the middle class in terms of relations of production) 
and the monarchy between the 1960s and 1970s. However, from the 1980s onwards 
even the military still retain significant roles in Thai politics although they are no 
longer a ruling class especially since the 1990s. Rather, the capitalists―including the 
monarchy―became the dominant social groups since the 1980s. The new ruling class, 
the capitalists, have since the 1980s configured new social relations as they posit 
themselves as the ‘middleman’ between the old ruling class, the bureaucrats, and 
politicians. Meanwhile the subaltern social forces, labour and the peasantry, in the old 
historical bloc were concerned with the conditions of living and have not been polarised 
                                                             
15On rural influences and Thai local politics see McVey, 2000.  
16 Along with political economy, the ruling class also maintains the ideological terrain of the 
Thai historical bloc by establishing the dominant ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology as a crucial 
cohesive factor of the historical bloc. This will be dealt with in part two of this chapter below.  
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by the conflicts between Yellows and Reds. This pattern of social relations configured 
the Thai historical bloc until the rupture in 1997.17 
 
3.1 The Ruling Social Classes18 
This section focuses analysis upon the ruling social groups in the old historical bloc 
including the formerly dominant group, the Bureaucrats, which is the middle class at 
the present time, and the current dominant social group, the capitalists. A general 
picture of social groups including their economic nature and positions towards the 
support of the Yellow and the Red Shirts will be also offered in this section. 
 
3.1.1 The Bureaucrat as a Former Dominant Social Force 
The Thai bureaucrats dominated the politics of decision-making in the Thai state since 
the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The revolution itself did not emerge 
through an uprising of the people; rather it was an uprising of factions of social elites 
such as bureaucrats in both civilian and military spheres (Ockey, 2004 b: 143). The 
bureaucrat social groups expanded as a result of capitalist development in the late 1950s 
and the emergence of crucial ‘technocrats’ and ‘think-tanks’ such as the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI), the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), and the Bank of Thailand (BOT). As figure 4.1 will show 
below, bureaucrats as the former ruling elite were important and held the decision-
making power and resources to run the country even though they constituted a small 
proportion of the population (Ockey, 2004 b: 144). Table 4.3 below shows the great 
expansion of the former dominant social groups since the revolution of 1932 up to the 
era of the military regime. It shows that the bureaucrats grew sharply by more than 
100% since the crucial year of 1957 compared to the change after the post-1932 regime.  
                                                             
17This will be addressed in the next chapter.  
18From a Gramscian perspective, social groups/social forces are interchangeably used instead of 
the word ‘class’. By distinguishing between the dominant and the subaltern social forces, 
Gramsci as himself a Marxist sees this difference in terms of the ownership of means of 
production. However, within each social class, as Gramsci and later Poulantzas elaborated, is 
contained a number of ‘class fractions’ which all have a variety of dialectical relationships―as 
class alliance and class antagonism at the same time―among factions within and beyond 
classes. Furthermore, the economic nature of the capitalist class in Thailand is, therefore, a 
similar view to the Marxist perspective in which a class exploited and accumulated the surplus 
value from other subaltern social groups through a number of methods (Marx, 1976). 
81 
 
 Table 4.3: Expansion of the Thai Bureaucracy, 1933-1979 
 
 Source: Morell and Chai-anan, 1981: 43.  
The regime in which the bureaucracy holds the central role in the state administration 
was described in the important work of Riggs (1966) as the Bureaucratic Polity. In this 
regime, political economy became only a matter of competition between bureaucratic 
cliques for the benefit of the military government rather than free competition between 
social forces (Wilson, 1962; Painter, 2006: 28). From the 1960s, the administrative civil 
service was organised into important ministries including Interior, Finance, 
Agriculture, Communications, Education, and the Office of the Prime Minister. The 
bureaucrats provide crucial roles in basic government functions including economic 
planning (mainly by the NESDB and TDRI), allocation of resources, agricultural 
services, development of infrastructure, education and health promotion (Girling, 1981: 
135). The bureaucrat social groups as the major middle class performed the central role 
of administration from the 1960s until the early 1990s when other social forces such as 
the capitalists and other civil society groups were rising and balanced the dominant 
roles of the bureaucrats.  
In short, the economic nature of the Thai bureaucrats is different from other social 
forces. Their requirements differ from the capitalists as they require the strong state to 
secure their investment/production to make profit and also differ from the working 
class/labour as they struggle over wages, health-care schemes, improvements in living 
conditions, and other social securities. Rather, the bureaucrat social groups in Thailand 
gain superior social status and greater economic benefits than the workers. They have a 
special health-care scheme which also covers their parents and family members. They 
also have a number of benefits such as the waiving of tuition fees for the education of 
their children. Therefore, the bureaucrats in Thailand do not demand any specific social 
securities because they already receive better service than the workers. Nevertheless, 
what they require is a clean/non-corrupted administration and economic growth in 
general. After the 1997 crisis, the Thaksin government implemented a number of 
projects that were targeted at rural people, in particular the peasantry. The bureaucrat 
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as the middle class could sense the feeling of being overlooked by the state. Therefore, 
in order to secure their own interests, most of the bureaucrats were inclined to support 
the movement of the Yellow Shirts. 
 
3.1.2 The Capitalists as a Dominant Social Group  
Based on the study of Hewison (1989) and Akira (1996), the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) scheme launched under the guidance of the first Five-year plan19  
established the expansion of domestic capital which can be categorised into several main 
groups including banking capital, industrial capital, provincial-local capital and agro capital. 
However, it should be noted here that this thesis does not aim to focus on the politics of 
economic accumulation in each capitalist group specifically. Rather, this research 
principally aims to critically review some ‘crucial actors’ in each social force as the 
leading groups who contribute to various aspects of the politics of transition of the Thai 
state.  
 
3.1.2.1 Pattern of Relationships: Bureaucrat, Capitalist, Politician 
Before the analysis provided in the sub-sections below, figure 4.1 illustrates the political 
economic relationships among the dominant social forces in the old historical bloc. The 
figure shows that the former dominant social groups in Thailand (excluding the 
monarchy in this figure) were bureaucrats and politicians. The capitalist involvement in 
politics during this period appeared in two main strategies; ‘clientage’ and ‘agency’. 
Under the clientage strategy, business groups are not involved in politics directly, but 
rely on political figures to provide protection and to influence policy on their behalf. 
However, another method is where the capitalist assigns their representatives to work 
on their behalf in politics by serving as MPs or as officers of a political party (Thanee 
and Pasuk, 2008: 253-254). These patterns of relationships between the capitalist and 
bureaucracy dominated Thai political economy for more than five decades and were 
transformed after the 1997 economic crisis led by the Thaksin government.  
 
 
                                                             




Figure 4.1: Relationships among dominant social forces in Thailand since the 
late 1950s  
 
Source: Khan, 2000: 103.  
 
1) Banking Capital  
The first capitalist social group to be mentioned here—which formed and expanded as a 
result of the ISI scheme since the late 1950s—is Banking capital. The banking capitalist 
factions are crucial to the development of Thai capitalists as a whole and also to the 
growth of other capitalists as well (Apichat, 2013). Hewison (1988) argues that Banking 
capital formed the credit system for capital in general. They acted as a source of credit 
by releasing inactive capital from circulation and transforming it into active capital in 
production. Thailand’s banking-financial sector dramatically expanded since the early 
1960s and is largely owned and controlled by domestic capitalists, who mainly are Sino-
Thai (Chinese-Thai) (Hewison, 1988: 82; Jomo and Folk, 2003). This is the result of the 
industrial promotion policies of the post-1957 Saritist period. The ISI strategy resulted 
in the dramatic increase in state investment in the private sector, private investment in 
import-substitution industries, increases in imports of intermediate and capital goods, 
and increasing exports of diversified agricultural products. All these improvements led 
to a rapid expansion of the banking business after the 1960s (Akira, 1996: 245).  
Banking capital in Thailand emerged and was regulated prior to 1962 under the 
Banking Act of 1945. The law empowered the Bank of Thailand to act as a central bank 
and to regulate the banking industry. In addition, it set the condition that banks must be 
limited liability companies. By the 1950s, the 1945 Act was ineffective and led to the 
new ‘Commercial Banking Act of 1962’ (Hewison, 1989: 187). The new Act had the 
objectives of offering more protection to depositors and promoting public confidence in 
the banking system; to promote the growth of commercial banking on a sound banking 
basis and with a high standard of efficiency as well as making banks play a major role in 
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economic development; and providing the necessary tools for maintaining monetary 
stability (Hewison, 1989: 189). Since the 1960s four major banks emerged that still 
dominate the contemporary Thai financial sector including the Siam Commercial Bank 
(SCB) of the royal family, the Bangkok Bank of the Sophonpanich family, the Thai 
Farmers Bank of the Lamsam family, and the Bank of Ayudhya of the Ratanarak family 
(Hewison, 1988: 83; Kraisak, 1984: 141). Apart from these four major banks, there was 
restructuring after the 1997 economic crisis because many banks faced bankruptcy while 
some survived the crisis. The Banking capitalists had lost their dominant role in Thai 
capitalism in the post-1997 era as the new and aggressive Telecommunication capital 
has since then gained this powerful role.  
 
2) Industrial Capital  
Modern capitalist development in Thailand after the late 1950s led to the emergence of 
a number of domestic industrial groups/domestic industrial capitalists who gained 
benefits under government industrial promotion policies. Several general characteristics 
of the Thai industrial group can be summarised; firstly, the industrial capitalists usually 
form a ‘group of companies’ rather than a single business. Secondly, most owners and 
leaders of the industrialist groups were ethnically Chinese. Thirdly, most of the 
industrial groups are owned and operated by a single family (Akira, 1996: 224). 
Moreover, Akira also observes that the industrial groups in Thailand after the late 
1950s contain four major patterns of development. First, most of the founders of 
industrial groups formerly belonged to a merchant class. Second, most commercial 
business groups moved into manufacturing industries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Third, the industrialist groups’ investment in manufacturing depended majorly on 
financial and technological support of foreign capital in general, and Japanese in 
particular. Fourth, most domestic industrialists enjoyed oligopolistic status in selected 
industries. Their oligopoly resulted from the rapid expansion of their business and 
production under the various privileges granted by the government (Akira, 1996: 225-
231). Further, it should be noted that along with government promotion of industrial 
policies, the major reason that entailed the expansion of the industrial capital is the 






3) Provincial/Local Capitals  
Another important social faction in the capitalist class is the provincial/local capitalist 
based in provincial businesses. This social group became increasingly rich and powerful 
from the 1980s. There are four main sources of wealth that the local capitalists benefit 
from including firstly, local merchants gain benefit by acting as an intermediary between 
agro-capitalists and cultivators in the cash-crop buying process (this is part of the 
problem of the indebtedness of the rural peasant and will be analysed later in this 
thesis); secondly, from investing and trading in highly profitable businesses such as 
distribution of local whisky, agencies for the sale of pick-ups and motorcycles, hotels, 
and speculation in land; thirdly, since the early 1960s, there have been voluminous 
projects on roads, water works, dams, and public building construction in the Thai 
countryside.  
Therefore, in this way the local/provincial capitalists gain concessions in construction 
work and supply materials from the government (on the study of construction 
capitalists see Noppanan, 2006); lastly, from semi-legal and illegal businesses such as 
logging, smuggling, gambling, gun-running, and drug-trading (Pasuk and Baker, 1997: 
29-30). The local capitalists have also been taking advantage of their wealth in the 
sphere of social and political life in rural Thailand. They gained a privileged status as 
influential figures (like the mafia and referred to as ‘Jao Pho’ in Thai) that built and 
maintained a patron-client relationship to Thai rural people.  
In short, since the promotion of the ISI strategy in the late 1950s, there has been 
dramatic expansion of capitalist social groups in Thailand. Industrialist capital and local 
capital gained benefits from loans and funding through Banking capital in expanding 
their businesses. Banking capital itself also enjoyed an oligopoly of a few Sino-Thai 
families. These capitalist social forces, later, suffered tremendous effects from the 1997 
Asian economic crisis and were forced to restructure themselves in order to survive. 
This led to chances for new players in Thai politics in the aftermath of the crisis.  
 
4) Agro-Capital  
The agricultural sector of the Thai economy was one of the largest contributors to Thai 
economic growth in the period prior to 1957. However, after the modernisation project 
of Saritism, agriculture was diversified through an ‘export-orientation’ policy. The 
expansion of agri-business or the agro-capitalists benefited from the shift in 
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development strategy of the Thai government from ISI towards Export-orientated 
growth in the early 1970s (Hewison, 1986: 7). The government offered a channel of 
funding in order to boost the national export sector by creating a special bank. The 
Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC), established in 1966, was 
created to provide loans to agricultural businesses, agriculturalists, and peasants. From 
the period between the 1960s and 1980s, some commercial crops were introduced and 
became crucial in terms of export value such as kenaf, sugar, maize, and tapioca (Akira, 
1996: 266-267). However, the agro-capitalists accumulated their wealth from agro-
industry rather than export of various crops. The agro-industry was promoted in the 
fifth Five-year plan (1982-1986) for two major reasons; firstly, in order to increase the 
income of people living in the countryside and second, to further increase exports 
(Hewison, 1989: 134).  
Along with the expansion in agro-business since the early 1970s, there were a number 
of capitalist groups that emerged and accumulated wealth in this period. For example, 
the Charoen Pokphand Group (the CP group) dominated the agro-businesses in exports 
of various products including shrimp, poultry, and feed milling, the Metro Group 
dominated the market for fertilizer, the Betagro Group in feed milling and poultry, and 
the Mah Boon Krong Group in silo storage and food retailing (Goss and Burch, 2001: 
980). These outstanding capitalist groups have operated until the present, especially the 
CP Group who had a close relationship with the Thaksin government. The CP also held 
a Ministerial position in the first cabinet of the Thaksin government, along with other 
capitalist factions, in order to secure their class interests. 
 
3.2 Subaltern Social Classes 
Thailand’s industrial promotion via the ISI scheme from the late 1950s massively 
changed the social relations of production in the country. Government industrial 
promotion policies not only stimulated the expansion of the ruling social class, but also 
subaltern social groups; labour and the peasantry.  
 
3.2.1 Labour 
When considering the term labour/working class, it is here taken to mean the social 
groups who do not own the means of production, who are exploited by the 
capitalist/employer, and who need to sell their own labour-power; both their mental and 
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physical capabilities existing in the physical form and living personality of a human 
being whenever he produces a use-value of any kind in exchange for a wage (Marx, 
1976: 270). Therefore, the worker in this meaning includes both labourers in any 
industrialist firm and white-collar workers.  
It should be noted that the situation of labour as a social force in the pre-democratic 
period until the 1950s was constrained under the absolute monarchy regime and the 
pre-mature democracy after the 1932 revolution. The real expansion of the working 
class emerged since the late 1950s and, in the first stage, only centred on Bangkok. In 
terms of the security of workers’ interests, there was no legal coverage of this matter 
under the authoritarian regimes of the Sarit and Thanom governments. It was not until 
1975 that Thailand introduced the first legal protection of labour interests (Schmidt, 
2003: 162-164). The 1975 Labour Relations Act (LRA), for the first time, allowed 
workers to inhabit a collective sphere and form labour organisations. At the time, 
workers were also permitted by the authoritarian military government to have 
representation through trade unions, labour federations, and labour congress in a 
tripartite system in which the workers, employers, and the government were equal 
partners in cooperation over solving industrial conflicts (Brown, 2007: 818).  
 However, this law provided limited rights to the working class for dealing with 
political issues. The Thai working class had only limited rights, mainly in economic 
matters (Brown, 2004: 96-97). However, some radical workers along with the student 
forces demonstrated against the dictatorship of the military regime between October 
1973 and 1976. This resulted in the victory of the ‘rightists’ and increasing constraints 
upon workers (Hewison and Brown, 1994: 501; Bowie, 1997).  
In the 1980s, organised labour in Thailand still faced the difficulty of being a collective 
and demanded the guarantee of their interests. During this period the country shifted its 
industrial strategy from ISI to Export-orientated growth. This change led to a 
substantial expansion of the urban industrial segment of the working class. However, 
what is interesting for the Thai case is, as Brown (2007) argues, that during that period 
business, civilian, and military bureaucratic elites set targets to ensure that labour 
conflicts would be contained and managed within the parameters of the new formal 
modes of participation and representation. Thai labour organisations received threats, 
beatings, and the strategic murder of a few union officials and activists in order to 
render the working class fragile and too weak to demonstrate (Brown, 2007: 819).  
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In the 1990s, Thai democracy was consolidating through the stream of globalisation 
and the expansion of civil society, NGOs, and the media (Brown, 1997: 176). Female 
workers have increased and began to occupy central places in a developing network of 
local labour groups, NGOs, academics, and other civil society groups. Even though the 
country has developed and democracy has strengthened within Thai political culture, 
labour still engaged in long term campaigns seeking to improve workplaces, health, 
safety, reform of labour legislation, extension of a social security system, problems 
related to migrant labour, and the placing of limits on sub-contracting and the use of 
other forms of flexible employment (Brown, 2007: 821). 
 
3.2.2 The Peasants 
The last subaltern social group to be considered here is the peasant social forces. The 
peasant, in the conceptualization held in this work, are not only the rural farmers or 
gardeners who employ agricultural means of subsistence, but also include the informal 
workers who work in general services without legal contracts20 in both urban and rural 
areas. However, most of the peasants are based in rural areas. As table 4.4 below shows, 
there were more than 80% of the population living in rural areas since the 1960s and 
that figure significantly declined since 2000. In addition, informal workers are majorly 
based in the agricultural sector. As table 4.5 below indicates, they constitute more than 
60% of informal employment in the agricultural sector while around 30% belong to non-
agricultural sector.  
 
Table 4.4: Percentage of Population Living in Rural Areas, 1960-2000 
 
Source: Bryant and Gray, 2005: 3.  
 
                                                             
20 Therefore, the informal workers, in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, are not 
included in the national social security system. The lack of social welfare systems provided to all 
social groups by the state is the main reason for the support of peasants towards Thaksinism as 
the Thaksin government offered a cheap 30-Baht Health Care scheme, a new invention that 
could reduce the social gap, to all social classes while they were in power. 
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Table 4.5: Percentage of Informal Employment of Agricultural and Non-
Agricultural Sectors in Thailand  
 
Source: Adapted from the Informal Employment Survey 2012. National 
Statistical Office, 2012: v.  
It could be said that the peasantry are the one of the major social forces in the Thai state 
in terms of numbers as the total labour force of Thailand in 2011was 38.98 million and 
15.53 million were still working in agricultural sectors (see the table 4.6 below). This 
data is helpful in pointing out the reasons why Thaksinism greatly concentrated on the 
peasant social groups 21  while the Thaksin government was in power because the 
peasant are their main political stronghold.  
 Table 4.6: Comparison of the Number of Employed Persons by Industry (Unit: 
Million)  
 
Source: National Statistical Office, Summary of the Labour Force Survey in 
Thailand: October 2012. 
Those considered here as peasant social groups shared similar socio-economic 
difficulties as a result of the uneven process of industrial development from the late 
1950s. The peasants, or what is sometimes called the ‘rural poor’ of Thailand, have faced 
three main basic problems including the difficulties of indebtedness, lack of health 
coverage, and landlessness. Firstly, the problem of indebtedness of the rural peasant has 
been a long standing issue for several decades. This crucial problem of the rural poor is 
a result of various causes. However, Turton (1992) argues that the major reason that led 
to the debt crisis of the peasants is the low market price of fruits and cash crops. Most 
rural peasants plant their crops in a primitive way that is dependent on seasonal 
                                                             
21 Appeared as the government spending on a number of projects to the rural social groups 
between 2001 and 2006. This will be discussed in the chapter six below. 
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weather. This led to cycles of low and uncertain productivity and the rural peasant lost 
their money after selling their goods. In addition, the price of crops is depressed by 
several reasons such as by intermediate merchant staking advantage of peasants, 
changing to the quota and grading systems, and fees for storage, transport and other 
costs (Turton, 1992: 78).  
Second, the lack of a universal health care system led to increasing health costs for the 
rural poor. Health crises including chronic and debilitating sickness are frequently 
precipitating factors related to the intensification of work and declining levels of 
consumption (Turton, 1992: 78). Without a reliable health care scheme these place a 
massive cost on the rural poor along with other routine expenditures such as education 
fees, fines, and other compulsory contributions. This lack of health care security, to 
some extent, brings the rural poor into a cycle of indebtedness. The data based on the 
national registration of the poor by the Thaksin government in 2005 shows that there 
were more than five million people confronted by the indebtedness cycle. 
Lastly, the most important problem that the rural poor has confronted and struggled 
with for a long time is the matter of landlessness (Haberkorn, 2011). In Thailand, there 
has not been proper distribution of land. Most of the rural poor do not own land and are 
by necessity tenant farmers who pay high rent each year. Based on statistics from the 
Agricultural Land Reform Office, it is estimated that 39.42% of people were tenants in 
Chiang Mai in 1976 (Anan, 1992: 99). Until the present day, the problem of the 
landlessness of rural peasants has not yet been systematically resolved. Based on the 
data from the Agricultural Land Reform Office it shows that there were more than two 
million people suffering from the problem of landlessness (Agricultural Land Reform 
Office, 2013). 
The rural peasants in Thailand have been considered as poor in the absolute sense for 
several decades. However, the modernisation projects initiated under Sarit’s 
government in the late 1950s led to improvements in terms of poverty in the absolute 
sense. However, relative poverty when compared to the rich capitalist class, has been 
enlarging each year. Moreover, the crucial recent study of Walker (2012) argues that 
the largest group in contemporary rural Thailand is not the absolute poor social group; 
rather it is the ‘middle-income peasant’ which comprises 80% of the population in central 
Thailand, 70% in southern and northern, and 60% in northeastern Thailand (Walker, 
2012: 43). Middle-income peasant households are diverse and involve a combination of 
subsistence and cash-crop agriculture with various sources of off-farm income. At the 
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top level rural middle-income peasants make profit from cash cropping and own their 
enterprises such as shopkeeping, crop trading, and money lending (Walker, 2012: 44).  
In short, four major social forces have emerged and possess different class interests. 
Political economy in any period is the politics of struggle to achieve a particular classes’ 
own benefit. However, what is interesting and makes the case study of Thai political 
economy unique is that the subaltern and dominant social classes in Thai historical bloc 
never struggled against each other in terms of different modes of thought or political 
ideology. The old historical bloc was successfully tied to these social forces together 
with what has been referred to here as the ‘royalist-nationalist’ political ideology. 
Within this hegemonic conception of the world, social forces never fight each other 
regarding aspects of political belief as their class relations were limited to only the 
economic-corporate phase (see chapter three). It was not until the massive change 
following the post-2006 coup d’état that social relations between the ruling and ruled 
were transformed―from economic-corporate to hegemony―and each social force raised 
awareness to question the broader picture of social structure that governed them. These 
matters will be explored in the core chapters below. 
 
PART TWO―IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY: ‘ROYALISM-NATIONALISM’ AS A COHESIVE 
FACTOR 
 
Part one of this chapter illustrated the picture of development in Thailand’s political 
economy since the early 1990s to 1997 and the emergence of four major social groups in 
relation to their class interests. However, the constitution of the so-called historical bloc 
was not established purely in terms of political economy, but also ideological-cultural 
politics. The dominant social classes have been employing the ‘royalist-nationalist’ 
hegemonic ideology as a cohesive factor that ties up several social groups in Thailand in 
the same ‘mode of thought’ along with harsh applications of the lèse majesté law. The 
picture of the ‘old’ historical bloc of Thailand will be completed after both economy and 







4. ‘ROYALISM-NATIONALISM’ AS A COHESIVE FACTOR  
The old historical bloc of Thailand―from the 1960s to 1997―established the ‘royalist-
nationalist’ ideology as a cohesive factor that determines class configurations. Social 
forces in Thai political economy regardless of whether they belong to the superior or 
inferior social groups had been tied to a similar political ideology that centred on the 
king and nationalist projects. The royalist-nationalist hegemonic ideology is comprised 
of ‘three’ major ‘common senses’―monarchy as a sacred institution, as a popular 
institution for all, and as a democratic monarchy―which operated in terrains of both 
‘force and consent’ through the monarchy’s network. The network, as McCargo (2005) 
described, is ‘the network of the monarchy’ or in the Gramscian sense it is the intellectuals’ 
network. In this section, the revitalisation of monarchical power and the three major 
ideological/cultural common senses that dominated and configured social relations for 
Thai social forces will be analysed.  
 
4.1 The Thai monarchy and its Ideological Centre in the Thai Historical Bloc   
The central ideology which dominated the Thai historical bloc following the 1932 
revolution was ‘nationalism’ under the period of Field Marshall Phibun through his 
many hegemonic projects such as the Statism acts (see part one of this chapter). It was 
not until the landmark military coup overthrew the Phibun government in 1957 that 
Thailand under Field Marshall Sarit employed other ideologies. These are ‘paternalism’ 
combined with military ‘despotism’ and form the central ideologies controlling the ‘mode 
of thought’ of Thai society. Nevertheless, the most distinctive ideology that attention 
should be paid to when considering modern Thai politics is the ‘royal power’ of the 
monarchy that some academics label as ‘royal hegemony’ (Chanida, 2007; Kasian; 2006). 
Hewison (2008: 191) argues that ideological, social, and cultural aspects of Thailand are 
unique from other countries. For some Thais, their ideological worldview revolves 
around the ninth king, Bhumibol, of the Chakri dynasty. The royal power and 
ideological hegemony of King Bhumibol, it is argued here, is not derived from nature. 
Rather, it was invented by the social elites in order to secure their own class interests. 
The invention of royal hegemony was first established by Field Marshall Sarit in the 
early 1960s. Furthermore, the King’s power was firmly rooted after his intervention in 
the 1973 student uprising. After that event, the combination of ‘royalism’ and 
‘nationalism’ was successfully established.  
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4.1.1 Revitalisation of the Monarchical Power  
The Thai monarchy gladly welcomed the military coup in 1957. They struggled and 
strived to regain their political power and hegemonic position from the Phibun 
government that had suppressed them in many ways. The 1957 coup offered a good 
opportunity for the monarchy to ally with the military rather than exist in opposition to 
it as had been the case for two decades previously. In fact, this occurred because Sarit 
and the monarchy shared mutual interests. On the one hand, in order to revitalise the 
importance of monarchy, Sarit could gain a high degree of political legitimacy and 
reputation from the Thai people as leader of the government that protected and 
promoted the significance of the king. On the other hand, the monarchy itself could 
secure the throne and regain some ancient monarchical power after it had been ignored 
for several decades (Thak, 2007: 181-222; Thongchai, 2008: 19-22; Morell and Chai-
anan, 1981: 64-69). 
It can therefore be seen that the Sarit government was the first actor who paved the 
way for the monarchy to return to the centre of Thai national culture and ideology 
(Handley, 2006: 156; Thak, 2007; Morrell and Chai-anan, 1981). The military 
government restored the sacredness of the king and the monarchy as political 
institutions by offering him the restoration of some crucial royal ancient rituals, 
increasing the King’s budget, and promoting the Thai monarchy to the world by 
establishing many years of royal touring with visits to many countries around the world 
during the early 1960s (Thak, 2007: 81-110). Moreover, the Sarit government also 
protected the Thai monarchy by maintainance of force through the tough application of 
‘the lèse majesté law’. This law is a very important state apparatus in order to protect the 
King, the monarchy, and the royal family from any charge or criticism and has been 
used until today (Streckfuss, 1995, 2010). It is argued here that the power of the Thai 
monarchy did not emerge from nature and therefore that it needs to be created by 
human actions through many social means. In this sense Gramsci sees that there are 
‘intellectuals’ in each social group who work for the monarchy in order to maintain its 
hegemonic project.  
 
4.1.2 Networks of Monarchy as Gramsci’s Intellectuals 
Duncan McCargo (2005) argues that the Thai king needs a ‘proxy’ who manages his 
network in order to secure and reproduce his power (McCargo, 2005: 505). This 
coincides with what Gramsci called the roles of ‘intellectuals’ who have the job of 
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producing knowledge and who exercise ‘consent’ of the great masses of the population 
towards the general direction (Gramsci, 1971: 12; see chapter three). In order to create, 
maintain, and reproduce the power of the monarchy, this thesis argues, the king needs 
to gain benefit from some social intellectuals. There are three major characteristics of 
Thailand’s network monarchy that have dominated Thai politics since the 1980s. First, 
the monarch functions as the chief source of political decisions during times of political 
crisis because the monarchy in Thailand has been the primary source of national 
legitimacy since the revitalisation of monarchical power in the late 1950s, as mentioned 
earlier. Second, the king acted as a commentator on national issues, giving suggestions 
to set Thailand’s national agenda, in particular through his annual birthday speeches 
and other occasions. Third, King Bhumibol actively participates in political and social  
developments by working through his proxies, in particular privy councillors, trusted 
military ﬁgures, and the lead proxy, former army commander and Prime Minister Prem 
Tinsulanond (Chambers, 2013; Chanida, 2007). This network of the King’s proxies 
unofficially determines the nature of coalition governments, and monitored the process 
of high-ranked military and civil bureaucrats annual promotions. At the centre, network 
governance of this kind was based on placing the right people in the right jobs and 
Prem was the key person in the network (McCargo, 2005: 501; Thanapol, 2006b). The 
next section will examine what the intellectual network of the monarchy has so far done 
over the past few decades in order to ‘produce and maintain’ the hegemonic royalism-
nationalism over Thai political society.  
 
5. PRODUCING COMMON SENSES 
Hegemonic status of the Thai king has been produced over the sphere of the 
superstructure both in civil and political society. Over four decades, the monarchy and 
its proxies have constructed at least three major ‘common senses/conception of the world’ 
over Thai society including the king as sacredness, popularity, and democratic king. 
According to Gramsci, ‘common sense’ is the conception of the world that is uncritically 
absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral 
individuality of the average man is developed (Gramsci, 1971: 419). Common sense is 
the conception of the world that is established by the ruling class in order to secure its 
class interests and control subaltern worldviews (Bocock, 1986: 46). This process of 
building common sense operates through the functions of intellectuals in the sphere of 
civil society and political society as is shown below.  
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5.1 Being Sacred  
The first common sense that was created in order to serve the monarchy and royalist 
interests is ‘the king as the sacred institution’. This was an attempt to renew the ancient 
belief, the so-called ‘Devaraja’ or the ‘god king’/‘the king as god’, and apply it to modern 
politics (Jackson, 2010). The creation of the common sense that the king/monarchy is 
sacred operates through both ‘consent and force’(via hegemonic and state apparatuses).  
 
5.1.1 Hegemonic Apparatuses   
In the Gramscian sense, hegemonic apparatus will be employed in order to gain consent 
over civil society along with the coercive apparatus that will be used in the sphere of 
political society. The combination between civil and political society is the significance 
of Gramsci’s notion of the integral state, as shown in the previous chapter. The Thai 
monarchy invented some hegemonic projects in order to construct this common sense 
via many royal rituals and other means. Among several attempts, the invention of ‘royal 
birthday celebrations’ is a major annual festival for the country. The King and Queen’s 
birthdays are official holidays in Thailand. On those occasions there are celebrations in 
all areas of Thailand and Thai people look forward to hearing the King’s annual speech 
on the day before his birthday in order to listen to his criticism of the government’s 
administration and hear other suggestions for Thai people.  
Moreover, the royalists produced the King’s birthday as the national ‘fathers day’ and the 
Queen’s birthday as the national ‘mothers day’. This birthday ritual reinforces the 
cultivated idea that the monarchs are the parents of all Thais (Thongchai, 2008: 21). 
Apart from royal birthdays, the monarchy takes advantage of the sense of the king as a 
sacred institution through other means such as the reinvention of the ancient royal 
fertility rites in which the king participates in a ploughing ceremony. This is to 
hegemonise most rural Thai people who work in the agricultural sector. They also 
invented the King’s role as titular head of the armed forces, increasing the number of 
royal guards in the palace. In addition, they increased the number of meetings with 
private business and industry, and with foreign dignitaries and agencies. The monarchy 
widened its network of contacts and information sources via many royal rituals 
(Handley, 2006: 143-145).  
In addition, another important hegemonic tool that the monarchy and its allies 
employed to create a common worldview of the sacral king is the integration of 
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Buddhism, business, and sacredness of the monarchy. As Jackson (2010: 33) argues, in 
Thailand political and religious forms of power have never been clearly separated. For 
example, King Bhumibol has been attached to the divinity of ‘Sadet Phor Ror Har’ 
(Royal Father of the Fifth King) of King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V). King 
Chulalongkorn has been promoted as the king who preserved Siam’s independence in 
the face of French and British imperialism, and established the country on a self-
determined course to modernity and economic development (Jackson, 2010: 46). King 
Bhumibol is commonly linked symbolically with the worship of King Chulalongkorn via 
many ways such as the production of Buddhist amulets together with images of King 
Bhumibol and King Chulalongkorn. Most Thai people believe in the divinity and extra-
ordinary magic of the amulet. To combine both kings with the amulet is the crucial way 
to sacralise the monarchy (Jackson, 2009; Jackson, 2010). Along with these hegemonic 
apparatuses, the network of monarchy also employs many state apparatuses in order to 
coerce the sacredness of the monarchy, as is shown below. 
 
5.1.2 State Apparatuses  
Following Gramsci’s notion of the integral state, in order to build up the common sense 
that the king/monarchy is a sacred social force, state apparatuses were employed along 
with hegemonic apparatuses as shown above. Major state apparatuses that the dominant 
social force employs are constitutional protection and the lèse majesté law. The power of 
the Thai monarchy had been limited since Thailand first enacted the first Constitution 
in 1932. However, this changed as a result of the struggle between the royalists and the 
People’s party between 1932 and 1957, the Thai Constitution of 1947 and especially 
after the coup in 1957 that restored privilege to the king. From 1947, the king was 
allowed to have and select the Privy Councillors. The power to control the Crown’s 
Property Bureau, which was abandoned by Field Marshall Phibun, was also restored. In 
addition, all Constitutions after 1947 protected the monarchy from any criticism. For 
example, in Section 8, Chapter II of the Constitution of Thailand 2007 it is stated that:  
Section 8. The King shall be enthroned in a position of 
revered worship and shall not be violated. No person shall 
expose the King to any sort of accusation or action. 
 
In addition, along with protection from the Constitution, the king was also protected 




Article 112: Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, 
Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of three to fifteen years. 
 
Streckfuss (1995), an expert on Thai lèse majesté, argues that the law of lèse majesté in 
Thailand was first a part of the Print Act in the late 1890s. The sentencing under this 
law provided for more than three years imprisonment. Nevertheless, he argues that the 
penalty of the lèse majesté law was increased in 1908 to up to seven years 
imprisonment. In addition, after the revision of the criminal code in 1957, lèse majesté 
became not merely a crime against the reputation of the royals, but a ‘national security’ 
offence. Even nowadays the sentence for the lèse majesté law has been raised to up to 
fifteen years imprisonment.  
In fact, the lèse majesté law is rarely used to penalise persons who accuse or insult the 
monarchy. Rather, it has been used as a tool to discredit the opposition in politics. 
Streckfuss (2010: 107) suggested that charges under the lèse majesté law have been 
increasing. From 1992 to 2004 there were fewer than on average five cases per year. 
However, during the period of the crisis of authority between 2005 and 2008 the 
average sharply increased to more than 60 cases annually (more details in chapter 
eight). Moreover, it was at its peak in 2007 when there were 126 cases in one year. The 
issue of the sacredness of the monarchy and the King and their apparatuses will be 
considered in more details in chapters seven and eight. In short, the conception of the 
world which represented the king as a sacred institution has been constructed through 
many means via both hegemonic and state apparatuses. These attempts were used to 
secure the hegemonic role of the Thai monarchy over Thai political society. 
 
5.2 Being Popular  
The Thai monarchy was neglected in Thailand before the re-establishment of power 
after 1957. In order to gain support from the monarchy, the Sarit government re-
invented the importance of the monarchy as is mentioned earlier. The king/monarchy 
needs to be popular for Thai people in Sarit’s view. The more people beloved of the king, 
the more praise to the Sarit government. 
The royal travels of King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit took place, as Thak (2007) stated, 
because of the poor social character of Sarit; he therefore turned to the king for help to 
promote the country abroad (Thak, 2007: 206). The king first started his royal world 
98 
 
tour by visiting neighbouring countries including the Republic of Vietnam, Indonesia, 
and Burma in late 1959. These visits gained the king strong reputation in both the 
international and the Thai press. The King’s performance received a very favourable 
domestic reaction and Thai people were happy that the Sarit government had offered 
support to the throne. A year later, the king and the queen visited Western countries 
between mid-June 1960 and mid-January 1961. These trips involved fourteen countries 
from the United States, England, West Germany, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
Moreover, in 1963 they continued the royal visits to Malaya, Pakistan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines (Thak, 2007: 207). These royal world tours left an 
impression of the king and the country. These were the first attempts to build up the 
conception that the monarchy was popular in Thai society.   
Further, the most popularity enhancing tool of King Bhumibol is his operation of the 
‘royal development projects’ or the royal projects under the budget of the government and 
his own money on some projects. The royal projects were initiated in the early 1950s 
and up to the present there have been more than 3,000 projects launched under the 
King’s initiative (Chanida, 2007: 4). The King’s royal projects are various and covered 
all areas of peoples’ lives such as the projects on rural development of roads, irrigation, 
agriculture, medicine, and education. In addition, all royal affairs involving the king, the 
queen, and the royal family involved are broadcast by every TV channel under the ‘royal 
affairs news’ section every day at 8 pm. Thai people have watched the hard-working 
images of the king and his royal family every day for decades through every public 
television channel. This is not surprising and is why most Thai people love the king and 
his family and never doubt them in any aspect. However, these social relations were 
changed by Thaksinism and could be seen, by the royalists, as an attempt to challenge 
the King’s hegemony (this will be discussed in chapter seven).  
In addition, another example of the construction of the king as a popular figure is the 
reception by Thai people of the notion of ‘sufficiency economy philosophy’ (SEP). After the 
economic collapse in 1997, there was a chance for the king to reinforce his hegemonic 
status over Thai society by launching his idea of SEP. This philosophy, the King argues, 
should be employed by Thai people in times of economic crisis and beyond―this will be 
shown in the next chapter on the role of SEP in the time of 1997 economic crisis. The 
King’s idea is an attempt to propose a new path for Thai society, economy, and culture 
by strengthening the ‘moral fibre’ of the nation. The King’s SEP is based on Buddhist 
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philosophical and moral principles which stimulated Thai people to create the 
conditions for the sufficiency economy in which people should live a moderate, self-
dependent life without greed, uncontrolled cravings and overexploitation (Isager and 
Ivarsson, 2010: 223). The King’s SEP has been promoted throughout the country via a 
number of state agencies and private sectors. The SEP was placed as the main theme of 
the Tenth economic and social development plan of Thailand. Without any scrutinising 
of the applicability of the concept, the SEP was constructed as one among various other 
important hegemonic tools to gain spontaneous support from Thai people (Walker, 
2010). The conception of the king as being popular and his image as a genius in many 
fields was constructed to hegemonise Thai people in order to secure this imbalanced 
social relationship between the dominant and subaltern social classes over the long run.  
 
5.3 Being Democratic  
The last standard conception of the world held by Thai people that was created is that 
the monarchy is ‘above politics’ and would not themselves play any role in political 
affairs. As Thongchai (2008: 22) argues, this is wrong because the monarchy is like 
everyone else in a political society. They always engage with politics in various ways for 
their own interests. Additionally, it is argued here that King Bhumibol actively 
intervened in politics on various occasions; however, the most clearly seen was the event 
of the student uprising in October 1973 and the massive demonstrations in May 1992 
(Callahan, 1998; Yoshifumi, 2008). The King’s interventions in times of crisis and the 
reinventing of the role of King Rama VII―who was overthrown from his absolutist rule 
in 1932―were two major attempts in order to build this common sense.  
On 14 October 1973, after a day of violent repression, King Bhumibol appeared in a 
nationwide television broadcast and made a royal speech denouncing the aggressive 
repression by state officials. The king asked everyone to think of the country and be 
united. After his broadcast the situation was controlled and ultimately Field Marshall 
Thanom and his allies, Field Marshall Prapas and Colonel Narong resigned from official 
positions and took refuge abroad. The King, as soon as possible, appointed his ally, 
Professor Sanya Thammasak, a lawyer, to be mandated as Prime Minister on the same 
day (Zimmerman, 1974: 512-514; Prajak, 2005). The King’s appearance and the 
utilisation of his calibre in order to control the crisis can be seen as an affirmation of the 
King’s power over Thai society. This was the major confirmation of his royal power 
since the revitalisation of the monarchy by Field Marshal Sarit in the 1960s.  
100 
 
In addition, another crucial event confirming the perspective of Thai people over their 
monarchy as the leader of democracy was the events of May 1992. The formation of the 
military-backed government in early 1992 was the starting point for another major 
protest in Thai political history along with the events of 14 October 1973 and 6 October 
1976 (Morrell and Chai-anan, 1981; Thanes, 2008). Thai people, almost all of whom 
were the middle class who lived in Bangkok, demonstrated against General Sujinda 
Kraprayoon, the non-elected Prime Minister, at Rajadamnern road between 17 and 19 
May 1992. The Sujinda government employed violent repression for a few days and the 
situation became worse. At this moment, King Bhumibol intervened in the political 
crisis, once again, by calling General Sujinda and Major-General Chamlong Srimuang, 
leader of the protestors to meet him at the Royal palace and broadcasted the meeting 
nationwide (Rosi, 1995:1050-1054; Suchit, 1993). The demonstration was resolved after 
the King took action. General Sujinda resigned from his position and Mr. Anand 
Panyarachoon was appointed by the King to be Prime Minister for the second time. The 
King’s action confirms that he still plays a hegemonic role in Thai politics and ties social 
forces up in times of crisis.  
Moreover, rather than intervening in times of crisis, the Thai monarchy constructed 
this common sense by means of the reinvention of the discourse of King Prachadhipok 
(King Rama VII) as the ‘founding father of Thai democracy’ (Thongchai, 2008: 23). Thai 
people nowadays have had their worldview shaped to include that King Prachadhipok 
was the real founder and the giver of Thai democracy rather than the great struggle of 
the People’s Party. The government funded the King Prachadhipok Institute (KPI) for 
research in politics and public affairs along with the KPI museum that reproduced this 
common sense to Thai society. The discourse of King Prachadhipok gives credit to the 
Siam absolute monarchy for delivering democracy towards Thai people, rather than the 
fight of ordinary men (Thongchai, 2008: 23). Nevertheless, this belief also benefited 
King Bhumibol as the key person who enabled Thai democracy to survive political 
crises many times.  
In short, the ideological aspect of the existing Thai historical bloc is centred on ‘the 
monarchy’, i.e. ‘King Bhumibol’. Thai society had been constructed by the King’s network 
of intellectuals in order to build up ‘three major common senses’ including the king as 
being sacred, being popular, and being democratic. These common senses were 
constituted through ‘nationalism’ and ‘royal paternalism’, which is the view of the king as 
the father of the nation rather than ‘liberalism’ or any other political ideologies. The 
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king became the centre of the ideological dimension in all areas of peoples’ lives 
following the revitalisation of the monarchy by the Sarit government in the late 1950s 
and this was more firmly rooted after his intervention in the events of the 1973 student 
uprising. The King’s power and these common senses/conceptions of the world seem to 
be extremely strong and should be predicted to last over the very long run. However, 
the emergence of the Red Shirts movement in 2009–2010 illustrated that these existing 
standard perceptions have now been challenged. Debates and discussions about the 
monarchy even under the protection of the ‘lèse majesté law’ in Thailand are, in fact, 
increasing (Ivarsson and Isager, 2010). The challenges of the Red Shirt social force will 
be considered in both chapters seven and eight.  
6. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in previous chapters this thesis deals with the four major 
features―history, crisis, transition, and crisis within transition―of the Thai historical bloc. 
This chapter has provided the overall picture of the Thai state to the reader as a basis 
for political analysis in the following core chapters. The chapter placed itself as a 
historical chapter that examines the changing conditions of political economy of 
Thailand since the 1932 revolution to the pre-1997 crisis period. As shown in Part One, 
the social relations of production have dramatically changed through the different 
political regimes of the nationalist-militarist regime in the 1940s-1950s and modern 
industrialisation since the late 1950s. In response to the changing political economy, 
major social forces―the capitalists, labour, the middle class, and the peasants―have 
their own class movements in order to secure their own interests.  
Nevertheless, as analysed in Part Two, these main social groups of the Thai state have 
never contested each other in relation to the question of the unfair/undemocratic 
regime on a political basis as they were all tied together as a social bloc by the 
hegemonic ‘royalist-nationalist’ political ideology. Social forces in the old historical bloc 
fought against each other in limited aspects of what Gramsci called the ‘economic-
corporate phase’―they were only concerned with economic matters in their struggle 
rather than politico-ideological stances. Social relations between the ruling and the 
ruled social classes were transformed after Thaksinism was usurped by the army in 
2006. The unthinkable aspects of the regime of government have been questioned by the 
subaltern social forces―led by the Red Shirts social force―which eventually led to 




THE RUPTURE OF THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC: THAILAND AND THE 
1997 ECONOMIC CRISIS 
1. INTRODUCTION  
John Holloway (1992) once stated that the concept of ‘crisis’ is not only economic, but 
presents itself as such. Crisis expresses the ‘structural instability’ of capitalist social 
relations; the instability of the basic relation between capital and labour on which 
society is based (Holloway, 1992: 159). The severe economic crisis of 1997, therefore, 
was not only an economic collapse that took place isolated from other elements. Rather, 
it was also a crisis of capitalist social relations in Thai society. It was a crisis of all  
economic, political, and socio-ideological elements. This chapter aims to paint a picture 
of the eruption of the old historical bloc in 1997. In the previous chapter it was shown 
that the modern Thai historical bloc was configured by the process of uneven and 
exclusionary economic development and royalist-nationalist ideology. Configurations of 
power among social groups in Thailand were shaped by these two crucial elements since 
the late 1950s. Nevertheless, the crisis of the state in 1997 affected these relations of 
social power. This paved the way for some new political actors to, eventually, transform 
existing social relations in the post-crisis period. 
The crisis of the Thai historical bloc in 1997 severely affected social forces in many 
ways. In terms of economic devastation1 the crisis demolished a number of Sino-Thai 
financial-banking capitalists―who had dominated Thailand’s economy for 
decades―and other banks funded by the Thai army and the monarchy. The crisis also 
hindered numerous investments by both domestic and international industrial 
capitalists. Likewise, for the subaltern social classes, a huge number of labourers and the 
middle class were immediately rendered unemployed and part of these groups returned 
to the rural agricultural sector. During the time of crisis, the Thai social forces―the 
capitalists, the middle class, the peasants, and labour in both urban and rural areas―had 
strongly demanded a ‘new, innovative, and strong state’ in order to secure and 
                                                             
1 The crisis of 1997 did not only affect the political economy of Thailand, but also ideological 
elements. The so-called royalism-nationalism that had been constructed since the late 1950s (see 
the previous chapter) had been strengthened by the monarchy through the King’s royal 
initiative notion of ‘Self-Sufficiency Economy’ (SEP). The monarchy played a cohesive role in 
binding social forces together by the time of crisis via this SEP and it had been significant for 
several years until the rise of Thaksinism in 2001. There will be more discussion on the SEP in 
chapter eight of the thesis.  
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guarantee their class interests as soon as possible.2 Then, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 
party,3 as the alternative, innovative and very strong social group, would later take 
crucial action in order to restructure the configurations of power, that were disrupted by 
the 1997 crisis, among social groups in Thai historical bloc. Therefore, as a critical point 
of departure to understand the crisis of the Thai state in 2010, this thesis argues, it is 
necessary to understand the 1997 crisis and its consequences upon social forces. This 
chapter offers itself as a connection to perceive the ‘crisis-ridden’ transition of the Thai 
historical bloc.   
 
2. ECONOMIC BOOM: EXPORT-LED GROWTH AND FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
2.1 Thailand in the 1980s  
Thailand in the period between the 1980s and 1997 faced the changing political 
environment as the Cold War ended and the Thai army learned to accommodate the 
spread of neoliberal globalisation. Under the administrations of the Prem and Chartichai 
governments, Thailand shifted its direction towards more foreign trade under the 
Chartichai government’s slogan of ‘changing the war for trade’ (Pasuk and Baker, 1997). 
With the rising stream of neoliberal hegemony, Thailand enjoyed economic growth 
without noticing the coming of crisis in 1997. In the 1980s, the country had opened up 
to the processes of globalisation and adopted neoliberal economic practices. The World 
Bank (WB) urged Thailand to liberalise its financial system as the next stage in making 
the economy more efficient and more accessible to foreign capital (Baker and Pasuk, 
2009: 253). This period was known as the ‘economic boom’ period. The Thai economy 
was considerably transformed from the earlier decades and attached itself closely to the 
strategies of the Washington Consensus including export-orientated industrialisation 
(EOI), foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial liberalisation as three main sources 




                                                             
2 On the concept of the strong state and free economy see Bonefeld, 2010, 2012a, 2012b.  
3The TRT party and its restructuring programmes of the Thai state will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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2.2 Explaining the Boom: Export-Led Growth and Foreign Direct Investment  
Until the economic crisis erupted in July 1997, Thailand’s economy had enjoyed four 
decades of exceptionally economic growth. The period from 1987 to 1997 was one of the 
great economic booms as Thailand achieved some of the highest growth rates in the 
world (Hewison, 1999a: 7). However, it should be noted here that the decade of boom in 
Thailand was not driven by improvements in the quality of the labour force (Warr, 
1998: 50). Rather, it derived from two major sources; firstly, it was fuelled by the shift in 
economic strategy of the Thai government from import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) towards the wider strategies of export-led growth or the EOI and FDI. Second, 
economic growth in the boom decade of Thailand was not based on the real economy 
that relies on intensive skilled labour, rather, it was due to financial liberalisation 
implemented in the early 1990s.  
 
2.2.1 Export-Led Growth 
From the 1950s, the major strategy of the Thai state to stimulate economic growth was 
ISI (Somboon, 2010: 64-72; Akira, 1989; Ingram, 2009). However, EOI, which was 
encouraged from the late 1970s, remained crucial for the Thai economy in the 1980s and 
beyond. From 1985 to 1990, total exports from Thailand multiplied three times. The 
sharp rise was led by local firms in labour-intensive manufacture (Pasuk and Baker, 
1998: 31). The country successfully transformed itself from an agrarian-based 
economy―which heavily depended on rice and land-intensive production―to an 
export-led economy that combined agriculture, agro-industry, manufacturing, and 
services. This is confirmed by data in figure 5.1 and table 5.1 below that show that the 
agricultural sector significantly declined in its contribution to economic growth from 
40% of GDP in the 1960s to only 10% in 1985 while non-agriculture increased from 
25.3% of GDP in the period between 1957 and 1973 to reach 45.5% on the eve of 






Figure 5.1: Percentage Contributions to GDP of Agriculture and Manufacturing 
Sectors in Thailand from 1960 to 1995 
 
Source: Hewison, 2000: 197 
Table 5.1: Economic Growth by Sectors and Percentage Share of GDP  
 
Source: Somboon, 2012: 142. 
Thailand had become one of the world’s few new producers of a broad range of fish and 
agricultural products and the top or close to the top exporter of rice, rubber, cassava, 
shrimp, canned fruits, processed tuna, sugar cane, soy, and frozen chicken. Thai exports 
also diversified considerably. Manufactured products such as electrical products 
(computers, parts, and integrated circuits), jewellery, footwear, vehicles and parts, and 
textiles were major export products (Doner, 2009: 26, 32; Juree, 1986: 180-181). 






Table 5.2: Net Export Performance of the Thai Economy 
 
 Source: Warr, 2000: 118.  
As the Thai state could not resist neoliberal hegemony it considerably based the 
country’s economic activities on EOI. As table 5.3 below shows, a decade before the 
crisis 37.9% of Thailand’s GDP was contributed by export of goods and services and 
this trend is further increasing in the post-crisis era, reaching 64.6% of GDP between 
1997 and 2006. 
Table 5.3: Percentage of Share of Export of Goods and Services to GDP, Various 
Countries  
 
Source: Somchai and Chalongphob, 2009: 3. 
 
2.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
Apart from EOI, the pre-1997 Thai state also employed FDI as a strategy to attract 
capital inflows from other countries. Following the hegemonic neoliberal policies 
mentioned above, the Thai government created an environment that welcomed foreign 
capital to invest in Thailand. The ‘FDI-led industrialisation’ in Thailand succeeded in 
attracting FDI from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea pushed by the rising costs and 
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currency appreciations after the ‘1985 Plaza Accord’ (Bello, 1999: 36; Hewison, 1989: 
142-167; Connors, 2004: 171). Thailand was considered as having been at the right 
place at the right time to benefit from a regional relocation of production in East and 
Southeast Asia (Doner, 2009: 36; Dixon, 1999 a: 124-125; Sheng, 2009: 145). Foreign 
funds did not come automatically into the country. Rather, foreign capital was 
convinced by at least three main policies of the Thai government: first, the policy of 
government deregulation or the removal of any restrictions on the inflow and outflow of 
capital; second, maintenance of high domestic interest rates relative to the US and other 
world financial centres in order to attract speculative capital; and third, fixing the 
exchange rate between the baht and the dollar to abolish or decrease any risk for foreign 
investors (Bello, 1999: 37; Felker, 2009).  
The Thai state as a neoliberal state has played the role of facilitator for private investors 
since that period. Then, from 1980 to 1994, Thailand had a massive increase in net FDI 
rising from approximately US$1,800 million to US$14,000 million (Doner, 2009: 124; 
Niksch, 1989: 165-166). Figure 5.2 below illustrated the sharp leap in net FDI in 
Thailand in the late 1980s. In addition, table 5.4 shows sources of capital invested in 
Thailand through the FDI encouragement strategy from 1981 to 1991.  
 
Figure 5.2: Net Private Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand, 1971 to 1991 
 
 





Table 5. 4: Foreign Direct Investment into Thailand (net flows), 1980 to 1991 
(millions of US dollars) 
 
Source: Warr, 1993: 70 
Along with EOI and FDI, the Thai state from the late 1980s took another crucial step 
that made Thailand more readily open to the world economy; the financial liberalisation 
led by the Chartichai and Chuan governments in the 1990s. This move enable freer 
flows of capital in and out of Thailand and contributed to the ‘bubble economy’ that 
eventually exploded in July 1997.  
 
2.3 Explaining the Boom: Financial Liberalisation in the 1990s 
Financial liberalisation in the 1990s during the Chartichai Chunahawan and Chuan 
Leekpai elected governments opened up the chance for the free flow of foreign capital. 
Financial opening became a way to bridge the gap by mobilising foreign and local funds. 
There was also hope that financial liberalisation would increase competitive pressure on 
Thai firms and help Thailand become a regional ‘financial hub’. The result was a series 
of neoliberal measures, including interest rate deregulation, liberalisation of foreign 
exchange controls, and financial institutional deregulation (Doner, 2009: 118; Hussey, 
1993; Pasuk and Baker, 1997).  
Prior to 1990, Thailand’s monetary policies were strict control of capital through some 
important measures such as interest rate ceilings, direct capital controls, controls on the 
foreign exchange positions of commercial banks, and withholding tax on foreign 
borrowing. However, in May 1990 Thailand employed the IMF’s policy in order to 
remove controls on foreign exchange for current account transactions and followed in 
1991 when several restrictions were lifted (Bhanupong and Warr, 2000: 102-105). In 
March 1993, the Chuan government established the so-called ‘Bangkok International 
Banking Facility’ (BIBF) to promote investors from around the world to invest and 
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trade in Thailand. The aim of the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in creating the BIBF was to 
establish Thailand as the financial centre of the region and employ BIBF to facilitate 
international banking business (Alba et al, 2001: 125). Under the BIBF programme, 
Thai banks and representatives of foreign banks were allowed to act as mediators of 
foreign international currency transactions. The BIBF’s activities can be defined as 
three types: out-out, out-in, and in-out. The out-out activities concern lending abroad 
by borrowing abroad. Out-in activities concern lending in the domestic market by 
borrowing abroad. In-out activities involve lending abroad by borrowing from the 
domestic market. The most successful activities were the out-in (see table 5.5 below). 
Initially, the minimum amount of lending was US$500,000, and subsequently, it 
increased to US$2 million (Nattapong and Srawoot, 1999: 2; Zhang, 2003: 128-133; 
Ammar, 1997).  
 
Table 5.5: BIBF Credits (Billions of Baht) 
 








Figure 5.3: Total Private Capital Flows 
 
Source: Alba et al., 2001: 129.  
 
Financial liberalisation through the BIBF programme opened up the capital market and 
stimulated massive foreign investment in the Thai economy. As figure 5.3 above shows, 
the net flows of private capital into Thailand significantly increased after launching the 
BIBF in 1993 as the country leapt from US$10,000 million to more than US$ 20,000 
million in 1995.  The financial liberalisation of both the entry and exit of foreign capital 
was very much easier than ever (Warr, 2005: 14). This inﬂow of foreign funds loosened 
trust-based links between lenders and borrowers that had been so successful in 
mobilising and investing Thai savings. It also posed regulatory challenges for which 
Thailand was unaware, because the amount of debt but more importantly to the matter 
that many of the loans were ‘short-term’ and unhedged against currency instability. 
These funds went to non-capital intensive sectors with long-term returns and into non-
productive activities, especially real estate and property sectors. The result was a 
combination of speculative booms in the real estate and stock markets, declining in 
competitiveness due to rising inﬂation and currency values, and rising current account 
deﬁcits due to a fall in export growth from 15% to 0% by 1996 (Doner, 2009: 118). In 
short, the financial liberalisation policy of the Thai state in the 1990s was one of the 
major causes of the 1997 economic crisis because it was an opportunity for currency 
speculators to attack and gain benefit from the expected floatation of the baht currency 
(Suchitra, 1998; Overholt, 1999; Thitinan, 2001).  
In short, the great decade of economic boom between 1987 and 1997 was constructed 
through neoliberal economic strategies of export-led growth, foreign direct investment, 
and financial liberalisation. These measures demanded that the Thai state act as a 
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facilitator and open broad spaces for the private sector to contribute to national wealth. 
In the mid-1990s, the boom affected all social classes as the economic elite recognised 
investment confidence from foreign capital and a chance to transform the country in to a 
Newly Industrialised Country (NIC). The labour/working and the middle classes 
benefited from growing opportunities in employment and reductions in poverty levels 
(in the absolute sense). However, the boom was a myth as the growth did not contribute 
to the real economy and enhance labour productivity and domestic production (Connors, 
2004: 169). Speculation for short-term profit and the weak state eventually led the Thai 
historical bloc into crisis. 
 
2.4 Onset of the Crisis 
The appearance of Thailand as a country with 10% economic growth and a rising star 
that could join as a new member of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) was only 
a myth or illusion that never occurred (Warr, 2000). Thailand could not sustain its 
economic development through the real production sector nor improve skilled labour. 
Economic development under the guise of neoliberal economic projects led to the 
resultant massive private external debt, slowdown in exports, and, eventually, to the 
crisis of 1997 or the so-called ‘Tom Yam Goong crisis’. 
The result of the neoliberal policies implemented under the Chartichai and Chuan 
governments in the 1990s paved the way for Thailand to face the crisis. Financial 
liberalisation in the 1990s encouraged large capital inflows that led to rapid growth in 
the country’s outstanding external debt. The total external debt increased from 
US$28.8 billion in 1990, 33.8% of GDP, to US$94.3 billion at the end of 1996. Most of 
these debts were created by the private sector and the critical aspect of debt was short-
term (Sheng, 2009: 141). Further, there was overinvestment due to wrong speculation 
by investors in many sectors, especially real estate and some basic industries, causing 
enormous excess supply. The excess supply of housing, more specifically, in Bangkok 
and the suburban areas, was expected to exceed 300,000 units and the rental rate of 
office space in Bangkok dropped to more than 50% at the end of 1998 (Nattapong and 
Srawoot, 1999: 2-3). Due to excess supply, most investors were unable to repay both 
foreign and domestic debts, which eventually led to the non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and caused many problems for Thai financial institutions (Cheung and Liao, 2005). 
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Only in 1997 did the proportion of NPLs to total loans of commercial banks between 
June and December 1997 sharply increase from 8.4% to 20.1%. In early March 1997, ten 
financial institutions that faced the NPLs problem were ordered to recapitalise within 
45 days or face intervention. However, in June 1997, the BOT decided to temporarily 
close down 16 bankrupt financial companies and subsequently 42 more companies on 5 
August 1997 (Nattapong and Srawoot, 1999: 4). From this result of the private sector’s 
debt it can be concluded that apart from the misplaced speculation of the private sector, 
there was no effective overall debt management mechanism of the Thai state and the 
BOT (Chalongphob, 1998: 1). The result of the large capital inflows created in Thailand 
the problem of high current account deficits. The current account deficits significantly 
increased from 0.7% of GDP in 1987 to 8.5% of GDP in 1990 and continued to be high 
in the range of between 5% and 8% until 1996. Nattapong and Srawoot (1999: 7) explain 
that the rapid economic growth and high current account deficit indicated the imbalance 
between aggregate demand and supply. The excess extension of demand due to the 
surge of investment financed by foreign borrowing is acceptable only if the investor paid 
off especially in terms of foreign currency earnings. Nevertheless, most external funds 
were used in many unproductive activities as mentioned above. 
 
Table 5.6: Ratio of Debt to GDP 
 
 Source: Chalongpob (1998: 5). 
Furthermore, another vital problem that Thailand faced in the pre-1997crisis period 
was the export slowdown that occurred in 1996. However, the export slowdown itself 
was not a direct cause of the crisis in 1997. Rather, it was a trigger that affected investor 
confidence and raised expectations of a devaluation of the baht (Warr, 2005: 22). In 
1996 export growth declined from over 20% per year in previous year. The slowdown 
accelerated for Thailand’s export destinations but was greatest in exports to Japan, 
NAFTA, and China. Table 5.7 below shows that the slowdown was mainly in the 
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labour-intensive industries. Many economists attempted to explain the causes of the 
export slowdown which included many reasons such as trade liberalisation, increasing 
competition in international markets from China, reduced demand from importing 
countries, and most importantly increases in real wages. Prior to modern economic 
development in the 1950s, Thailand had sufficient supply of unskilled rural labourers 
and elasticity to shift from the agricultural to the industrial sector.  
However, in the mid-1990s, the real wages in the Thai economy increased because of 
both supply and demand sides. On the supply side, Thailand in the mid-1990s differed 
from the previous decades. Cheap unskilled rural labour was no longer elastic as it had 
been. This is because some rural labourers in agricultural industries needed to leave 
their jobs in some seasons in order to harvest their crops in the countryside areas. This 
led to the problem of seasonal labour shortages. On the demand side, there were some 
important changes such as non-tradables, especially in the service sector, that were 
more labour-intensive than tradables. As non-tradable prices increased compared to 
tradable prices, wages rose relative to the consumer price index, which finally led to the 
increase in the cost of production. This led to the end of the era of cheap labour and the 
competitiveness of Thailand’s labour intensive export industries declined sharply (Warr, 













Table 5.7: Sources of Export Slowdown in 1996 
  
 Source: Warr, 2005: 22. 
As shown above, the pathway to the crisis illustrates the vulnerability of the structure of 
the Thai economy. The huge foreign debt which accumulated between 1993 and 1996, 
the high current account deficit for two consecutive years, excess supply in real estate 
and other sectors, massive NPLs of many financial institutions, the unusually strong 
baht, and the slowdown of exports led to the instability of the Thai economy. All these 
problems paved the way for attacks by the international hedge funds as they expected 
the Thai government to eventually devalue the baht.  
The baht attacks occurred first in February and then in May 1997. The BOT decided to 
defend the baht rather than float it. They utilised foreign reserves to counter the 
attackers by buying in both the spot and forward market (Nattapong and Srawoot, 
1999: 7). In May 1997 alone Thailand’s foreign reserves declined by as much as US$4 
billion, and eventually by as much as US$ 23.4 billion before July 1997. Following the 
attack in May, the financial situation in Thailand worsened. Capital outflows sharply 
rose and foreign reserves continued to dwindle. At the end of May, the minimum 
lending rate and minimum overdraft rate shifted steadily as liquidity was drained from 
the system (Sheng, 2009: 147-148). The situation disintegrated as the high interest rate 
slowed down the economy, NPLs increased, and rumours about financial difficulties 
spread. Eventually, the BOT announced a float of the currency. The rate immediately 
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changed from 25 baht per US dollar to 30 baht and reached 55 baht in January 1998 (see 
figure 5.4 below).  
Figure 5.4: Exchange Rate between Baht and US$ 
 
 Source: Warr, 2005: 25. 
In short, neoliberal economic development in Thailand since the late 1980s paved the 
way for the crisis in 1997. Thailand transformed itself from a rising star and the next 
expected NIC to be the first among other Asian countries to face economic collapse. The 
next section examines the Thai state’s response to the crisis and the roles of the IMF 
and its bailout packages. 
 
3. IMF AND THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAMMES 
Amidst the crisis in 1997 the Thai state was bankrupted and social forces were all hit by 
the economic downturn. The crisis of the old historical bloc this time was not only 
occurring because of the misplaced economic policies of the Thai state, but also the 
unsound politics of Thailand―high rates of corruption, normalisation of patron-client 
systems, overwhelming roles of nationalism and royalism with lack of inclusive politics for 
ordinary people―that itself indirectly contributed to the crisis. Illustrating the character 
of the weak state, shortly after the crisis the Thai government requested a bailout 
package from the IMF to intervene and rescue Thailand from the severe economic 
downturn. This section explores the roles of the IMF during the time of crisis and its 
restructuring programmes. The failed IMF strategies galvanized social forces, mostly 
the business groups and the labour unions, to employ neo-nationalist project against the 
IMF and the Democrat party as the party that loyally followed the plans of the IMF. 
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3.1 The First Phase of the IMF Programme 
After the clash of the financial sector and massive loss in foreign reserves of the BOT, 
the Thai government requested the IMF’s assistance (Chalongphob, 1999). On 20 
August 1997, Thailand engaged in a 3-year Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF. The 
crisis led to the Thai government receiving a rescue package worth US$17.2 billion 
from the IMF. The IMF-restructuring programme (in collaboration with the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank) in the first stage attempted to restore market 
confidence by employing tight fiscal and monetary policies (Fisher, 2004; Flatters, 2000: 
265). The primary aim of monetary policies was to stabilise the baht via a high interest 
rate policy (Sharma, 1998). More specifically, the aim of stabilising the baht was to 
reduce the current account deficit to about 5% of GDP by the end of 1997 and to 3% in 
1998. A balanced budget strategy was also suggested by the IMF through the 
combination of spending cuts at an amount of 3% of GDP and tax increases, primarily 
on value-added tax, from 7% to 10% (TDRI, 1998: 15-16). 
 From the IMF’s perspective, this was a crucial measure to implement in order to 
stabilise the fluctuating currency while budget cuts were also necessary to make room 
in the budget for the interest costs of financial restructuring (Fisher, 2004). In addition, 
along with the budget cuts and increases in interest rates, management of the massive 
NPLs was also forced by the IMF. The Thai government, under the guidance of the 
IMF, established two institutions to handle the NPLs—the Financial Sector 
Restructuring Authority (FRA) and the Asset Management Corporation (AMC). The 
FRA’s task was to review the rehabilitation proposal of 58 suspended financial 
institutions; to assist creditors and depositors of the suspended companies; and to 
administer the liquidation of companies whose proposals were rejected by the FRA. The 
AMC was established to bid for the purchase of the impaired assets of finance companies 
that the FRA deemed no longer viable. The AMC became the last measure for defective 
assets, as its main mission was to buy the bad assets and then manage, restructure, and 
sell them  (Sharma, 2003: 103). 
However, the rescue programme suggested by the IMF in the first stage could not 
rebuild market and investor confidence. The ‘tight’ monetary policy was criticised from 
various sectors. Critics argue that the IMF’s monetary and fiscal policies were not 
something new but typical of the programme developed earlier for Latin American 
countries burdened with external imbalances associated with massive public sector debt, 
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hyperinflation, and low rates of private savings (Sharma, 2003: 104). However, the 
causes of the Thai crisis, as shown above, were different from the Latin American 
countries. Thailand’s financial crisis emerged mainly from a huge build up of short-term 
private debt, rather than wasteful government spending and lack of monetary control as 
in Latin America (Pasuk and Baker, 2001; Hewison, 2006: 97). The monetary policy of 
the IMF reduced credit for the private sector and raised interest rates, which reduced 
output. The tight fiscal policy reduced incomes and lowered total demand, whereas the 
weak export capabilities at that moment led to the decrease in both output and demand 
in the Thai economy. In short, instead of restoring market confidence, the result of the 
first phase of the IMF bailout failed to stimulate the real productive economy. 
 
3.2 The Second Phase 
The Chavalit government lost its legitimacy to hold political authority since their 
announced to float the baht on 2 July 1997 (Hewison, 1998). Under the short lived 
Chavalit era during time of crisis the baht decreased its value to 41 baht per US$ on 31 
October 1997 (it was 26.5 baht per US$ in July 1997). The weak Chavalit government 
could not deal with the high demands of social forces in the Thai historical bloc to 
efficiently solve the economic downturn. Then on 3 November 1997, Chavalit 
Yongchaiyut announced his resignation from premier authority (Raquiza, 2012: 47). 
This led to a chance for Chuan Leekpai, the Democrat Party leader, to return to the 
premiership and he formed the coalition government taking office on 15 November 1997 
with a slight majority of 208 seats from 393 seats in parliament. 
The Democrat-led government directed the Thai state to the pathway of neoliberalism 
under the close guidance of the IMF in order to restore market confidence. The 
government signed the first and second letter of intent on 14 August and 25 November 
1997 correspondingly. The primary aim was to signal to the market that the Chuan 
government was distinct from the previous deficient Chavalit administration. The first 
letter of intent states the objective of strictly implementing the IMF’s restructuring 
programme in the Thai economy over the coming three years (Thailand Letter of 
Intent, 14 August 1997),while the second letter noted that the new economic team was 
determined to take a number of additional measures to strengthen the policy package 
and reinforce public confidence. The Thai government planned to reach a 1% surplus in 
the 1997/98 budgetary year. This goal could be achieved by increasing taxes, cutting 
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the funding of state enterprises, raising utility prices, and lowering real wages in the 
public sector. These policies affected various social classes in the country which later 
would lead to the rising demand from social forces for a strong and alternative 
government who could run the country contrary to the IMF direction. In addition, on 
the aspect of financial restructuring, the government announced its aim to move ahead 
as quickly as possible with the restructuring of the 58 suspended financial institutions 
(Thailand Letter of Intent, 25 November 1997). With these commitments, Thailand 
became a good cooperative partner of the IMF and soon the IMF’s star pupil (Sharma, 
2003: 107). Nevertheless, it seemed that the IMF programme was not applicable and 
they underestimated the depth of the economic recession. Even though the Thai 
government strictly followed the IMF-suggested fiscal and monetary policies, the quick 
restoration of the market economy did not materialise. In fact, market confidence, 
instead of bouncing back, continued to decline. The baht continued to devalue and hit an 
all-time low of 56 baht per US$ in mid-January 1998. 
Not surprisingly, by the first quarter of 1998, the public support for the Chuan 
government’s IMF strategies began to deteriorate. The private sector broadly attacked 
the IMF programme which wastefully focused on fiscal discipline, external stability, and 
financial restructuring, but paid no attention to the real economy. Moreover, some had 
criticised the IMF programme in a nationalist discourse that criticised the Thai state as 
behaving like a semi-colonised state under an imperialist project created by the IMF to 
devastate Thailand’s local firms (Kamol, 1998; Narong, 2003). This nationalist ideology 
at the time of crisis was powerful because social forces especially the labour class later 
would protest against the IMF to protect some state enterprises from privatisation. 
Later in 1998 after the TRT party had been formed, this nationalist position against the 
IMF emerged to become one of primary policies of TRT in the election campaign in the 
early 2000s. 
From June to August 1998, the Thai government accepted that the IMF’s tight 
monetary and fiscal policies were misplaced. Then, in summer 1998, the Thai 
government changed its strategies to recover the Thai economy through the promotion 
of more relaxed fiscal policy. They extended the ongoing reform of the financial sector, 
strengthened corporate governance, reformed state enterprises in preparation for 
privatisation, and relaxed the macroeconomic policy especially on the revenue side 
(Sharma, 2003: 111). By the end of October 1998, the Thai government had signed the 
fifth letter of intent and stated its commitment to implementing some eleven basic 
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economic laws concerning bankruptcy, foreclosure, property rights, and restrictions on 
foreign investors. These laws can be grouped into three categories; proposition for 
liberalising the Alien Business law into a new and more liberal Foreign investment law; 
a bill to facilitate the privatisation of state enterprises; and the amendments to the 
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws and procedures (Sharma, 2003: 112). This commitment 
later showed that it was a wrong decision of the Chuan government as social forces later 
criticised this decision and paved the way for other political forces to replace it in 
parliament. Neo-nationalism emerged in Thailand after the Thai government signed the 
fifth letter of intent in order to rally against these semi-colonial laws and defend the 
importance of local community in the stream of globalisation (this issue will be 
discussed in the next chapter). Two years later, Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak 
Thai party picked up this aspect and promoted it as an alternative policy to prevent the 
Thai economy from future crisis. 
In 1999 the Thai government offered several new spending or fiscal stimulus initiatives. 
In March 1999 the government announced many major social spending programmes 
funded from external loans provided by the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, the 
WB, and Japan. The Miyazawa plan supported by the Japanese government was 
implemented in order to create jobs and encourage reverse migration from urban to 
rural areas. The government allocated 51 billion baht in order to provide direct and 
indirect employment that was more concentrated in the countryside. Direct employment 
initiatives included a 68 province-wide job-creation project, whilst indirect employment 
included vocational education (Sauwalak and Chedtha, 2000). By mid-1999 most 
indicators showed that the Thai economy had recovered. After seven consecutive 
quarters of economic recession, the economy began to expand in the first quarter of 
1999. Manufacturing played the leading role in economic recovery with growth of 
around 15% in 1999. Export volumes also turned positive and expanded by 6% in 1999. 
Even though there were many critics of the IMF’s programme, Thailand’s national 
reserve was gradually rebuilt. External vulnerability was concretely lowered with 
decreases in foreign debt while the current account surplus remained comfortable 
(Sharma, 1998). The crisis in 1997 and the several years in its aftermath affected social 
forces in various ways in both political economy and cultural-ideological aspects that 




4. SOCIAL FORCES IN THE TIME OF CRISIS  
The year of 1997 not only appeared as an economic crisis, but also as a crisis of the old 
historical bloc. The existing historical bloc had been ruptured. Social forces were no 
longer relying on the ‘old’ configuration of power. In other words, the established social 
relations were scattered and social forces needed an alternative configuration of power 
to transcend the crisis of the state. This section analyses socio-economic impacts on 
social forces at the time of crisis. The crisis urged social forces to seek an alternative 
political force to establish new social relations that could extricate them from the crisis 
and ensure for them various forms of class interests. 
 
4.1 The Capitalist 
The 1997 economic crisis had immense impacts upon several social forces of the Thai 
historical bloc. However, among social groups in Thailand, the capitalist social forces 
were most harshly hit by the crisis in terms of profit lost and bankruptcy. As mentioned 
in the earlier section, at the time of the crisis the Thai state strictly obeyed economic 
restructuring programmes of the IMF. Their strategies attempted to increase 
deregulation of the Thai state in order to attract foreign investment and convince 
transnational capitalist groups to enter and boost the Thai economy (Dixon, 1999 b: 
450). This can be seen in the Thai government’s decision to allow the revision of eleven 
laws that related to foreign capital and ownership of land in Thailand. The crisis in 
1997 paved the way to the wider opening of the Thai economy. As shown in figure 5.5 
below, the net FDI in Thailand markedly shifted from an average of US$2 million in the 









 Figure 5.5: Net FDI of Thailand 1985 – 2005 
 
 Source: Adapted from Krist Decharuk, 2009: 10.  
 
4.1.1 Banking/Financial Capital 
In the past, banking capital dominated the Thai economy as it played a central role in 
channeling savings to other economic firms. The banking capitalists enhanced these 
savings to gain profit on investments. The banking capitalists in Thailand used to rely 
on their own investment through state agencies and their own insiders and ignored 
modern financial analysis and risk management (Ammar, 2005: 79). This was one of the 
crucial causes that contributed to the crisis in 1997 as many financial institutions and 
banks comfortably offered loans to the private sector. The crisis affected the dominant 
banking and finance sectors. After the crisis, there were seven commercial banks and 70 
financial institutions under the financial rehabilitation programme of the Thai 
government through the Financial Institution Development Fund of the Bank of 
Thailand. This eventually led to the elimination of 56 financial institutions. Moreover, 
the oligopolistic structure of banking capital that was dominated by a few Sino-Thai 
families was transformed to the new structure in which foreign capital expanded its 
share in many commercial banks (Natenapa, 2006, 2008). 
After the crisis, the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB), First Bangkok City, Siam City 
and BBC were nationalised. The Tejapaibul family stake in BMB was lost, and the 
family was found to owe the bank 4.42 billion baht. There were three banks (Thai 
Dhanu, Laemthong, and Bank of Asia) that needed to sell majority stakes to interests in 
Singapore, Kuwait, Hong Kong and the Netherlands. The Ratanarak family sold 25 
percent of its Siam City Cement to Swiss investors in order to support its holdings in 
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the Bank of Ayudhya. In addition, the Siam Commercial Bank, a conservative bank 
owned by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) also went to 49% foreign ownership. The 
CPB made assurances that it would maintain its holdings and keep the bank in Thai 
hands (Porphant, 2008). However, Thailand’s biggest commercial banks such as the 
Bangkok and Thai Farmers were able to gain new capital quickly although this meant 
moving to 49% foreign ownership. Both banks have long possessed strong international 
connections, especially with US investment banks. The shareholdings of the powerful 
Lamsam (Thai Farmers Bank) and Sophonpanich (Bangkok Bank) families had already 
been diluted during the1980s, but these families have been able to maintain 
management control (Hewison, 1999 b: 32-33). 
In short, banking and financial capital in Thailand has long been in the hands of Chinese 
merchants from a few families, but the crisis disrupted this and ended the era of family-
run banking capital. The crisis opened up a new era of banking capital in Thailand as 
banks are no longer in the hands of Chinese families and face more competitive 
pressures from foreign capital as the country shifted towards FDI and welcomed foreign 
capital in the post-crisis era (Ukrist and Rattapong, 2006; Akira, 2002).  
 
4.1.2 Industrial and Local Capital 
Industrial capital was similar to the other capitalist factions in terms of the damage it 
received from the crisis. Based on the study of Natenapa (2006: 41-100) the capitalist 
factions who were able to survive the crisis were not closed-family businesses, rather it 
was the ‘specialised’ and ‘modern’ businesses that could control the situation and 
possessed established practices of good debt management. Crucial industrial capitalist 
groups who successfully survived from the crisis include the Charoen Phokphan Group 
(CP), the Siam Cement Group (SCG) of the CPB, the automotive capital e.g. the Thai 
Summit, and the Shin Corporation of Thaksin Shinawatra. Along with some survivors 
from the crisis, the Thai Summit capital and the CP group joined other capitalist 
factions and other social forces to form the Thai Rak Thai party and eventually 
successfully established the alternative Thaksin government in 2001 in order to secure 
their class interests and guarantee that the new and strong government could prevent 
the occurrence of future crises. In addition, it could be said that provincial/local 
capitalist factions were less affected by the crisis than the national capitalists. They 
confronted greater competition from many new multinational corporations that 
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penetrated the rural areas of the country, for example, the dramatic increase in local 
supermarkets such as Tesco and Carrefour (Pasuk, 2006: 26). This is significant for the 
landscape of social power in Thailand’s historical bloc because some local capitalists 
changed their patterns of relationship with politicians and political parties in the post-
1997 crisis period. They attempted to themselves participate as prominent political 
players in order to secure their interests with the TRT party rather than secretly 
supporting politicians as was the case before the crisis.4 
 
4.2 Labour 
The capitalist social groups suffered due to the economic crash in terms of benefits lost 
and bankruptcy, as shown above. However, the antagonist social forces to the capitalists 
are the labour/worker social forces. It was defined in the last chapter that this work 
considers labour as a social force to be the groups of people who do not own any means 
of production; therefore, this worker/labourer includes both blue and white collar 
workers. At the time of crisis, the most obvious trouble that affected labour as a class 
was the problem of unemployment.  
 Table 5.8: Employment by Sectors (Number and Percentage of Total 
Employment), February 1994-1998 (dry season)  
 
 Source: Sauwalak, 2002: 9. 
 
                                                             
4In the next chapter, this thesis will discuss more on the roles of several capitalist fractions that 
formed the TRT party and its transformative politics in the early 2000s in Thailand. 
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Table 5.9: Employment by Sectors (Number and Percentage of Total 
Employment), August 1994-1998 (wet season) 
 
 Source: Sauwalak, 2002: 10. 
In the labour market, the 1997 crisis created problems for labour in three main aspects; 
unemployment, higher cost of living, and decline in social services. Unemployment had 
been increasing since the beginning of the crisis. Many economic firms had to lay off 
workers in order to reduce their cost of production as shown in tables 5.8 and 5.9 above. 
The data shows that the sector most severely affected by unemployment was 
construction as the employment rate decreased by 36.68% from 1997 to 1998. Likewise, 
white collar workers in financial and real estate sectors also lost their jobs at a rate of 9-
14% from 1997 to 1998. In terms of the total number of unemployed persons, a survey 
by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) in early 1998 concluded that 
unemployment had climbed from 1.73 million persons in February 1997 to 2.74 million 
persons. In addition, there was an increase in the number of returned labour from 
abroad. Massive numbers of Thai labourers working overseas especially in Brunei and 
Taiwan were sent back to Thailand (TDRI, 1998: 12). Moreover, another social problem 
derived from the crisis was a large-scale reversal in migration. For the previous forty 
years of modern economic development in Thailand since the 1950s, rural labourers 
moved to find jobs in the capital city and other major provinces. However, in the post-
crisis period, this situation reversed. Unemployed and laid-off workers returned home to 




Table 5.10: Changes in Per capita Income by Region 
 
 Source: Sauwalak, 2002: 17.  
Apart from the difficulties in the labour market, the higher cost of living and the 
decrease in social services were also critical dynamics. The baht devaluation in 1997 and 
1998 affected both the real economic and social sectors. Many ordinary people who were 
food buyers were affected by the sharp increase in food prices. For the people who were 
laid off and many who had reduced working hours, it had an impact upon the loss of 
their normal income. The table 5.10 above shows that income per capita of Thai people 
significantly declined and affected mostly those working in Bangkok (-17.44% from 
1997 to 1998) and Eastern Seaboard Industrial sites in the east of Thailand (-23.75% 
from 1997 to 1998). The decrease in income per capita also faced inflation that was also 
sharply rising and decreases in real purchasing power. 
Moreover, social services in Thailand were directly affected by the crisis. There were a 
number of government budget cuts (see table 5.11 below). Under IMF loan 
conditionalities Thailand was required to reduce public spending on many projects. 
Reportedly the 1998 budget had to be revised several times to accommodate the IMF 
conditions and more than 18% of the first submitted budget, accounting for 182,000 
million baht, was cut from the budget bill (TDRI, 1998: 16). In terms of health care 
services, the Ministry of Public Health’s budget also suffered a 11.4% cut from the 1997 
budget. The insufficiency of public health services became more critical, as public 
hospitals were facing problems of operating above capacity with a lower budget, higher 
costs of imported medical supplies, and an increasing number of patients who could no 
longer afford private hospitals. The problem of public health care services was really 
crucial and represented a chance for the Thai Rak Thai party to promote the issue and 
126 
launch its campaign to gain the vote in 2001. The ‘30-baht health care policy’ was 
announced to address this problem.5 
Table 5.11: Government Expenditure, 1997-1999 (million baht) 
 
 Source: Sauwalak, 2002: 5. 
Furthermore, in 1998 another social problems for the labouring class―and also the 
middle class and the peasants―affected by the crisis was the issue of education and 
scholarships. In 1998, the Ministry of Education was subject to a 10.7% budget 
reduction, which was nearly 17,000 million baht (TDRI, 1998: 16), as part of the cuts in 
social services of 35% in 1998. The decline in the educational budget increased the 
salience of the problem of human development in Thailand. It is evident that the 
number of students that dropped out from schools and universities sharply increased 
over the time since the crisis (Isra, 2005: 157; Nicaise , 2000). This situation led children 
to look for a job to support their families in financial difficulties with more than 0.35 
million doing so in 1998 (Sauwalak, 2002: 21). The crisis also affected schools in both 
public and private institutions. Private schools across the country recorded more than 
900 million baht in overdue tuition fees in the second semester of 1997. In addition, 
                                                             
5 Details on this will be provided in the next chapter. 
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concerning tertiary or higher education, the government scholarship, which is a very 
crucial means to develop human resources in the government and public sector, declined 
in the year after the crisis. Even the ongoing scholarships were affected by a reduction 
of 10% in monthly allowances and other expenses (TDRI, 1998: 16). Although the 
labour class faced severe troubles due to the economic crisis, the year of 1997 offered 
them a chance to benefit as the new 1997 constitution was legitimised later in that year. 
 
4.3 The Middle Class 
The other social force to consider in this section is the middle class. The Thai middle 
class is composed of several social factions; however, in this work it excludes the ‘white-
collar workers’―as they are placed in the labour social force―and the ‘small/self-
employed traders’―as they are placed in the provincial capitalists, a faction of capitalist 
forces. Therefore, the major middle class social groups in Thailand remain as ‘the 
bureaucrats’ or the state officials in both civil and military offices. The middle class 
social forces in Thailand were affected by the same troubles as labour and the peasant 
social groups in terms of the decrease in income and higher cost of living (Sauwalak and 
Chedtha, 2000). However, what makes the middle class social groups in Thailand 
distinct from other forces is their concern with ‘good governance’―the concept 
introduced to developing countries by the World Bank―of the state. The middle class 
forces see Thai politics as the vicious circles of corrupt politicians and believe that part 
of the crisis of the Thai historical bloc in 1997 was caused by the lack of good 
governance in the administration of the Thai state. Therefore, the crisis in 1997 raised 
awareness of the Thai middle class forces to defend their rights and political 
participation in the new 1997 constitution in order to construct good governance in 
Thai politics. 
The bureaucrat social force as the middle class was one of the least affected groups by 
the economic crisis in terms of economic interest. Most were not confronted with severe 
unemployment due to the job security in their posts. However, the middle class, like 
other social forces, demanded for an alternative administration that would enable the 
country to survive. In addition, the new constitution that was enforced several months 
after the crisis in 1997 provided some conditions that benefitted the middle class by 
securing their involvement in parliamentary politics (however, excluding the 
worker/labour). The creation of the party-list electoral system and specification of at 
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least a bachelors degree for any candidate to be a Member of Parliament or the Senate 
benefitted those who had higher education and social status. These conditions of the 
1997 constitution gave advantages to the middle class to get involved in parliament 
while excluding the broader population of the country. In the next chapter, this thesis 
will discuss the roles of the middle class forces in the process of constitution drafting in 
1997 and the reformation of the bureaucratic bodies of the Thai state by the Thaksin 
government; another crucial part of the transformation of the Thai historical bloc that 
paved the way to another crisis in 2006.  
 
4.4 The Peasants 
The last major social force to consider in this section is the peasant social group—this 
includes factions of rural people such as farmers, gardeners, cash-croppers, and all 
agriculturalists who either own or rent some means of production from the landlord. 
However, what they share in common is that these social forces do not earn regular 
wages or salaries like the workers or labourers, rather their income derives mainly from 
selling their agricultural products and related services in the village or in their own 
community.  
Compared to other social forces, it should be noted here that the peasant social forces 
were the least affected by the crisis of 1997 in terms of money lost in the economic 
downturn. However, if the peasant social forces are considered as one of the major 
groups in terms of total number, it should be said that there were more than 11 million 
people who suffered from the crisis in this social group. As shown in table 8 above, the 
labourers/workers in construction sites in Bangkok and other urban cities were forced 
into unemployment as construction companies went bankrupt. These labourers were 
mostly rural people who relocated to work in Bangkok in order to seek a better life in 
terms of money. At the time of crisis these people returned home to the countryside 
while waiting for the economy to improve from the crisis. The returnee labourers in the 
rural areas were mostly involved in their family agricultural activities for subsistence 
reasons. However, the problem of massive labour return to the countryside was that 
local resources were further stretched and there was greater competition for local jobs 
(Sukaesinee et al., 2004: 51-52). Apart from these local troubles, the peasant social forces 
also confronted similar problems to the middle class and labour social forces such as the 
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problems of increased expenditures, higher prices for food and consumer goods, debt 
accumulation, and loss of social welfare due to government austerity programmes.  
Nevertheless, this research sees that what is important to most of the peasant social 
classes at the time of crisis is the ideological rule by the proposed idea of the king in 
terms of the ‘sufficiency economy philosophy’ (SEP).6 Amidst the crisis and severe social and 
economic devastation, the King's SEP convinced the peasants and other social forces to 
keep being happy with the agrarian myth of the ‘sufficient ethic’ and do everything by 
moderate means (Dayley, 2011: 348). However, the sufficient ethic that was 
hegemonised by the King of Thailand at the time of crisis was contested by the new 
political forces or Thaksinism. Contrary to the SEP, Thaksinism in the early 2000s 
expanded financial credit to multi-level sectors and urged social forces to spend and 
consume in order to boost the Thai economy in the post-crisis period. The peasant 
social forces were one of the major policy targets of the TRT and a number of social 
policies would later be launched to benefit the poor and, at the same time, directly 
challenge the King's sufficiency ethic. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter posits itself as a part of the broader picture that needs to be understood in 
order to grasp the crisis-ridden transition of the Thai historical bloc that culminated 
with the clashes and mass demonstrations of 2010.The previous chapter showed the 
first theme of the argument which is the ‘history of the old historical bloc’ as it was 
constructed through the exclusionary capitalist development that resulted in severe 
social gaps and the royalist-nationalist political ideology that cohered social forces in 
the bloc altogether. This chapter has shown the second feature of the argument of this 
thesis, which is the ‘crisis of the old historical bloc’. The economic crisis in 1997 severely 
affected social forces in different levels and aspects. The crisis also ruptured the ‘social 
configurations’ of power that had been maintained for decades and opened up the 
‘chance to restructure’ social relations in Thailand during the post-crisis era.  
                                                             
6The SEP is a notion offered by King Bhumibol at the time of the 1997 economic crisis that 
offers suggestions to social forces in the Thai state on how to survive the crisis. The idea—
based on Buddhist beliefs—suggests that Thai people should live and consume in a moderate 
way and exercise a self-sufficient ethic in their own lives. This matter will be discussed more in 
chapter eight.  
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The chapter has examined the pathway to the crisis in 1997 and responses to the crisis 
of the Thai state, in particular the request to the IMF to come and solve economic 
problems in Thailand. The role of the IMF in the time of crisis led to the strengthening 
of social forces in their nationalist projects against the strict and imperialistic character 
of the IMF programmes. The Thai state under IMF guidance from 1997 urged social 
groups in Thailand to demand a ‘strong state’ to emerge and run the country. This 
demand was listed and structured in the new and so-called ‘people’ constitution of 1997 
in order to establish a strong executive and highly stable administration. This 
eventually paved the way for the coming agency of social transformation, the TRT 
party in the late 1990s. The next chapter will discuss another theme of the argument, 
which is the ‘transition of the historical bloc’ from the old social relations to the 
alternative historical bloc. However, it should be noted here that transition was not as 
smooth as the TRT party would imagine, but rather was a ‘crisis-ridden’ transition that 




THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC IN TRANSIT: THAKSINISM AND NEW 
SOCIAL RELATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, another feature of the contemporary Thai historical bloc will be 
analysed—‘transition’ of the state between 1997 and 2006. This period of time has been 
considered to be significant and crucial in modern Thailand’s political history, and it 
will be argued that this period offered an opportunity for the Thaksin/Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) government to play an active cohesive role in the Thai historical bloc. During 
the time of uncertainty social forces were confused and pursued a strong power to 
reconfigure social relations in both political economy and social-ideological terms. TRT 
cohered these discontented social forces together through both ‘force and consent’ via a 
number of state and hegemonic projects. In the first section, the structural condition of 
the making of the 1997 constitution and the construction of the strong state through 
the authority provided by the new constitution will be analysed. The main features of 
the so-called people’s constitution will also be examined, as it is a presupposition of the 
strong TRT government in the early 2000s.  
The second section deals with the rise of Thaksinism/Thaksin regime. Political 
pathways of Thaksin Shinawatra, his TRT party, and the composition of capitalist 
factions and other social forces are also the subject of this section. Then the last and 
core section of the chapter will turn to the politics of social transition of the Thai 
historical bloc led by the TRT as a factor of cohesion. As part of the four main features 
of this study―history, crisis, transition, and crisis within transition―this chapter posits 
itself as a point of departure to understand the crisis-ridden social transition of the Thai 
state. The transformative projects led by the Thaksin regime were not completed and 
this paved the way for ‘another crisis’ in 2006 and led to the crisis of the state in 2010. 
 
2. THE 1997 PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION, CREATING THE STRONG STATE, AND THE 
PRE-THAKSIN ERA 
The crisis in1997 was not only an economic crisis, but also a crisis of the Thai historical 
bloc—including social, political, and ideological elements. This chapter deals with 
political consequences of the crisis as it brought the Thai historical bloc into the 
‘transition period’. Years before the crisis took place, social forces in Thailand during 
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the early 1990s demanded the end of ‘money politics’1 and called for political reform that 
might enable the country to achieve true democracy. Political reform movements of the 
middle class social groups in Thailand throughout the 1990s coincided with the crisis in 
1997, which consequently led to the emergence of the process of drafting the new 
constitution, with the hope of creating a strong state. The new 1997 constitution 
directly affected Thai social forces in various ways. It secured rights for all social groups 
and, at the same time, shaped a new configuration of power based on a strong executive 
body. This section examines the making of the 1997 ‘peoples’ constitution and its crucial 
features that configured power relations in Thailand over the following years. 
 
2.1 Demanding a Strong State: Political Reform and the Making of the 1997 
Constitution  
The military coup in 1991 and the rise to political power of the army in 1992 led to 
critical middle class demonstrations in May 1992 (later known as the Black May of 
1992) (Sujit, 1993: 218-219; Callahan, 1998; Yoshifumi, 2008: Ch.1). After that incident, 
the military stepped away from politics and political authority returned to a civilian 
government under the Chuan Leekpai premiership. It appeared as if Thai politics was in 
a ‘normal’ situation. However, social groups in Thailand experienced many defects of 
Thai democracy and felt that it was time to solve the existing problems of the country. 
Yoshifumi (2008: 119) argues that a number of problems in Thai politics that should be 
resolved include corruption among politicians and bureaucrats, violation of election 
rules, political parties dominated by a small number of funding providers, centralised 
government administration, and weak enforcement of the rule of law. Therefore, Thai 
society required political reform in order to achieve true democracy and to cure a 
number of flaws in Thai politics.  
The political reform campaign was gradually established in May 1994 during the first 
Chuan government. Mr Chalard Vorachart, a political activist, began his hunger strike 
                                                             
1 This means the type of politics in which money seems to be a decisive factor in gaining power 
through vote-buying. Politicians once elected as a Member of Parliament attempt to regain their 
money by engaging in various forms of corruption. However, the dominant perception that 
believes that subaltern groups could easily have their vote bought therefore causing a defect in 
Thai democracy has been contested. Subaltern social forces have their own rural constitution 
(Walker, 2008, 2012; Jakkrit, 2012) that regulates their social and political life and not only the 
poor contributes to defect in Thai democracy (Prajak, 2009). 
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in front of the parliament and demanded to amend the current constitution to open up 
the chance for only elected persons to have the right to hold administrative office 
(Prawase, 2002: 22). In fact, the political climate of the Thai historical bloc in the post-
Black May of 1992 period was exposed to the notion of political reform, for example 
through Amorn Chandarasomboon’s paper, published in 1993,entitled 
‘Constitutionalism’2 (Amorn, 1996).  
Nonetheless, Chalard’s hunger strike was crucial because his action brought public 
attention to the issue of political reform and gained popular support from various social 
groups who felt frustrated with the existent political situation in Thailand. The Chuan 
government responded with a political campaign established by the Democracy 
Development Committee (DDC) on 9 June 1994 hoping to end Chalard’s hunger strike 
and consider how to reform and amend the constitution. However, the DDC could not 
do much because they lacked support from the Members of Parliament. Then, the 
Chuan government dissolved parliament in May 1995 due to the problem of 
irregularities in the government’s accelerated land reform programme (King, 1997: 
136).  
The general election that took place on 2 July 1995 resulted in the victory of the Chart 
Thai (the Thai nation) party. Banharn Silpa-archa became the twenty-first Prime 
Minister and formed his seven party coalition government in July 1995. The Banharn 
government aimed to implement his political reform campaign as soon as possible due 
to its promise to the people who voted for them. Later, the Banharn government 
launched the Political Reform Committee (PRC) in order to recommend the amendment 
of Article 211 of the 1991 constitution aiming to set up a constitution-drafting 
mechanism (Prawase, 2002: 24).  
Eventually, after a period of public hearings in a process of public debate, the 
government established the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) composed of 76 
provincial representatives and 33 academic experts in law and political science 
(Thamsuk, 2002). The CDA, led by Uthai Phimchaichon and Anand Panyarachun, 
secured high popular participation by arranging for a number of public hearings 
throughout the country. Public debates and academic conferences actively took place 
                                                             
2 This work significantly urged academic attention in Thailand to be more aware of the idea of 
political reform at that time. 
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and that was the reason that Thai society referred to the new constitution as a ‘people’s 
constitution’ (Hicken, 2006; Dressel, 2009). In addition, in terms of academic research 
and opinions it was supported by the Thailand Research Fund. Consequently, even the 
process of constitutional drafting and public hearings between 1996 and 1997 would be 
challenged by illiberal forces, however, the draft of the new constitution was approved 
by the parliament (with 579 supporting votes, 16 against, and 17 abstentions) and 
enacted amidst the economic crisis on 11 October 1997 (Connors, 2002: 37-55). This 
sixteenth constitution of Thailand later evidenced that it shaped the new relations of 
power in Thai politics; an issue that will be returned to in the third section of this 
chapter. Hence, below can be found a summary of the main features of the new supreme 
law of Thailand.  
 
2.2 The 1997 Constitution and its Crucial Features   
Thai social forces learned the lesson from previous decades of experience that the major 
problems of Thai politics were the weakness of the state and political discontinuity. 
Following the notion of ordoliberalism in post-crisis Germany in the late 1920s 
Bonefeld (2012a, 2012b, 2013) argues that at the time of crisis the ‘strong state’ is 
required in order to play the role of a political master of the free economy. He also 
argues that economic freedom only takes place on the basis of order. The pursuit of 
societal order during the post-crisis period of  a given society could not be attained by a 
weak state as it is unable to defend itself from preying social interests, and has thus lost 
its independence from society (Bonefeld, 2012 b: 640). Thailand, then, during the time of 
the 1997 crisis also demanded that a strong state facilitate order as the social basis for 
economic freedom. The CDA had some premises in mind when they were drafting the 
new constitution. Rangsan Thanapornpan, a leading Thai political economist, argues 
that the constitution aims to reform Thai politics in terms of three major aspects 
including firstly, securing people’s rights, liberties, and political participation; secondly, 
ensuring clean and honest politics; thirdly and most importantly, establishing a more 






2.2.1 Securing Human Rights  
The demand to deal with human rights at the constitutional level in Thailand was 
inspired by the 1992 government crackdown on Ratchadamnern Avenue in the Black 
May incident (Harding and Leyland, 2011: 222). Basic rights and liberties of individuals 
were massively extended from the previous constitutions. There are forty sections 
contained in chapter three on the ‘Rights and Liberties of the Thai people’ in this new 
constitution. However, some innovative human rights were covered such as the right to 
access through the 12-year fundamental education from the state, the right to gain 
standard public health services, the right of children and youth without guardians to 
receive care and education from the state, the right of the elderly with insufficient 
income to be aided by the state, and the right of the disabled to receive public 
conveniences from the state (Pinai, 2002: 105). Further, regarding basic human rights, 
people could sign a petition of 50,000 names and forward the document to parliament in 
order to legitimise it. These rights were entirely new and had never been granted in any 
previous constitution of Thailand.  
Moreover, not only the rights of individuals ought to be protected, but also group 
rights. The 1997 constitution provides rights for various social groups such as cultural 
rights and environmental rights. For instance, local people have their right to conserve 
and restore their customs, local knowledge, arts, culture, and natural resources. Further, 
people have rights to receive information and explanation from the state regarding any 
public decisions. In order to protect these constitutional rights, the new constitution 
offers a specific mechanism to deal with them, which is the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC). The NHRC has powers and duties to inspect whether the 
exercise of state powers affect human rights.3 The commission would report to the 
parliament for further procedures (Pinai, 2002: 112). In short, social groups in Thailand 
had their human rights protected in many aspects under the new constitution that had 
never been before. These basic rights created a new ‘conception of the world’ on the part of 
Thai citizens which was more democratic than the past.  
 
 
                                                             
3 The human rights issue is ones that matters and later would be crucial when the military 




2.2.2 Making Politics Clean and Honest  
One of the most important presuppositions behind the CDA was that Thai politics had 
been governed by dirty-handed and greedy politicians. In this perception of the world, 
politicians play the central role of politics rather than ordinary people. Therefore, in 
order to reform this kind of politics, the clean, honest, and good man should be engaged 
politically. There were a number of methods to make Thai politics clean under the 1997 
constitution. For example, the introduction of the new electoral system; the emergence 
of many independent inspection organisations; and creating channels for popular 
participation. The 1997 constitution introduced a new electoral system and for the first 
time in Thai political history both the House of Representatives and the Senate were 
directly elected by the people. Under the previous constitutions the Senate derived from 
the King’s suggestion or was recruited by a designated committee. Regarding the 
election of the House of Representatives, the constitution provides a new ‘party-list 
system’ in which people elect the party that they most favour. Members of Parliament 
under this constitution are the 500 members derived from 400 constituencies and 100 
from the party-list basis. The reason for introducing new party-list method of the CDA 
was to open up a chance for a ‘good’ and ‘competent’ person who lacked popular support 
to engage in the political system (Pinai, 2002: 108).  
In addition, the CDA believes that the educational qualification of a person should 
guarantee their ethical character and ability to work as a Member of Parliament and it 
supposed that only university graduates could meet this requirement (Yoshifumi, 2008: 
145-157). Therefore, electoral candidates in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate must hold at least a Bachelor degree to qualify for the candidacy. Further, the 
Election Commission, a new independent institution, has been introduced to Thai 
politics in order to hold and regulate the national elections and to ensure that the 
election was run honestly and in a fair manner. The Election Commission has the 
authority whether or not to confirm the election result of each candidate (Owen, 2009). 
The assumption of the CDA was based on the understanding that Thai politicians tend 
to be corrupted easily, therefore, in order to terminate corruption and abuse of political 
power, the CDA created some innovative independent inspection organisations to 
monitor the government, the Members of Parliament, the Senate, and other state 
officials including the Constitutional court, the Ombudsman, the Administrative court, 
the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the State Audit Commission 
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(Thailand’s Inspection Organisations and Related Laws, 2002; Thitinan, 2008: 147-148). 
Moreover, apart from the inspection of many independent organisations, the 1997 
constitution engaged peoples’ participation in the process of checks and balances on 
state power through various channels. However, the entirely new method of political 
participation was the signing of a petition for 50,000 names in order to relieve state 
officials. In sum, based on textual restrictions written into the constitution it seemed 
that the new constitution should be capable of preventing the abuse of power and curb 
the massive corruption of Thai politicians. However, in the following years corruption 
remained crucial in Thai politics and it was a major reason for the coup makers in 2006 
against the TRT government.  
 
2.2.3 Creating a Strong Government  
As shown in chapter four of this thesis regarding ‘history’ of the old historical bloc, one 
of the major defects of Thai politics is the instability of the executive body. No elected 
government has ever held power for the full four-year-term in modern Thai history 
since 1932. The 1997 constitution attempted to overcome this problem on the rationale 
that in order to improve the quality of democracy the order or steadiness of Thai 
politics should be secured. To achieve that, the state should be strong and there are 
several measures to enhance government stability. Firstly, the 1997 constitution created 
more difficult barriers for the opposition in the parliament in submitting no-confidence 
motions on the Prime Minister. The opposition must gain at least ‘two-fifths’ support in 
the House of Representatives; however, only one-fifth is sufficient to secure a debate on 
the cabinet (Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 1997, article 185). This condition 
led to Thai politics differing from previous eras as a debate of no-confidence over the 
PM has usually been employed as political tool against the government. Setting a high 
barrier on this is in order to secure the stability of the government. 
Secondly, the people’s constitution, unlike previous versions of the Thai constitution, 
makes clear the separation between legislative and executive power. Members of the 
House of Representatives chosen by the Prime Minister who become cabinet members 
are disqualified from holding seats in the House of Parliament. This means that if the 
Prime Minister recalls any member of the cabinet from their position they will lose all 
official political authority. This method was adopted to strengthen the Prime Minister’s 
authority over cabinet members and bring about a stable administration (Yoshifumi, 
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2008: 158). Strategic fighting to pursue the political interests of cabinet members as had 
occurred in the past no longer existed under this condition. 
Thirdly, the new constitution was designed to prevent the lower house MPs from 
bargaining with the Prime Minister in exchange for the passage of bills. If the bill is 
related to government policy or the constitution and also the number of votes against 
does not exceed one-half of the lower house members then the government is eligible to 
resubmit the bill to a joint session between the senate and the lower house (Yoshifumi, 
2008: 159). In short, these rules under the new constitution provide higher stability to 
the Prime Minister’s authority than ever. This matter is very crucial and engaged in the 
process of hegemonic construction of the Thaksin government, who was the first 
administration under the 1997 constitution. 
 
3. PRE-THAKSIN ERA AND THE RISE OF THAI RAK THAI PARTY 
The Thai state in the pre-Thaksin era, from 1997 to 2001, was in the stage of recovery 
and learning the new political rules.4 Social forces demanded a new and powerful state 
to facilitate the free market and boost the economy following severe economic recession 
rather than the economic self-sufficiency concept proposed by the King.5 However, what 
is crucial in this period of Thai politics is the formation and the rise of the alternative 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party of the tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra. The party was 
established in 1998 as an alternative political force in the post-crisis era. Within a short 
period TRT had ascended to political power and acted as a strong cohesive factor that 
brought the Thai historical bloc into transit.  
                                                             
4It was recovery from both severe economic devastation and social-ideological rearrangement. 
On the economic recovery from the crisis and the politics of IMF restructuring programme 
have already discussed in the last chapter. At this short period, it was happen that social forces 
had demanded to overcome the ‘old-styled’ of bureaucratic executive of the Chuan government 
(1997-2001) (Bidhya, 2000: 93). In addition, the new 1997 constitution was legalised. New 
political institutions such as some autonomy inspection organisations had been established and 
the rules of election had been introduced to Thai society, for example, the first time Senate 
election in March 2000 (Montesano, 2001: 171).  
5The Thai monarchy had actively taken action in Thai politics in order to play a cohesive role 
between mid-1997 and early 2001. The king’s proposition of the notion of Self-sufficiency 
Economy Philosophy (SEP) did nothing to improve quality of life of social groups in the 
capitalist mode of production. However, the SEP itself is significant for the maintaining of the 
dominant ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology. On this matter see the chapter four.  
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Thaksin Shinawatra, born in July 1949, came from a Chinese higher middle class family 
in Chiang Mai. He was a member of 10th class of the Armed Forces Academies 
Preparatory School and graduated from the Thai Police Academy in 1973. He pursued 
further study in the United States where he holds a PhD in Criminology (Pairoj and 
Ruj, 2001: 16). While Thaksin was studying for his PhD, he had the chance to enrol on 
Information Technology and Computer courses. This was crucial for him in the 
following years because Thaksin was the pioneer in Thailand’s computer and 
telecommunication sectors after he resigned from his police career. He established his 
computer business by first importing IBM computers for the Thai market (Weerapol et 
al., 2001: 18). However, even after he left his bureaucratic life, his bureaucratic 
connections were pivotal for him in making a large amount of money. Pol. Capt. 
Chalerm Yubamrung, who was a minister of the Prime Ministers office in 1990, allowed 
Thaksin a 20-year-state concession on the cable television network and mobile phones 
services (Kanmunee and Narongchai, 2002: 66). This led him and his family to become 
billionaires through a number of related businesses.  
Thaksin first stepped into political life in late 1994 when he took the position of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under the coalition quota of the Phalang Dharma Party 
(PDP). Later, he was a leader of the PDP and a deputy Prime Minister under the 
Banharn government in 1996 (Weerapol et al., 2001: 38). Thaksin’s short period of 
participation in Thai politics between 1994 and 1996 was not a successful period in his 
life. Under the complexity and a high degree of patron-client relations that are rooted in 
Thai politics, Thaksin as a new comer at that time could not do anything as easily as he 
wished. Therefore, he left the Banharn government in 1997 and formed his own political 
party a year later.  
Although the crisis in 1997 made significant impacts on most social forces as shown in 
the last chapter, some forces gained benefit and took advantage in terms of political 
economy from the crisis. The crucial survivors from the crisis were the capitalists in 
several sectors. Thaksin as a capitalist represented one of the most powerful social 
groups who played the leading role as a cohesive factor among other capitalists and 
formed the Thai Rak Thai party in 1998 as an attempt to directly secure their own 
interests over the following years. Table 6.1 below shows that the Advance Info Service 
(AIS) and the Jusmin group were the biggest telecommunication capitalists that 
comfortably survived from the crisis. The AIS owned by Thaksin’s family and the 
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Jusmin group both joined and formed the TRT party along with other actors in 
capitalist network as illustrated in figure 6.1 below.  
 
Table 6.1: Telecom Stock Performance (Net results, January – September 1997) 
in billion Baht  
 
Source: Ukrist, 1998: 74.  
 
TRT, a leading survivor of the crisis, was founded in July 1998. During the first stage, 
it comprised of two major social groups consisting of several capitalist factions and 
some NGOs and public intellectuals. On the one hand, the TRT was founded by ‘six’ 
principal capitalist groups including 1) the Shinawatra Group of the Shinawatra family 
who own a number of leading telecommunication, mobile, and satellite businesses 2) the 
mass media group of Pracha Maleenon, owner of the Channel Three television station. 
This is a major broadcasting and advertising business in Thailand 3) the Jasmine 
Telecommunication Group led by Adisai Photharamic, the owner of a number of 
telecommunication businesses especially the landline telephone services throughout the 
country 4) the Juengrungruangkit family of the Thai Summit Group which is the leader 
in the automobile and electronics industries 5) the CP Group, the biggest agricultural 
industrial company in Thailand (Baker, 2005; Bukhoree, 2004: 116) 6) the construction 
and real estate capitalists; most of this faction is based in local/provincial businesses and 
as Noppanan (2006: 283-291) notes there were more than 60 families of local 
construction millionaires who coalesced as part of the TRT government. The TRT 
government as a leading social force of political transformation after the 1997 economic 
crisis formed a new relationship pattern among social forces in Thailand as shown in 
figure 6.1 below.  
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On the other hand, a number of public intellectuals especially the Octobrists, former 
student leaders in the events of October 1973 and 1976, are also crucial for the 
formation of TRT (Kanokrat, 2012). Some prominent Octobrists and NGOs included 
Phumtham Wetchayachai, the well known social volunteering NGO leader, who helped 
in drafting TRT’s policies and organised for the meeting between the party and many 
NGOs throughout the country. Dr Prommin Lertsuridet, a student leader in the 6 
October 1976 protests, also contributed to the policy drafting process. Dr Somkid 
Jatusripitak, Professor of Marketing, brought innovations in social marketing that were 
adapted to TRT’s election campaign between 1999 and 2001. His contributions to the 
formation of TRT were massively crucial to TRT’s success over the following years. Dr 
Theerapat Sereerangsan, a political scientist from Sukhothai Open University, also 
helped out in policy drafting, party regulations, and forming party visions. These 
prominent public intellectuals brought the social connection between the party and the 
society and they gained high popular support due to their careers and social functions 
(Kanokrat, 2012: Ch. 6; Bukhoree, 2004: 117-142). Eventually, TRT was officially 
founded on 14 July 1998. The network of Thai political economy in the post-1997 crisis 
after the formation of TRT is illustrated in figure 6.1 below.  
 
Figure 6.1: Thailand’s Political Economy Network in the Post 1997 Crisis 
Period 
 
Source: Ukrist and McCargo, 2005: 220 
The above figure shows political economy network of the Thai historical bloc in which 
the Thaksin group as a social force played a cohesive role for several ruling social 
groups. The Thaksin/TRT party since 1998 conglomerated the scattered capitalists, 
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politicians, and also military and police and won the general election in January 2001 
with a landslide victory.6 The social alliance of Thaksinism in the early 2000s comprised 
the rising groups of telecommunications and media-entertainment capitalists along with 
the old banking and other capitalists such as steel, petrochemicals, and real estate. 
These ruling social forces later established themselves as the new dominant social force 
and dominated Thailand for several years. What really matters for the study of the Thai 
historical bloc in the transition period is that Thaksin and his allied capitalist forces 
changed the pattern of social relationships among dominant forces in Thailand (see 
figure 6.2 below).  
 
Figure 6.2: Relationships among dominant social forces in Thailand since the 
1997 economic crisis  
 
Source: Thanee and Pasuk (2008: 258) 
As was shown in figure 4.1 in chapter four earlier, in the old historical bloc there were 
politicians and bureaucrats who played dominant roles in Thai politics whilst the 
capitalists supported the bureaucrats behind the scene for their own sake. Later, from 
the beginning of the Thaksin era in 2001, the pattern of social relationship among 
dominant social forces in Thailand changed as the politicians were no longer the leading 
force who bargained over their interests with the bureaucracy. It was the capitalist who 
controlled the politicians and the bureaucracy in order to administrate the country and, 
at the same time, secure the economic interests of their own group and allied factions. 
There is clear evidence to support this pattern of relationship as there were many 
capitalists (and some proxies) who took charge as ministers and vice-ministers in 
various ministries while the Thaksin government was in power. In short, this section 
                                                             
6 For in-depth analysis of the 2001 general election see Nelson (2002).  
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analysed the social composition of the TRT party and the changing pattern of social 
relationships among dominant social groups in the Thai historical bloc. These will be 
the basis for the account of the politics of transformation under Thaksinism within and 
beyond this chapter.  
 
4. THAKSINISM, SOCIAL FORCES, AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROJECTS 
The Thai state gradually recovered from the crisis in 1997. The short period from 1997 
to 2000 in Thailand happened to be a chance for the monarchy to play a cohesive role 
via the King’s SEP. However, the old historical bloc was still in crisis and the King’s 
cohesive practice alone could not combine diffuse social forces in the post-severe crisis 
period into a power bloc. Whilst social groups were demanding for a strong alternative 
power to regulate social relations, the TRT government, since early 2001,cohered them 
together through ‘force and consent’7 by practicing its power at three crucial moments—
politics, political economy, and ideology. Through these exercises of power, TRT 
established the so-called ‘Thaksinism’ or ‘Thaksin regime’ 8  that brought the Thai 
historical bloc into the transition period.  
Recent studies9 of the politics of Thaksinism have mainly relied on three dominant 
approaches of Behaviouralism, Institutionalism10 and the Economic framework.11Rather, 
this thesis argues that Thaksinism should be approached as part of broader social 
transition and that it was a process of hegemonic building, constructed through a 
number of hegemonic projects together with legislative-parliamentary politics. In this 
section, the politics of hegemonic building through the Thaksin government’s 
transformative projects in both terrains of political economy and ideology will be 
                                                             
7 See the concept of integral state in chapter three section I.  
8 The terms used here in this study, Thaksinism and Thaksin Regime, refer to the term that is 
called in Thai ‘Ra Borb Thaksin’. Both have the same meaning and will be used interchangeably 
throughout this work.  
9 See chapter two for broader critical exploration on traditional accounts of Thai studies.  
10 The Behaviouralist and Institutionalist approaches to the Thaksin regime have been applied 
to a variety of aspects such as the implementation of the populist policies of the TRT 
government (Thirayuth, 2002, 2007; Prawase, 2006, 2007; Ruangwit, 2003), social actions of the 
TRT towards certain aspects, for example, the TRT and IMF  (Glassman, 2004), government 
behaviour towards public policy formulations (Thitinan, 2003; Khanin, 2004), and even studies 
of the personal leadership of PM Thaksin (McCargo, 2011; Heppell, 2011). 
11Economic approaches mainly focus on the formation, implementation, and impacts of the 
economic policies of Thaksinism at different levels of analysis (Pasuk, 2004; Apichat, 2007; 
Warr, 2009; Brown and Hewison, 2005). 
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analysed.12 The section will begin with the first moment, politics, which is a basis for 
further practice in economy and ideology respectively. 
 
4.1 Moment of Politics: Creating a Strong State 
Gramsci sees the state in a wider sense. The integral state not only operates through 
consent building, but also in the legal sphere and coercion in what Gramsci called 
‘political society’ (Gramsci, 1971: 12, Q12§1*). Although hegemonic projects created 
through hegemonic apparatuses on the terrain of civil society are crucial and powerful 
for the dominant TRT party, the new historical bloc could not be successfully 
established without a ‘strong’ position in parliamentary politics. In order to strengthen 
their state power, utilising ‘force’ is necessary. It is argued here that there were three 
major means that the Thaksin government utilised over Thai political 
society―parliamentary domination, interventions through many inspection 
organisations, and controlling the bureaucrats.  
 
4.1.1 Parliamentary Domination 
In the Gramscian account, both civil and political society reverberate off each other. 
Therefore, in order to secure hegemonic position over civil society, Thaksinism needed 
to strengthen its parliamentary legitimacy. Under the new 1997 constitution, the 
‘number’ of MPs was very crucial in order to secure a strong government (Kasian, 
2003b). As is mentioned earlier in this chapter, the constitution requires at least ‘two-
fifths’ from the lower house in order to initiate a debate of no-confidence over the prime 
minister. This was a major reason for the Thaksin government to increase its MPs by 
employing two major methods; coalition and party mergers (Siripan, 2006).  
The first method was a traditional and normal procedure in Thai politics in which no 
party had ever enjoyed an absolute majority in parliament. Therefore, coalition 
government was the usual norm for the country. During the first stage, even TRT won 
a landslide victory in the 2001 general election, but the opposition in the parliament still 
                                                             
12 It should be noted that the distinction between structure and superstructure in Gramsci’s 
political theories is only a theoretical distinction in order to give a clear theoretical explanation 
in his thought (Green, 2006: 196). However, in practice or the real political praxis, Gramsci sees 
that both structure and superstructure are always interrelated between each other (see chapter 
three section I). 
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retained the ability to trigger a debate of no-confidence over the prime minister. 
Therefore, they needed to increase number of MPs as much as possible to dominate the 
majority rule. When TRT was forming the government there were two political parties 
that joined the coalition, the Chat Thai Party and the New Aspirations Party. The 
coalition of TRT and its two allies increased the number of MPs to comprise 325 out of 
500. Nevertheless, the TRT party continued strengthening itself by using another 
method that was the ‘merger of other political parties’. This merger method was entirely 
new in Thai political history.  
The TRT party adapted the business company method to public administration by 
offering a chance to participate in government and an opportunity for MPs in several 
political parties to become ministers or deputy ministers. The rationale behind adopting 
this technique is in order to bypass the regulation of the 1997 constitution in which 
section 107 (4) states that ‘a person having the following qualifications has a right to be a 
candidate in an election of the House of Representatives: (4) being a member of any and only one 
political party for a consecutive period of not less than ninety days...’. This means that in case 
TRT did not persuade politicians to join their party for 90 days before the election it is 
sufficient if both political parties are merged as one party. The TRT party appreciated 
the use of this technique because they could increase their MPs without the 
constitutional regulation. Between 2001 and 2004, there were four political parties that 
merged with the TRT including the Seri Dhama Party, New Aspirations Party, Thin 
Thai Party, and Chart Pattana Party (Siripan, 2006: 114-116). These eventually boosted 
the total number of TRT MPs to 372 out of 500. With these methods the Thaksin 
government held an absolute majority and totally dominated the House of 
Representatives and employed their strength to facilitate economic and social policies.  
The Thaksin government gained a high number of MPs not only to protect the stability 
of the government but also to facilitate legislative procedures. They employed their 
strength in the House of Representatives to pass some controversial acts, for example, 
the ‘Bureaucratic Reform Act’ in 2002 and the ‘emergency decree on excise tax’ in 2003 
(Painter, 2006). In the case of the Bureaucratic Reform Act the Thaksin government 
announced to the public when they came to power in 2001 that the Thai bureaucracy 
should be reformed and that they would complete the process by October 2002. The 
opposition in parliament argues that the draft contained some mistakes and the rationale 
for the reformation was not clear. However, TRT ignored the opposition’s opinion and 
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passed the act in October 2002 as they announced it a year before. An absolute majority 
ensures that the government could maintain its legislative control effectively. In 
addition, the most controversial aspect of the politics of Thaksin’s government was that 
they sometimes bypassed the House of Representative’s standard procedures and 
launched ‘emergency decrees’ for which normally the executive should launch in case of an 
emergency or very significant challenge facing the country and which ought to be 
passed by the House of Representative as soon as possible. The emergency decree on 
excise tax in 2003 was not an urgent issue requiring executive action and should have 
been pursued by parliament. There was much societal criticism that this emergency 
decree benefited Thaksin Shinawatra’s telecommunication allies, and that this option 
was followed in order to avoid the checks and balance system embedded in 
parliamentary politics.  
 
4.1.2 Interventions through Inspection Organisations  
The TRT government’s interventions in the sphere of political society were not only 
restricted to its domination of the House of Representatives but also over other 
independent institutions. In democratic theory, ruling power should be checked and 
balanced by both state institutions and other independent organisations. However, the 
major characteristic of Thaksinism was to intervene through many inspection channels 
(Jermsak, 2004). The Thaksin government made many attempts to freeze inspection 
processes through intervening in the Constitutional inspection organisations, the mass 
media, the bureaucracy and the armed forces.  
The first channel that the Thaksin government attempted to interfere with was in the 
penetration of its power and personal connection in the many ‘constitutional inspection 
organisations’. The 1997 constitution required that in order to recruit persons to be in 
charge of any Constitutional inspection organisations, the recruitment committee must 
be comprised of representatives from political parties that have MPs in the parliament, 
academics, and members of other inspection organisations. The TRT party intervened 
in the recruitment process by sending their MPs to lobby other committees to select the 
preferred person to be in charge (Matichon Editorial Team, 2006: 95; Mutebi, 2006). In 
addition, the TRT party lobbied some Senators because the Senate held the final 
decision in accepting the selection process undertaken by the recruitment committee. 
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The connection between TRT and many senators came from the regulation of the 
people’s constitution which obliged that Senate candidates must only be informed by 
their personal information and could not pursue any campaign in order to gain votes. 
The TRT party had powerful social connections to their MPs; therefore, there was 
unofficial support of the TRT by a number of Senate candidates. This was 
understandable in cases where the Senator would facilitate any possible actions for the 
TRT. Throughout its five years in power there were a number of cases that were met 
with much doubt in Thai society as to whether the TRT had intervened in state power 
inspection process, for example, the case of the recruitment of the head of the State 
Audit Office and the recruitment of the heads of the Election Commission, the 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commissions, and the National Counter 
Corruption Commission (Mutebi, 2006; Case, 2007).  
Another intervention in political society by the Thaksin government was its control 
over the ‘mass media’. Intervention in the sphere of mass media was very crucial because, 
on the one hand, the Thaksin government could construct a perception of the world of 
their preference in political society. On the other hand, intervention through mass 
media decreased the efficacy to monitor government affairs. There were many patterns 
of mass media interventions by the Thaksin government. Somkiat Tangkitwanich (cited 
in Kriangsak, 2006: 13-14) summarises that there were ten patterns including 1) state 
propaganda 2) intervention through the media who gain the state concession in order to 
bargain over the renewal of concessions 3) implementing the Publishing Act to 
constrain the media over its critique of government 4) employing other laws such as the 
Launder Act to prosecute the media who oppose the government 5) freezing the 
expansion of local and private media 6) intervention in television work such as the case 
of intervention in the news report of ITV in 2001 7) its ownership of ITV and the 
Nation Multimedia 8) providing benefits for media firms who were government allies 9) 
using nominees to prosecute the NGOs who worked for the media reform campaign and 
10) interventions through a number of newspapers via a large amount of advertising 
fees (Ubolrat, 2004, 2005).  
 
4.1.3 Controlling the Bureaucrats  
Furthermore, in order to build a strong state, TRT also controlled the ‘Civil Bureaucrats’ 
via an innovative ‘CEO Governor’ (Bidhya, 2006). This policy had been implemented 
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since 2001 by adopting a private company CEO style of administration for the 
governors of all provinces in Thailand. The CEO Governor derived the idea and 
philosophy of administration directly from the TRT government. Therefore, between 
2001 and 2006 the civil bureaucrats were under the control of the Thaksin government. 
In addition, TRT’s political influence also penetrated its in local politics. Between 2001 
and 2004, there were nation-wide local elections to administrate the work of the 
Provincial Administration Organisation (PAO), Sub-district Administration 
Organisation (SAO), and Municipality. This was entirely new for Thai politics, because 
in the past it was not obviously clear that local politicians were supported by any 
national political party. 
Apart from controlling the civil bureaucrats, the Thaksin government also interfered in 
the ‘Armed Forces’ especially in the Army and the Police (Chambers et al, 2013). In the 
Thai political tradition intervention through the Armed forces is a normal occurrence. 
The military was the true ruling social class in Thailand since the 1932 revolution. 
They dominated the supreme political power both directly and indirectly for more than 
five decades out of eight decades of modern Thai politics. The Thaksin government 
promoted their allies, especially their classmates from the Armed Forces Preparatory 
School class 10 of Prime Minister Thaksin, to top positions. Not only the PM’s 
classmates were promoted to the high ranks of the Armed forces, but also his relatives 
and cousins (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 225-238). These interventions in both the civil 
bureaucracy and the Armed forces guaranteed that the Thaksin government could 
comfortably maintain its power over Thai society during the period between 2001 and 
2006.   
In short, the first moment in which the TRT party acted in order to strengthen its 
political power is the political moment. Enhancing its number of MPs through coalition 
and merger of political parties along with interventions in inspection state 
organisations, mass media, and controlling bureaucrats made the TRT government a 
strong state. They employed this advantage as a basis to facilitate their economic 






4.2 Moment of Political Economy: Introducing to the ‘Thaksinomics’ 
The TRT government entered into power in 2001 at a time of severe economic 
recession and recovery. Therefore, TRT carried a high expectation from social forces in 
the Thai historical bloc to recover, to boost the country, and to facilitate the economy as 
an urgent agenda. Economy is a crucial matter in each political society because it is vital 
to the social and political power of any single government. The Thaksin government 
was well aware of the urgency to recover the Thai economy; therefore, they ignored 
what the King’s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy offered in 1997 and provided their 
own economic practices through a number of economic policies to address this social 
demand.  
However, it should be noted that the set of economic policies of the Thaksin 
government which was later labelled ‘Thaksinomics’―economic policies that were 
implemented during the Thaksin era―are not entirely new ideas but are instead based 
on many economic and political ideologies (Rangsan, 2003b). At the first stage of their 
administration, the notions of ‘Keynesianism’ and ‘economic nationalism’ were employed 
in both recovering the Thai economy and gaining support from the anti-IMF labour 
social groups in Thailand (Glassman, 2004; Kasian, 2003 a;Kasian, 2006; Schmidt, 2010: 
105). The ‘Dual-Track policy’ was a major characteristic of the Thaksin government’s 
economic policies. They claimed that it would enhance the Thai economy in both 
domestic and international levels altogether (Olarn, 2003). 
Domestically, the Thaksin government adopted a number of measures to boost domestic 
demand at various levels including individuals and small and middle entrepreneurs to 
stimulate consumption and local production. However, at the time of economic recession 
it was difficult to stimulate people to consume and spend their money. Therefore, some 
innovative policies, which were part of the political campaign for the 2001 general 
election under the central theme of ‘Think new, Act new for Thai people’, were launched at 
the first stage including the 3-year-Agrarian debt moratorium, the village fund, the 
people’s bank, turning assets into capital and the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) 
programme.  
The 3-year-Agrarian Debt Moratorium was the very first tool that the TRT employed to 
deal with the Thai economy. This programme, financed by the government’s 
agricultural bank, offered the agrarian social forces in the countryside to stop paying 
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debt to the government agriculture bank for three years. Alternatively, the debtor could 
choose to pay the debt without interest for three years. In addition, rather than offering 
a moratorium, the government also initiated the process of re-structuring debt between 
the agrarian class and the creditors (4 Years Recovered Thailand for Thai people by 
Thaksin Shinawatra, 2005: 14-15). This programme was very crucial for the Thaksin 
government in gaining majority support from ordinary people because the agrarian 
population is the greatest mass in Thailand. A few years later, after the army carried out 
the coup in September 2006, these peasant social groups who supported TRT played a 
crucial part in the counter forces to the military coup.  
The Village Fund project was the second step the Thaksin government implemented by 
targeting other sectors wider than the agricultural sector. This programme was based 
on the concept of ‘providing fund, gaining income’ (4 Years Recovered Thailand for Thai 
people by Thaksin Shinawatra, 2005: 16) and the intention of the government was to 
offer easy access to local funding for people to loan without a guarantor. The Thaksin 
government offered one million baht to every village (72,944 villages) in Thailand and 
led the village committees to manage loans and interests. Village fund transactions were 
to be inspected by higher state officials including district chief officers and the governor. 
The government claimed that the village fund was not only stimulating demand in 
economic terms, it was also a democratic model in which people in the village could 
manage their funding, take care of themselves, and also check and balance other 
members in each process. Each village fund could manage its own funding to gain more 
money by investing or other economic activities. This programme conquered people’s 
mind in various sectors, both the poor and the middle class, because the village fund 
provided easier loans with low interest. This TRT strategy created a good operating 
environment for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in both the urban and rural 
areas in Thailand at that time (Natthachet, 2005: 94-95).  
Another type of similar programme, based on the idea of offering funding for the rural 
poor who usually loan from illegal creditors, was the People’s Bank project. The 
importance of the middle class and the SMEs was that the SMEs constituted 
approximately 40% of Thailand’s GDP (Natthachet, 2005: 95). In addition, the Turning 
Asset into Capital Programme was another crucial policy of Thaksinomics. This 
programme derived its idea from Hernando De Soto, a Peruvian economist, who was 
invited to Bangkok in 2002 to offer economic advice to Prime Minister Thaksin. The 
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programme was based on similar notions to other policies mentioned above that aim to 
increase the channels of funding and prepare people to be new entrepreneurs. The 
turning assets into capital programme aims to turn the rights on properties and also 
intellectual rights as a guarantor of loan from any involved banks (Sorayuth and 
Waraporn, 2004).  
Furthermore, the One Tambon13 One Product (OTOP) programme was another important 
project that boosted the domestic economy in Thailand at that time. The project derived 
its idea from the model of Japanese provincial products (First Year of the One Tambon 
One Product Programme, 2002). This policy aims to promote the local wisdom and 
knowledge in each Tambon by enhancing the best product in each Tambon to be sold 
on the national and international market. The state would facilitate markets for each 
local community and provide some loans, knowledge, technology and marketing. The 
TRT claimed that this OTOP programme would maintain local development and 
people’s participation in order to build a strong and democratic community.  
Further, local people should earn more income from selling and developing their own 
local products (Pasuk and Baker, 2009: 115). In short, these economic policies of 
Thaksinism were nothing new in their theoretical or philosophical foundations. The 
TRT only adopted various economic experiences, for example, from Latin American 
countries and Japan and applied them towards the Thai economy. However, these policy 
implementations were entirely new and innovative in Thai politics. Coincidently with 
other social policies, the Thaksin government successfully created a new form of 
consent over Thai society in the first few years in power because they had done what 
they promised; to secure the increased income of Thai social groups. The table below 




                                                             
13 ‘Tambon’ in English is means ‘sub-district’. In Thailand’s bureaucratic administration, there 
are three levels of administration; firstly, Central Administration which is the ministry; 
secondly, Provincial Administration including province (Changwat), district (Amphoe), sub-
district (Tambon), and village (Mooban); thirdly, Local Administration which are Provincial 
Administration Organisation (PAO), Sub-district Administration Organisation (SAO), and 
Municipality. Bangkok and Pattaya are the only two special administrations in Thailand that 
have autonomy to govern themselves.   
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Table 6.2: Average Household Income, Expenditure per Household, and Average 
Debt per Household  
 
Source: National Statistical Office  
Table 6.2 above confirms that the average income per household in Thailand while the 
TRT party was in power between 2001 and 2006 tremendously increased from 12,150 
baht per month in 2000 to be 17,787 in 2006. However, the data above also confirms the 
criticisms of the TRT programme as they significantly raised the household debt of the 
country. As the TRT’s economic policies awakened the market and urged people to 
consume more in the post-crisis period, the data below shows that in 2001 the average 
debt per household jumped significantly from 68,279 per household per year in 2001 to 
82,485 baht in 2002 (or 20.8% change from the previous year).  
Table 6.3: Poverty Line, Number of Poor, Head Count Index, Poverty Gap 
Index, and Severity of Poverty: 1994 – 2006  
 
Source: National Statistical Office  
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Moreover, the domestic economic strategies of TRT also reduced the number of poor 
persons and the poverty gap. Table 6.3 above shows some important information on 
poverty in Thailand from 1994 to 2006. It can be seen that Thailand successfully 
improved poverty in the absolute sense because it lifted up the poverty line from 838 
baht per person per month in 1994 to1,386 baht per person per month in 2006. The 
number of poor persons also significantly decreased from 12.8 million persons in 2000, a 
year before the TRT party came to power, to 6.1 million in 2006.  
Apart from boosting the domestic economy, the Thaksin government also dealt with 
another track of its ‘Dual-Track policy’ at the international level. Thaksinomics had a 
variety of philosophical foundations. Although the Thaksin government employed a 
Keynesian approach in government spending on the domestic economy in order to 
stimulate consumption after the time of economic crisis, they could not refuse the 
influence of neoliberalism. The Thaksin government promoted free trade and foreign 
direct investment as leading campaigns in its economic interventions (Jarvis, 2002: 313-
315). Furthermore, another distinction of this external track was a call for closer 
regional cooperation among the ASEAN countries and also with the East Asian 
countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea (Pasuk and Baker, 2009: 123-124). 
 
Figure 6.3: Growth Rate of Real Gross Domestic Product: 1998-2007  
 






Table 6.4: Gross Domestic Product 1998 – 2007 
 
Source: National Statistical Office  
In sum, in the process of transforming to a new historical bloc led by the TRT party, 
Thaksinomics in terms of political economy is only a part of that process. However, 
evidence shows that Thaksin’s interventions in the economic sphere in the post-
economic crisis period were successful. The Thaksin/TRT government boosted the 
Thai economy as seen from the increasing GDP from 5,133,502 million baht in 2001 to 
7,095,893 million baht in 2005 and lifted the National Income Per Capita from 53,838 
baht in 2001 to 71,283 baht as shown in figure 6.3 and table 6.4 above (National Income 
of Thailand, 2009). In addition, the government managed to satisfy social groups in the 
country as is apparent from a number of opinion polls because social forces admired the 
strong, speedy, and pioneering style of the executive of the TRT (Matichon, 28 October 
2002: 5).  
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the set of Thaksin’s economic policies not only 
contributed to positive outcomes for Thailand, but also led to some negative effects on 
Thai society. The ideas of stimulating domestic demand of the TRT government by 
offering many channels to people led to the problem of inappropriate loans. Some people 
spent their loans on buying any entertainment or electronic devices rather than 
investing in their careers (Matichon, 17 August 2004). This problem was a major target 
for the opposition in the parliament to discredit the significance of Thaksinomics. 
Nevertheless, even the high popularity of the TRT maintained at least in the first few 
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years because ‘Thaksinomics’ or the political economic interventions of the Thaksin 
government successfully secured economic interests for various social groups.14 
 
4.3 Moment of Ideology: Thaksinism and its Hegemonic Projects  
The changing of social relations between the TRT as a dominant social force and other 
subaltern social groups during 2001 to 2006 was feasible as the Thaksin government 
secured its political strength and gained high popularity from its economic practices. As 
a  further step TRT aimed to sustain their hegemony over the long run. Therefore, the 
moment of ideology is crucial as Thaksinism employed some crucial hegemonic projects 
to conquer Thai civil society in order to construct popular consent over Thailand’s 
historical bloc. 
 
4.3.1 Thaksinism and Hegemonic Projects: Politics of Consent Building  
  
In the chapter three, it was shown that Gramsci overcomes the problem of ‘economism’ 
or ‘economic determinism’ by providing the concept of the relationship between 
structure and superstructure or the ‘historical bloc’. His idea paves the way for more 
comprehensive political analysis rather than solely scrutinising a specific social element. 
In the Gramscian account, structure and superstructure are mutually connected. In the 
last section, the politics of economic intervention under Thaksinism were examined, 
whilst this section will focus on TRT’s political practices in the terrain of 
superstructure. Thaksinism’s political interventions in the sphere of ideology could be 
seen as a challenge to the existing hegemonic ideology of ‘royalism-nationalism’. With 
this TRT contest, the transformative projects of Thaksinism were eventually ended by 
the coup in 2006 and the new historical bloc was not successfully established.  
Civil society, for Gramsci, is the terrain upon which social classes compete for social and 
political leadership and consent or hegemony over other social classes. He argues that 
the superstructure of civil society is like the ‘trench-systems’ of modern warfare 
(Gramsci, 1971: 235, Q13§24; Thomas, 2009: 137). This means that in order to preserve 
                                                             
14This economic basis would offer a chance for the TRT to construct another level of relation 
(hegemony) through the politics of hegemonic projects.  
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hegemony, the dominant class―the TRT party―should overcome people’s hearts and 
minds (consent) in civil society. In the case of Thailand, it is argued here that the 
Thaksin government attempted to build up consent over Thai civil society through two 
major hegemonic apparatuses including implementation of ground-breaking social 
policies and leadership management.  
 
4.3.2 Ground-Breaking Social Policies  
Within five years in the premiership, TRT implemented many innovative social policies 
over Thai society. Not only were these new and unique, these policies also provided 
‘concrete benefit’ to Thai people especially to the rural subordinates in the countryside 
(Sutree, 2011). One of the most crucial campaigns for the general election in 2001 was 
the declaration of the ‘new social contract’ for Thai society (Hewison, 2004). The TRT 
party declared to fight over three ‘wars’ including the war on poverty, war on drugs, 
and war on corruption (Thaksin, 2001). 
The War on poverty social policy operated along with the economic policies mentioned 
above. Poverty-related aspects such as improvements in health care services were 
implemented. The Thaksin government offered the progressive ‘30 Baht Health Care 
Scheme’ that set price of 30 Baht per visit at any state hospital. Even though Thailand 
experienced modernisation and industrialisation in various aspects its social security 
system remained weak as a result of the lack of focus of previous administrations on the 
issue (Chalermpol, 2007; Selway, 2011). The 30 Baht per visit programme was criticised 
mainly by state hospital executives because it forced them to reduce many costs to 
support the programme (Jiraporn et al., 2004).  
However, from a subaltern perspective this social policy was a highly important 
programme that concretely improved the quality of life for all social forces. This 
hegemonic project gained high support from Thai people as evidenced by polls in 2003 
(Matichon, 31 March 2003: 10; 20 July 2003: 8). In addition, after two years in power 
the Thaksin government launched a new project to tackle poverty, ‘The Comprehensive 
Solving of Social Problems and Poverty’, by providing the official registration of peoples’ 
difficulties at every District administration office. This project aims to aggregate 
systematic information on peoples’ difficulties such as the problems of poverty, 
homelessness, landlessness, and illegal careers (The Handbook of Registration of The 
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Comprehensive Solving of Social Problems and Poverty Programme, 2003; Bamford, 
2003).There were more than eight million people who registered with state officials in 
order to report their social and economic troubles. This massive amount level of 
participation in the project was crucial because the government could roughly estimate 
the number of votes they should gain in the forthcoming election which would be held a 
year after the implementation of the project. 
Another important project dealing with basic social services was the ‘SML Project’ 
(SML stands for Small, Medium, and Large). The SML project proposed that this 
programme would increase the power of local people, while decreasing state authority 
(Siripan, 2009; Chetthapum, 2006). The project allocated funding to villages depending 
on the size of each village based on number of residents. The small villages with no 
more than 500 people received 200,000 Baht (approximately £4,000) per annum. The 
medium villages, 501 – 1,000 people, received 250,000 (£5,000) Baht and the large 
villages with more than 1,000 people obtained 300,000 Baht (£6,000). Each village 
would consider for themselves how and for what purposes they would spend this 
funding. A committee was elected to run the project and anytime the committee decided 
to do something on funding, it occurred through a public hearing in their own village. 
Most villages spent funds on the fulfillment of basic infrastructure in the village such as 
to improve the quality of local roads, water supplies, and other community properties 
(Siripan, 2009). 
Apart from the war on poverty, TRT announced that they would fight the ‘war on 
drugs’. Narcotics have been one of many social problems in Thailand; therefore, the 
TRT government attempted to combat the drug trade spreading further, especially in 
the Northern border provinces of the country. The government set a deadline for the 
project that by the first of February 2003 Thailand should be clean from the narcotics 
problem. This led to a sharp decline in the spread of drugs and more than 500,000 cases 
were prosecuted (Kachen, 2005; Pinij, 2007). Another policy of Thaksinism that gained 
massive popular support from Thai society was a ‘Social Order Programme’. This 
programme was a part of the ‘war on drugs’ project. It was implemented in 2001 as soon 
as the government was in power. Led by Purachai Piamsomboon, the vice-premier, this 
programme rather than take a passive approach to drugs and other social problems 
actively intervened any possible social problems by patrolling a number of nightclubs, 
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bars, and entertainment complexes through Bangkok and other provinces. In addition, 
apart from patrolling, zoning bills were launched (Surichai, 2009).  
Furthermore, the Thaksin government operated many state led projects in order to 
overcome the long neglected aspects of social welfare through the so-called ‘Krong Karn 
Oua Ar Thorn’ (provided by the state with kindness). There were a number of social 
projects within this theme such as the state providing housing for the poor and 
homeless, taxi and motorcycle taxi for rent provided by the state, and computers for 
every local administration (Sutree, 2011; Pasuk and Baker, 2008). These state provided 
projects were criticised by economists and the opposition in parliament as government 
spending without fiscal discipline that would lead to the problem of public debt in the 
future (Jurairat, 2004).  
However, this project was crucial because the implementation of these ‘Krong Karn Oua 
Ar Thorn’, in other words, could be seen (especially by the royalists) as the TRT trying 
to ‘challenge’ the existing ‘Royal Initiative Projects’ led by King  Bhumibol. The royalist-
social elites always claimed that numerous royal projects have been operating for more 
than four decades and already contributed to various aspects of the country (Chanida, 
2007). The King’s ideological hegemony has been established through the royal projects 
for several decades, and then within a few years Thaksinism shook the hegemonic 
position of the King’s projects. This eventually led to the clash in the sphere of 
superstructure in Thai politics as both the TRT and the monarchy contested to gain 
hegemony over Thai civil society. This issue will be seen more clearly in the next 
chapter on the politics of ideological struggle between 2005 and 2010. After the 2006 
coup d’état, the return of the royalist social elite in order to disgrace Thaksinism and its 
transformative projects and preserve the status quo of the royal hegemony obviously 
appeared.  
In short, these ground-breaking social policies were promoted through innovative 
marketing methods led by expert and professional staff in social marketing (Nishapa, 
2003; Hewison, 2010; Ake, 2011: 82). If we see Thai politics in a Gramscian sense, these 
policies posit themselves as ‘hegemonic apparatuses’, as Gramsci argues that the 
hegemonic apparatuses could be a number of agencies in civil society, for instance, the 
schools, the universities, the church, the mass media, or the trade unions (Gramsci, 
1971: 235, 342, Q13§24, Q11§12). These Thaksinist social policies can be seen as 
agencies in civil society as they had constructed a new ‘conception of the world’ and the 
159 
 
new relation of force within its five years in political authority. This new conception of 
the world clearly showed in the post Thaksin period that massive numbers of people 
demanded any policy that was ‘eatable’ like Thaksinism had provided (Prapas, 2006). 
Along with the implementation of a number of social policies, the TRT party 
successfully managed their political leadership, which was very important to build 
consent over social forces. 
 
4.3.3 Leadership Management  
Apart from implementing a number of ground-breaking social and economic policies, 
‘leadership management’ was another crucial method pursued under Thaksinism. This 
leadership management issue was based majorly on the personal charisma of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra; however, it also derived from adopting the right political 
strategies. It is argued here that there were two major leadership management features 
of the Thaksin government while it was in power which include presenting new visions, 
new style of politics and positing a close relationship to the mass.  
The first and the most crucial leadership management feature that was admired by Thai 
subalterns was the presentation of the Thaksin government as having a ‘new visions and 
new style of politics’. Thaksin is a billionaire and Thai society knew him prior to being a 
politician as a young successful businessman. Thaksin and his party, TRT, came in to 
the election campaign at the moment a strong leader with a wide vision was urgently 
required in order to solve the economic crisis that emerged in 1997. Once Thaksin said 
in the Annual Conference of the Thai Rak Thai Party that ‘Do not be afraid of my wealthy. 
I am rich enough, so why do I need to be corrupt? I ask for a chance to serve my country’ 
(Thaipost, 27 March 2000: 2-3). This completely differed to all previous Prime 
Ministers who typically have backgrounds in the army, bureaucracy, and legal 
profession; it was the first time that a rich businessman held the position of  Prime 
Minister.  
The TRT party offered its slogan of ‘Think new, Act new for every Thais’ which clearly 
stated that the ‘old style’ of politics—patron-client system, corruption, instability, and 
coup d’états—should be replaced. When the TRT government gained political power, 
they pronounced to the public that they would adopt the ‘new style’ of politics; an 
innovative politics, rather than destructive politics as in the past. They adopted some 
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distinctive political rhetoric such as the ‘integrated administration’, which means an 
administration covering all related aspects of work. A ‘CEO’ style of private executive 
governance was also employed in Thai politics, for example, the project of CEO-
governor that aimed to make the seventy-five governors in Thailand CEOs who could 
run each province more effectively (Wiraj, 2003). It is argued here that there were two 
major events that took place in 2003 that enhanced the strong leadership of the Thaksin 
government. The first event was the disbursement to the IMF in July 2003 (Chookiat, 
2004). The TRT claimed that this early repayment of debt to the IMF could save the 
country from paying a large amount of interest. Moreover, in the neoliberal point of 
view, this was a great opportunity to secure consumer and foreign investor confidence. 
While TRT was even criticised in that repayment of debt to the IMF was just a 
‘political ploy’, the result of this campaign was a demonstration of the strong leadership 
of the TRT government and the popularity of the government reached its height 
(Chookiat, 2004: 258). The second event was an opportunity to host the ‘Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation’ (APEC) in October 2003. It was a successful conference and 
Thailand was admired by the member countries and it eventually led to its increasing 
popularity (Pran, 2004).  
Another important hegemonic apparatus of the Thaksin government was the leadership 
management on ‘positing a close relationship to the masses’. Prime Minister Thaksin had 
built up a new popular perception as easy going, kind, welcome, and very close to the 
people which is entirely different to previous Prime Ministers. Actually this kind of 
relationship between the PM and the masses was not a genuine idea of the Thaksin 
government, but rather was an adoption of similar ideas from the Sarit government in 
the early 1950s (Thak, 2007). Thaksin tried many times to sit down and have meals 
together with protestors and some rural poor.  
However, it should be argued that the most powerful leadership management feature in 
forging a close relationship to the people was the programme of the ‘Government 
Countryside Tour’ or as Thai people called it, the ‘Tour Nokkaminh’ that first started in 
2004. This programme took the Prime Minister and his cabinet to 53 provinces15 in 
order to understand people’s difficulties and to follow up on many state led projects as 
mentioned above. Whenever the government takes a tour to rural areas they make 
                                                             
15Thailand has 76 provinces plus Bangkok as a special autonomy administration.  
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promises to allocate large amounts of funding to the communities. This government 
tour was admired by rural social forces in Thailand because it was a chance for them to 
give direct responses to the Prime Minister (Prakirati, 2006). The Tour Nokkaminh 
Programme was very crucial because it was an attempt of Thaksinism to transform the 
‘old patron-client system’ in local politics (in which people depend on local influential 
cliques or some local state officials) to be the ‘new patron-client’ where the government 
has a shortcut directly approaching the masses and bypassing the old provincial or local 
patrons (Hewison, 2010: 122). Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the government 
countryside tours could be seen as a challenge to the hegemonic role of the monarchy as 
well as the state led projects as mentioned above. Royalists claimed that Thaksin’s 
government attempted to perform the same function that the king had done before 
between the 1950s and the 1990s (Hewison, 2008). Within TRT’s political interventions 
in the terrain of superstructure, the royalist-nationalist ideology had been ignored and 
there only Thaksinism was important and could guarantee quality of life for all social 
forces. 
In short, this section focuses on the politics of ‘consent building’ over the sphere of civil 
society in the changing historical bloc between 2001 and 2006. It was argued that a 
number of social policies and methods of leadership management―apart from social 
benefits provided to subalterns―can be seen as hegemonic projects employed by the 
dominant social group or the TRT party in order to build hegemony. Evidence from the 
popularity polls confirmed that the Thaksin government established a leading and 
active ‘consent’ over Thai social forces. Nevertheless, it was not the case that all social 
groups benefitted from economic and social interventions under Thaksinism. Some 
subaltern social forces turned to be antagonists against TRT’s power and later formed 
the anti-Thaksin social movement. 
 
4.4 Thaksinism and Antagonist Subaltern Social Forces16 
The transformation of the historical bloc from the old social relations to alternative 
social relations of Thaksinism was not a success. The Thai state under Thaksinism 
                                                             
16 It does not mean that the Thaksinism had conflicts only with the subaltern social groups. 
Indeed, the TRT party itself had conflicts with capitalist factions both within the party and with 
other factions. The fall of Thaksinism is examined in the next chapter.  
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between 2001 and 2006 could apparently ‘guarantee’ class interests for the capitalists 
and the poor social groups. In case of the poor or the peasant social force, they obviously 
gained concrete benefits from a number of economic interventions introduced by 
Thaksinism as shown above. For the capitalist, as this research does not aim to provide 
specific details on the various capitalist factions, they enjoyed the period of economic 
growth once again after the clash in 1997. There are several economic indicators 
supporting the claim that the capitalists gained from the stable politics and economy 
between 2001 and 2006 such as the sharp decrease in the number of the poor (table 6.3 
above), the growing GDP (table 6.4), and the decline in the unemployment rate (figure 
6.4 below). All these economic indicators can confirm that the Thai economy under the 
strong Thaksinism between 2001 and 2006 generally satisfied the capitalist social 
groups as they secured the stable political economic conditions in order to invest and 
accumulate wealth in their own areas. However, it was not possible that any single 
government, even one wielding strong political power, could guarantee economic 
interests for all social groups. Some capitalists also lost their own benefits and joined 
the Yellow Shirts social group to rally against Thaksinism which will be dealt with in 
the next chapter.  
Figure 6.4: Unemployment Rate in Thailand, 1998-2011 (% of Labour Force) 
 
Source: Index Mundi.  
Nevertheless, some social forces―especially labour and the middle class 
bureaucrats―turned themselves to become antagonist forces to Thaksinism and this 




4.4.1 Thaksinism and the Labour Social Group 
By the end of the 1990s, the working class that was still struggling for political 
inclusion via a collective form of representation confronted some crucial problems. 
Neoliberal development in Thailand had created the working class that confronted 
inequality, long hours and low paid work, poor health and safety in the work place, job 
insecurity, intensification of work, and lack of social welfare coverage. After the 1997 
economic crisis, labour confronted widespread unemployment, decreased real wages, 
extensive workplace change, and employer refusals to comply with labour laws, 
especially for wages and compensation (Brown, 2007: 825). In addition, the IMF’s tight 
monetary policies that the Democrat government bonded after the economic crisis 
forced Thailand to keep wages low and pursue privatisation of a number of state 
enterprises that led to  worse conditions for the Thai working class. These severe 
circumstances led to the demand for the strong state rather than the weak, bureaucratic-
style of Democrat government in the post 1997 period. 
The year 1997 was vital to Thai politics in two aspects; the first is the economic crisis 
and the re-arrangement of capital, labour, and other social forces. Another crucial aspect 
is the enforcement of the 1997 constitution. At the time of constitutional drafting there 
were massive movements from various social groups in order to request interest 
protection from the new constitution. The working class, along with NGOs, proposed 
their requirement to gain basic rights such as social welfare and insurance, a reformed 
labour relations framework, expanding educational opportunities, a progressive tax 
system, and changes to electoral laws that discriminated against workers’ inclusion 
(Brown and Hewison, 2005: 357).  
The 1997 constitution, to some extent, offered a vast expansion on protection of many 
basic human rights and increased the checks and balances of power through newly 
innovated independent organisations. However, the political inclusion from the workers 
was still abandoned and even worse was the condition that the Members of Parliament 
must hold a bachelor degree as a minimum requirement. This should obviously be seen 
as an attempt by the social and business elite to obstruct workers from being directly 
represented in parliament. 
At the very first stage of the TRT party rule they announced that they would deal with 
the creation of more stable politics and rescuing the Thai economy from crisis. In 
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relation to its economic policies, TRT promised to do many things to the working class. 
However, it could be seen that after they won the 2001 election, the TRT government 
‘had ignored’ many issues concerning working class matters. As Brown (2007: 827) 
argues, the Thaksin government did nothing to the 1975 Labour Relation Act (LRA). 
Moreover, they also sacked 21 employees of the ITV broadcaster illegally (the Shin 
Corporation of Shinawatra family took over it after Thaksin won the 2001 election). 
Moreover, the government never engaged in the promotion of any labour organisations. 
Nevertheless, what the Thaksin government had done, as shown in previous sections 
above, is create the new patron-client system that abandoned the collective organised 
labour and directly provided a number of economic interests through their innovative 
policies. Brown (2007) argues that the Thaksin government’s efforts to mobilise 
workers and encourage them to rely on the TRT government was a central source of 
support (Brown, 2007: 830).  
Nevertheless, even the workers are not the direct target of the TRT as they were, by 
nature, a combination of capitalist factions, but TRT, to some extent, did reform the 
structure of the bureaucratic body related to labour. They established the new Ministry 
of Social Development and Human Services in 2002 to deal with any issues regarding 
human development. The government reorganised the Ministry of Labour in late 2002 
and appointed a team of advisors and promised to solve a number of labour problems 
within two years. They also passed a law on the Promotion of Labour Skills and 
encouraged both public and private sectors in establishing an industry skills standards 
and development centre to train workers to meet prescribed standards; a co-operative 
scheme between the Ministry of Labour, universities, and employers to improve 
worker's literacy and numeracy; improved workplace training for vocational students; 
raising standards in many occupations to meet local and international market demands, 
and the establishment of employment centres (Brown and Hewison, 2005: 366-369; 
Lauridsen, 2009).  
 In short, the relationship between the Thaksin government as a representative of the 
capitalists and labour at the first stage seemed to be a compromise based on the 
government’s economic nationalism that announced its intention to rescue the Thai 
economy from crisis and also the political standpoint against the privatisation scheme of 
the IMF. However, as the economic nature of capitalism is to gain the maximisation of 
profit, the TRT government therefore aimed to privatise a number of state enterprises 
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in 2003. This directly brought the concern over unemployment and job insecurity of the 
labour/worker social forces which eventually led to demonstrations in late 2003 and 
later was part of the Yellow Shirts movement in 2005. The formation of the Yellow 
shirt forces will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.4.2 Thaksinism and the Reformation of Thai Bureaucracy 
The bureaucrat as the major middle class social force was the least affected by the 
economic crisis in terms of economic interest. Most of them were not confronted with 
the severe unemployment situation due to security in their posts. However, the middle 
class, like other social forces, had demanded an alternative administration that would 
enable the country to survive. In addition, the new constitution that was enforced in 
October 1997 provided some conditions that benefit the middle class in order to involve 
it in parliamentary politics (however, it excluded the workers/labourers). The creation 
of the party-list electoral system and specification for a bachelor degree for any 
candidate for Parliament or the Senate benefitted those who possessed higher education 
and social status. These conditions of the 1997 constitution gave advantages to the 
middle class social groups rather than other social groups of the country.  
In their first term in power the Thaksin government carried out the crucial reforms of 
the Thai bureaucracy by launching the law on restructuring the Thai bureaucracy and 
the appointment of the CEO-style of provincial governors. In October 2002 the Thaksin 
government passed the Reformation of Thai Bureaucracy Act which significantly 
restructured the Thai bureaucracy by creating six new ministries (increasing the total 
from 14 to 20 ministries) (Ockey, 2004: 148). Along with the establishment of many new 
ministries and a number of departments and sub-departments, the crucial point is that 
there were promotions and transfers of high-ranking bureaucrats in order to centralise 
the control over bureaucrats by the government. In addition, the CEO-styled provincial 
governors were trained and appointed by the government in order to improve 
provincial administration and centralise TRT power through the new type of governors 
as shown above. After the reformation of bureaucracy, the current workforce of Thai 




Table 6.5: Types of Civilian Workforce of Thailand in 2007 
 
Source: Piyawat, 2011: 115. 
Based on the information in the table above, it can be seen that even the size of the 
public sector in Thailand is only approximately two millions or around 3% of the 
national population (around 5% of total labour force) and the budget for the public 
sector expenses on salaries and wages of its personnel is almost 30% of the national 
budget (Piyawat, 2011: 114). This means that the bureaucrats as a social force are still 
important in Thai politics even though they are no longer the dominant social force as 
they were between the 1960s and 1980s. But the bureaucrats, with their educational and 
social status, remain important in Thai politics and no government could not ignore or 
deny its power. After five years in authority, the Thaksin government confronted 
difficulties from the middle class mainly because of corruption and their fear of 
government over-spending on the rural poor through a number of economic and social 
policies. Therefore, even though Thaksinism could offer a more stable politics and 
growth in the economy, the bureaucrat social forces eventually supported the Yellow 
Shirts movement in order to defend their own interests (they required the state to not 
spend too much money on the rural poor whom the middle class believes do not pay any 







This chapter has dealt with the highly significant period of Thai politics between 2001 
and 2006 under the hegemonic projects of the TRT party. This chapter argues that the 
Thaksin government was a pivotal ‘agency’ of social transition. In the first section, the 
brief pathway to political reform prior to the 1997 economic crisis and the main features 
of the so-called people’s constitution are examined. The constitution aimed to establish a 
‘strong’ state through many regulations and it did appear to be a very strong 
government under the Thaksin/TRT rule in 2001. The 1997 constitution is a structural 
condition that made the TRT government a strong state. The powerful TRT gained 
benefit from the new constitution and they also strengthened their own power through 
mergers with several small political parties to increase the number of their MPs and 
control sectors that check and balance their power. TRT uses its strong political power 
as a basis to constitute the ‘Thaksinism’/’Thaksin Regime’ that is based on its own 
Thaksinomics political economy and a challenging ideology.  
At the time of post-economic recession, the Thaksin government showed its strong and 
innovative ideas to boost the Thai economy and stimulate consumer demands in the 
domestic market. Along with economic interventions at the structural level, the Thaksin 
government employed a number of ‘hegemonic projects’ towards social forces. The success 
of Thaksin’s hegemonic projects through many social policies was based on the fact that 
the Thaksin government created the ‘concrete reality’ to broader social groups, especially 
the capitalists, entrepreneurs, and the rural poor. Many Thais believe and trust in the 
Thaksin government as they had already constructed a ‘new critical consciousness’ 17 
towards social forces. The Thaksin government transformed the old ‘economic-corporate’ 
relations of force, in which consciousness of the subaltern or the ordinary people is only 
present in terms of economic interest and in a specific group rather than a class 
consciousness, to be ‘hegemonic’ in which the interests of social classes are not only 
present for a specific group but for all subordinate groups and economic, political, 
intellectual, and moral unity are integrated.  
In the Gramscian sense, the relationship between social, political, and ideological forces 
are dialectical. Therefore, changing any element could lead to the transformation of 
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other elements as well. Based on the strong state in politics and well accepted in 
political economy, these paved the way for the TRT party to further transform social 
relations of the Thai historical bloc through a number of hegemonic apparatuses. 
Therefore, they gained high popular support in the sphere of ‘civil society’ due to its 
social policies and leadership management techniques.  
However, the crucial point that is missing from explanations of the contemporary crises 
of Thai politics was that the Thaksin government had, to some extent, challenged the 
moral cohesive function of the monarchy. Even though the Thaksin government could 
establish social, economic, and intellectual leadership during a five year period in 
authority, it could not replace the ‘moral leadership’ of the monarchy because of its deep 
rootedness in the thought of the old social elites in Thailand. In order to ‘balance’ the 
active and offensive power of Thaksinism, the royalists and their allies needed to take 
some social actions. This led to the emergence of ‘another crisis’ and it was the ‘crisis 
within transition’ that was catalysed by Thaksinism between 2001 and 2006. In the next 
chapter, the politics of counter-Thaksin hegemony, the formation of the Yellow Shirts 
who rallied against the TRT and the Reds who defended the Thaksin power bloc and 
the incident of the 2006 military coup will be analysed because all were part of another 
crisis of the Thai historical bloc.    
CHAPTER 7 
 
SOCIAL TRANSITION AND THE CRISIS WITHIN: SOCIAL GROUPS AND 
BALANCE OF CLASS FORCES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on two features of the Thai historical bloc—transition and another 
crisis within this transition—by critically examining the attempts to ‘balance’ the 
forceful Thaksin hegemony by the conservative forces which formed the ‘People’s 
Alliance for Democracy’ (PAD) or the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts movement’. The chapter 
considers the counter-Thaksin social forces as a result of the unfinished business of 
Thaksin’s restructuring project of the Thai state. The rising of the PAD since 2005 will 
be investigated in section two and three in terms of both political economy and socio-
ideological aspects. Analysing the political economy of the emergence of the Yellow 
Shirts social force, this chapter argues that there were many contradictions between the 
TRT party, as a capitalist faction, and other capitalists, especially the conflicts with the 
Manager group due to the government annulment of the Manager’s TV programme in 
late 2005. The Manager, led by Sondhi Limthongkul, enlarged its conflict with the 
Thaksin government to the wider public by agitating ‘ideological war’ over Thai civil 
society and accused the TRT party of being the enemy of the nation.1 
The Yellow social forces, with cooperation of the old social elites such as the Democrat 
party and the army, created the conditions for—what Gramsci calls—‘passive revolution’ 
that eventually occurred with the military coup in September 2006. However, some 
crucial ‘paradoxes’ still remain in understanding the politics of social forces in Thailand 
because even though the TRT government offered a number of concrete economic 
interests to social groups, some of them turned against TRT and participated in the 
Yellow Shirts movement. To grasp this point, this chapter argues that some of the 
social groups lost their interests in various forms. Therefore, they needed to balance 
Thaksinism in order to ‘protect’ their own interests. In addition, the old elites attempted 
to re-conceive their own legitimacy through a junta government and the Democrat 
Party amidst the conflicts of the post-2006 coup period. Nevertheless, the destructive 
movement of the old social forces had finally led to the emergence of the challenging 
force of the ‘United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship’ (UDD) or the so-called ‘Red 
Shirts’ which was constituted by leading roles of former TRT politicians, some 
                                                             




capitalists who lost advantages from the military coup in 2006, some middle class 
constituents, labourers, and the rural peasantry. This chapter considers the Red Shirts 
as subaltern social groups who attempted to emancipate themselves from the dominant 
social relations in both economic and ideological senses. The last section deals with the 
underlying economic interests of various social groups that combined in the Reds 
together with its ideological stances.   
 
2. THE FALL OF THAKSINISM  
The powerful TRT government effectively performed the role of a leading agency of 
social change that brought ‘transition’ to the Thai historical bloc between 2001 and 
2006. They attempted to transform the ‘old’ historical bloc—the set of social relations in 
both political economy and ideological aspects—and established their own alternative 
power bloc. Thaksinism reached its peak in terms of popularity in 2003 as the 
antagonist forces were still weak and could not contest the Thaksin regime. However, 
the decline of Thaksinism had begun from late 2004 onwards and eventually collapsed 
after the coup d’état in 2006.However, the interesting aspect of the fall of Thaksinism is 
that it was not mainly a result of its economic interventions as the indicators show that 
the Thai economy was growing well at approximately 9% in 2003 and 2004.2 Rather, 
the decline of Thaksinism derived from political and ideological matters. 
With very strong power in parliament, the TRT party did not face major problems in 
parliamentary politics. However, there were several political difficulties that paved the 
way to the fall of Thaksinism including three crucial controversies; the matters of 
corruption, the failure to solve violence in the Southern provinces, and the threat to 
royal hegemony. Firstly, TRT was accused of being one of the most corrupt 
governments in Thai political history (Mutebi, 2008).The TRT party was blamed as 
they introduced ‘policy corruption’3―the government launched policies and laws that 
benefitted their allied social groups in both direct and indirect ways. The most 
noticeable corrupt project the TRT government faced was the case of the CTX bomb 
scanner in 2005. The TRT government failed to answer questions regarding the CTX 
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9000 bomb scanner that the government bought and to install at the new international 
airport, Suvanabhumi Airport. The Minister of Transport, who was responsible for this 
matter, was transferred to another position in the TRT government just several days 
before parliament would hold a debate of no-confidence over the Minister of Transport 
(Nelson, 2005). The unavailability to declare information on the overspending on the 
budget in buying the bomb scanner led to the dissatisfaction of social groups in 
Thailand especially the middle class who demanded a clean and transparent 
government.  
In addition, the most crucial matter of corruption that brought the TRT government to 
its downfall in popularity was the amending of some articles of Thailand’s 
Telecommunication Act in January 2006. TRT amended the proportion of stock holders 
for foreign capital from no larger than 25% to 50%. The problem was that this 
amendment was only finished two days before the Shin Corporation (company of PM 
Thaksin’s family) decided to sell their stocks, which were worth 70,000 million baht, to 
the TEMASEK holding company― Singapore’s governmental company (The Nation, 
25 January 2006: 1B, 6B). This decision made the social elites and middle class forces in 
Thailand furious because it was, obviously, a severe conflict of interests on the part of 
TRT.  
At that moment, there was an attempt by the Democrat Party, the leading opposition 
group in parliament, to request that PM Thaksin declare and explain about this stock 
selling in a parliamentary discussion. But PM Thaksin avoided the parliamentary 
process and escaped from this situation through the decision to dissolve parliament, just 
a month after selling his stocks (The Nation, 25 February 2006: 1A, 3A; Manok Lae 
Dek Nokkrob, 2006). The selling of Shin Corporation stocks was a catalyst of the fall of 
Thaksinism because the counter-Thaksin forces singled out this issue and exaggerated 
it as a matter of selling the country (the Shin Corporation held some major state 
concessions such as the state satellite and broadcasting system) and that national 
security might be threatened by the Singaporean government (Thitinan, 2006; Schmidt, 
2011: 334).This issue was employed as a major issue for the Yellow Shirts in its initial 
stage in early 2006.  
The second matter that contributed to the fall of Thaksinism is the failure of TRT to deal 
with the violent crisis in the southern provinces. The southern crisis in Thailand did not 
just begin during the TRT period but had rather been escalating since the TRT 
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government came to power. In January 2004many weapons in the army base in 
Narathiwas province, one of the three southern border provinces of Thailand, were 
stolen and a number of schools in Narathiwas, Pattani and Yala were burnt (Albritton, 
2005: 166-167). The southern crisis has never ended and the conflicts in the region have 
been intensifying every day. The growing southern violence considerably discredited 
the TRT government and eroded the popularity of the government (Chaiwat, 2009; 
Connors, 2009). 
The last matter that led the strong force of Thaksinism into crisis was the accusation 
that PM Thaksin Shinawatra was disloyal to the King (Hewison, 2008: 103; Warr, 2009: 
335; Lewis, 2007). This claim came from an event at which PM Thaksin acted as 
chairman, an ancient Buddhist celebration at the Prakaew Morrakot temple (the royal 
temple of Thailand). This temple, as a Thai custom, is reserved for the King and his 
royal family to hold any religious celebrations. This action of Thaksin was a very 
sensitive issue for Thai people because the relationship between the monarchy and social 
forces is so strong (Glassman et al, 2008: 361) under the hegemonic royalist-nationalist 
ideology. Therefore, it was a chance for the anti-Thaksin movement to agitate 
ideological struggle against Thaksinism by claiming that Thaksin and the TRT party 
had challenged the monarchy and that they pose a threat to the country. Thaksinism 
began to decline from 2005 and it was eventually unseated from political authority by 
the coup in 2006. The next two sections will discuss both political economy incentives 
and ideological reasons that brought social forces to join together and form a counter-
Thaksinism social force. 
 
3. FORMATION OF THE COUNTER-THAKSIN FORCES AND THE POLITICS OF THE 
YELLOWS 
Chai-Anan Samudavanija, a leading Thai political scientist, once argued that ‘the old 
soldier never died and they have just been bypassed’ from the frontline of Thai politics 
(Chai-Anan, 1997). The last military coup in Thailand took place in 1991 overthrowing 
the Chartichai government after the coup makers claimed that the government was 
corrupted. The coup in 1991 eventually led to protests and the severe repression of May 
1992 that paved the way to political reform and the new constitution in 1997 as shown 
in the last chapter. Only a decade later, the country was in engulfed in rumours that the 
army might initiate a coup again in late 2005 and the rumours proved correct in 
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September 2006. This section will provide an overview of the formation of the counter-
Thaksinism social forces, the politics of common sense and several attempts of the 
Yellow Shirts to restore authoritarianism in Thailand.  
 
3.1 Counter-Thaksinism Social Forces: Political Economy Incentives 
As shown in the last chapter, the TRT government had established the so-called 
Thaksinism―the regime that was based on political and economic innovations led by 
the TRT party―for a short period of five years. The attempt to build a new historical 
bloc of the TRT party gained popular support from social forces in the country as the 
government secured concrete economic interests for these social forces in post-1997 
crisis period. Nevertheless, it is impossible that the state could guarantee benefit for all 
social groups evenly. The formation of counter-Thaksinism social forces emerged 
because the need to balance their class interests with the TRT government. This 
section, therefore, provides analysis of the formation of social forces against Thaksinism 
that are here categorised into ‘four’ major groups including the working class social 
forces, the middle class, the old social elites, and the capitalist factions. These social 
forces had later united, directly and indirectly, as the PAD (the Yellow Shirts). The 
emergence of these anti-Thaksin government groups could be seen as the ‘process’ of re-
balancing class interests from the state. These social forces eventually created the 
‘condition’ that entailed the coup in September 2006 and this will be dealt with in the 
next section.  
 
3.1.1 The Labour Social Forces 
Under Thaksin’s hegemony between 2001 and early 2005, the movement of organised 
labour such as in the forms of NGOs and other protests were strictly controlled by the 
state apparatuses. Compared to the frequency of protests against Thai governments 
prior to the Thaksin period there was a sharp reduction by the time the TRT party was 
in power. However, Pye and Schaffer (2008) argue that the contradictions within 
Thaksin’s neoliberal capitalist projects paved the way for the emergence of antagonist 
social forces against Thaksinist neoliberal policies. It is argued here that there are three 
major reasons that the workers should take action against the Thaksinism and defend 
their interests: the attempt to privatise some major state enterprises; the commitment to 
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free trade agreements (FTA) without deliberative hearings in parliament; and doubts 
over the government spending too much on the rural poor. Firstly, the TRT party at the 
time of their political campaign throughout the year 2000 proposed to the public that 
they would save the country from being colonised by the IMF and would not 
conveniently obey the IMF suggestions as the Democrat party did before. This proposal 
gained strong popular support due to its nationalist rhetoric during the last stages of 
the political campaign. Nevertheless, the TRT government, in fact, was in actuality a 
neoliberal agency that attempted many times to privatise a number of state enterprises. 
At the beginning of the fall of Thaksinism in late 2003, the TRT government had faced 
crucial challenges from major five labour social forces; the labour union of the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, the labour union of the Provincial 
Electricity Authority, the labour union of the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, the 
labour union of the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority, and the labour union of the 
Provincial Waterworks Authority (Brown and Hewison, 2005; Pye and Schaffar, 2008; 
Schmidt, 2007).  
These five major forces had joined and demonstrated to present their needs for several 
weeks in Bangkok in July 2003 in order to stand against the government’s plan for 
privatisation (Fah Deaw Kan, 2003: 24). From 2003 to late 2005, these labour unions 
had been actively protesting the government’s privatisation plan at various places and 
finally achieved their goal. It should be seen that even though TRT provided several 
economic policies through local communities, most of organised labour still chose to 
defend their class interests with TRT as they would have lost their benefit if the 
privatisation projects had been pushed through.   
Secondly, apart from the controversy of privatisation projects, the TRT government had 
also been challenged by social groups who were against the FTA (Kasian, 2006: 32; Pye 
and Schaffar, 2008: 55; Ammar, et al., 2006). At the first stage, there was a small initial 
group of senators together with a few hundred people who protested against the FTA 
between Thailand and Australia in June 2004 (Choudry, 2010). These social forces then 
expanded by joining with hundreds of NGOs led by the ‘FTA watch’, an academic 
group who deeply scrutinize the effect of the FTA upon Thailand. Throughout the 
years of 2005 and 2006, a number of civil society organisations joined the anti-FTA 
campaign including the network of the landless movement, an alternative agricultural 
movement, and the national student union. This network of social groups later joined 
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with the PAD or the Yellow Shirts movement in early 2006. The major incentive that 
led various social groups to support the movement against the FTA was that social 
groups had lost their benefit from the FTA in various ways such as losing in 
competition with foreign products and the decrease in prices of agricultural products 
(Sajin, 2009).  
Lastly, as Brown and Hewison (2005: 371) point out, labour did not entirely gain benefit 
from Thaksinism’s economic and social policies. Rather labour social forces felt that the 
TRT government had spent too much on the rural poor instead of them. For example, 
the government gained great approval, especially from the rural poor, for its 30-Baht 
universal health scheme (UHS) under which every Thai citizen pays only 30 Baht per visit 
(approximately £0.5) for any services at state hospitals. However, it should be noted 
here that for the workers, their health care schemes are officially covered under the 
Worker’s Compensation and Social Security Funds―which are different from the 30-Baht 
scheme―and the workers fear that their own health care coverage would be 
downgraded if their funds were siphoned into the UHS (Asma, 2010; Ammar, 2011; 
Hicken and Silway, 2012).  
Moreover, for the white-collar worker, the major economic reason to rally against the 
Thaksin government was the opposition playing upon the myth that the government 
spends taxes (the white-collar workers believe that they pay higher taxes than the rural 
famers) on many policies that predominantly benefit the rural poor (Pye and Schaffar, 
2008: 39). In short, with fears over losing benefits from privatisation, the FTA, and 
losses in the health care scheme, the labour/worker social forces decided to protest in 
order to defend their own benefits and were the social basis for the upcoming Yellow 
Shirts movement. 
 
3.1.2 The Middle Class: Public Intellectuals/Academics  
The middle class social groups in Thailand were quite obviously seen to propose 
themselves as antagonists of the TRT government. Without ideological and political 
reasons, it could be argued that the dissatisfaction of the bureaucrats towards the TRT 
government that took place since late 2002 was one of the major reasons for that social 
force to turn against Thaksinism. The bureaucrats saw that the restructuring of the 
Thai bureaucracy was nothing but a government attempt to exert control over the 
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bureaucracy. They believe that the introduction of the CEO-style governors by the 
TRT party was only serving the interests of capitalist factions in order to deal with 
local investments rather than the improvement of peoples’ quality of life. In addition, 
although the middle class would benefit from several social and economic policies of the 
TRT government in a broader sense, they could not bear the government corruption in 
many projects as the middle class claimed that they had better access to information on 
Thai politics than rural people in remote areas (Jager, 2012).  
However, this thesis argues against the idea that the middle class in Bangkok had better 
access to information and were therefore better informed about politics and government 
corruption than the rural poor because the Thai countryside had changed and social 
groups in rural areas could access information easily through expanding new media 
such as the internet and satellite television (Walker, 2012; Apichat et al., 
2013b).Transformation of the rural area’s infrastructure and the development of 
information technologies significantly decreased information gap between rural and 
urban areas in Thailand. This means that social forces in the rural areas could learn and 
decide by themselves what they should do about politics.  
However, there are two middle class groups that played important roles against 
Thaksinism; public intellectuals and university scholars. Thirayuth Boonmee (2004), an 
ex-leader of radical student activists in the 1970s, is the most prominent figure who 
criticised TRT several times. Thirayuth claimed that the TRT government were like an 
‘evil capitalist’ who always attempts to freeze any political participation in public 
sectors. He argues that the emergence of TRT brought the campaign of political reform 
in 1997 to a dead-end. TRT, Thirayuth argues, was not engaged in any kind of 
innovative politics, but just re-engineered Thai politics by combining old-style local 
politicians with the influence of new industrialist factions. Moreover, he also criticised 
the set of Thaksinist policies in that they would eventually lead Thai politics to a 
dictatorship of the single party (TRT) in parliament and that it was a kind of ‘policy 
corruption’ (Thirayuth, 2004: 47-69). Although these criticisms of the policies of 
Thaksinism were based on Thirayuth’s own opinion, and it is unclear that whether or 
not his comments were based on any original academic research, his pioneering role in 
criticising the very strong and massively supported government urged Thai academia to 
deeply scrutinise and criticize the Thaksin regime.   
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In addition, from early 2003 there were a number of academic seminars around the 
country discussing the Thaksin regime and prospects for the country. One important 
event was held in Chiang Mai, the Northern province and birthplace of PM Thaksin, by 
the ‘Fah Deaw Kan’ (the Same Sky) radical left journal. More than 30 leading scholars 
from Thai universities attended that two-day seminar in January 2004. Major topics of 
the seminar were concentrated on theoretical approaches to the Thaksin 
regime/Thaksinism, the understanding of the contradiction within TRT, the emergence 
of the Thaksin regime and the transformation of state and capitalism in Thailand under 
Thaksin’s regime (Fah Deaw Kan, 2004). Further, throughout the year 2004 there were 
a number of academic alerts discussing the administration and abuse of power by the 
Thaksin government (Jermsak, 2004). In short, these academics and university scholars 
as part of the middle class should be considered as an individual or group action rather 
than any movement of social forces against the Thaksin hegemony. However, many 
comments and criticisms from these public intellectuals were crucial in order to 
stimulate other social groups in Thai society to have more critical awareness and 
serious consideration of the Thaksin government and his allies.  
 
3.1.3 The Old Social Elites: Network of Monarchy and the Military 
Thai politics is unique compared to other democratic countries because of the active 
involvement of the special and outside constitutional forces such as the monarchy and 
the army (Surachart, 2001; Chambers, 2013 a). Handley (2006), in his book banned in 
Thailand, argues that the Thai king and the royal family have played an active role in 
Thai politics throughout six decades on the throne. However, it should be noted that the 
king himself seldom directly intervenes in politics. There were three clear cases in 
which the king took action. These were in order to control the national crises in 
October 1973, October 1976, and May 1992. Resultant from these political 
interventions of the king, the royalist ideology was secured over Thailand’s historical 
bloc (on this see chapter four). McCargo (2005) crucially points out that the king does 
not take direct action in Thai politics, rather, he has the so-called ‘network monarchy’ to 
facilitate a number of the royal projects. The network of monarchy consists of the Privy 
councilors led by Prem Tinasulanond, an ex-army commander and prime minister, other 
proxies such as public figures who served him on the royal initiative projects, and the 
old political elite or the high-ranked bureaucrats.  
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During its first three years in political power, it could be seen that the TRT 
government could successfully compromise with the elite and the network monarchy as 
there seemed to be a good relationship between PM Thaksin, the army commanders and 
the crown prince (Chambers, 2013 a). However, when the government reached its peak 
of what Gramsci called ‘national-popular’, some might think that they felt over-
confidence and PM Thaksin was aggressive and displayed egoism (Hewison, 2010: 128). 
As the Thai historical bloc was still characterised by the old-style patron-client system 
in which the inferior should be submissive to the superior (Amara, 1996), the aggressive 
and strong TRT government could pose a significant threat to the palace as they might 
have been overthrown (Ukritst, 2007; Scmidt, 2011: 340). Regarding this matter, the 
case where the Manager group claimed that Thaksin himself and his cabinet 
disrespected the monarchy should be considered (Hewison, 2008: 103).  
This accusation derived from the event of which PM Thaksin was a chairman in an 
ancient Buddhist celebration at the Prakaew Morrakot temple (as mentioned above in 
the first section). Furthermore, the Thaksin government also had conflicts with other 
elements of the network of monarchy, especially the military. Thailand has long 
established social relations under the military rule of more than five decades since the 
1932 revolution. The army has been functioning as the centre of political power both 
directly and indirectly for a long period. Once, first in power, TRT had very strong 
support from the armed forces through the connection of Thaksin’s classmates of the 
pre-cadet school class 10 (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005).  
However, the rise of Thaksin and his allies through the ranks of the Thai bureaucratic 
system, to some extent, could be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the influence of 
Prem, Chairman of the Privy Councillors (Chambers, 2011: 297). The government 
employed several methods in order to polarise the Thai military from being centred on 
Prem (at the same time it could be seen as centred upon the king) such as extolling the 
virtues of the military, giving retired soldiers highly sought after positions, granting 
autonomy to soldiers in the area of internal security, and even building up a faction in 
the military in order to pay loyalty to PM Thaksin alone (WikiLeaks cable: 
06BANGKOK3916). It seemed that the Thaksin government could already control the 
Thai armed forces by the first few years in power, but the government went too far in 
some military affairs. Chambers (2011: 298) crucially noticed that the Thaksin 
government intervened in the army by reducing the armed forces’ budget and prepared 
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to privatise military assets such as the Channel 5 television station, and his high 
influence in senior military promotions. These reasons, along with the other accusations 
and political agitations of the Yellow Shirts on the matter of corruption and disrespect 
to the king shown by the TRT government, were enough for the army to conduct the 
coup in 2006.  
 
3.1.4 The Capitalist Factions  
In the last chapter, it was explained that the formation of the TRT party consisted of a 
number of social groups. However, the most influential actors in TRT were the 
capitalist factions, especially the telecommunication millionaires who survived the 1997 
economic crisis. The capitalist factions within the Thaksin government enjoyed their 
increasing economic benefits in relation to the rising political power of Thaksin’s 
government. Under TRT’s power, the Shin Corporation Group, Thaksin’s family 
business, had significantly gained profit of more than 9,723 million baht in 2003 and 
also held assets of 60,153 million baht with a market capitalisation of 113,888 million 
baht. Moreover, the Shin Corporation also expanded their businesses from 
telecommunications to other sectors such as ‘Thai Air Asia’, a low cost airline, and 
‘Capital OK’, a personal credit company, and ‘SC Asset’, a real estate company (Ukrist, 
2008: 133-134).  
However, it should be noted that not all social groups were satisfied with Thaksin and 
his allies’ businesses. There were at least three crucial cases regarding economic rivals 
of the Shin Corporation that induced them to take part with the anti-Thaksinism forces 
in the pre-2006 military coup period. Firstly, it was the conflict between the Thaksin 
government and Prachai Leophairat of the TPI group, one of largest petroleum and 
chemical industries in Thailand. The TPI had faced a critical debt crisis since the 1997 
economic downturn. The TRT government once in power attempted to pursue TPI to 
restructure their debt trouble. Later the TPI had been taken over by creditors in order 
to solve the problem and Prachai, who was the owner, lost his chief executive position in 
May 2006 a few months previous to the coup. The dissatisfaction of Prachai led him to 
attempt to provide substantial support to the anti-Thaksinism movement; for example, 
he decided to advertise his business in the Manager and donated substantial funds to the 
PAD movement (Ukrist, 2008: 134-135; Pasuk, 2006). 
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The second vital aspect of economic discontent with the Thaksin government was the 
government’s obstruction of the Thai Beverage Group on the stock exchange in late 
2005. The Thai Beverage company, owned by the tycoon Charoen Siriwattanapakdee, 
wanted to float its business on the Thai stock market, where they could earn more than 
300 million baht, but this was blocked by the Thaksin government (Nualnoi, 2008). 
During that period, the TRT government blocked the Thai Beverage floatation attempt 
due to high pressure from civil society. However, this could also be interpreted as the 
unwillingness of the government to benefit a business rival of the Shinawatra family 
(Ukrist, 2008: 135). After the failed attempt to enlist Thai Bev on the stock exchange 
market of Thailand, Charoen subtly supported the anti-Thaksinism forces as he 
provided his Ratchapruek Club as the venue for the launching of a crucial book, The 
Royal Power, written by Pramuan Ruchanaseree, a radical royalist in late July 2005. 
Later, this book became vital for the rightist movement and the attempt to conduct a so-
called ‘passive revolution’ after the PAD was formed (this issue will be discussed in the 
next subsection). 
Lastly, the most important and controversial conflict of the TRT government was the 
clash with the Manager Group, a media business owned by Sondhi Limthongkul. It could 
be seen that Sondhi himself, in the first stage of the Thaksin regime, had a good 
relationship with the TRT government. His media business faced a critical financial 
problem by the 1997 economic crisis, however, by supporting Thaksin Shinawatra he 
was able to reconstruct his business a few years later (McCargo, 2009: 8). The Manager 
Group broadcasted the weekly television programme ‘Muangthai Raisapda’ (Thailand 
Weekly) on Thailand’s ‘Channel 9’ which mainly provides weekly political analyses. 
However, Sondhi’s TV show featured increasing levels of criticism on various 
government affairs which finally saw the show taken off the broadcasting schedule in 
late 2005. Although the Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand (MCOT) that 
owns Channel 9 explained that the reason to ban the Thailand Weekly programme was 
because Sondhi himself frequently raised the issue of the monarchy which is 
inappropriate manners in Thailand, people believed that the genuine reason was to shut 
criticisms of the government down from the public attention. It should be noted that the 
government’s decision to ban Sondhi’s programme was crucial for Thai politics over the 
following years. They struggled to defend themselves and eventually led to the so-
called ‘Sondhi Phenomenon’ (Connors, 2008 a: 153; Khamnun, 2005).  
181 
 
The so-called ‘Sondhi Phenomenon’ is the term that represents the active participation 
of Thai social forces in criticising and scrutinising the TRT government from late 2005 
to the emergence of the PAD in early 2006. After his TV programme was taken off air, 
Sondhi turned his show into a weekly road show and named it ‘Muangthai Raisapda 
Sanjon’ (Thailand Weekly on Tour) gaining high public attention especially with the 
anti-Thaksin audiences around the country (Kasian, 2006: 5). The Thailand Weekly on 
Tour by the Manager group was usually held at the Lumpini public park in the centre of 
Bangkok. This venue was in a very convenient location and could be reached by most of 
the white-collar middle class in Bangkok, which was the majority support base of the 
anti-Thaksin movement (Kamnoon, 2006). From September 2005 to January 2006, 
Sondhi ran the counter-Thaksinism social group by himself through the media in his 
hands including newspapers, the ASTV cable TV, magazines, books, CDs and the most 
powerful channel to reach most of the middle class, the ‘Manager Online’ website. His 
weekly talk show created the ‘Sondhi Phenomenon’ that greatly stimulated public 
attention and it was the point of departure for the movement of the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD) or the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts’ movement. The Yellow Shirts 
movement’s major structures, leaders, symbols, and aims will be examined in the next 
section.  
In short, this section analyses the formation of the counter-Thaksinism social forces, 
which is the constitution of various social forces in order to ‘balance’ the power of 
Thaksin’s government and secure their own class interests. Most social forces began 
their anti-TRT movement with various different aims and targets. However, what they 
share in common was that they all had some economic incentives behind their 
movements. In order to strengthen and make the protest against TRT a success, 
political ideology should be brought in as a hegemonic tool to persuade social forces to 
fight against Thaksinism. This will be discussed in the following sections on the politics 
of the Yellows social forces.  
 
3.2 The So-Called ‘Yellow Shirts Social Force’ 
The TRT party had conquered the Thai historical bloc for the short period between 
2001 and 2005, however, as shown in the section above, by the end of 2003 the TRT 
government’s dominant power had been challenged by various social forces. Each social 
force operated for themselves in order to stand against the Thaksin government for a 
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specific purpose―but to some extent all of social forces lost their own interests―at a 
given time between later 2003 and early 2005. It should be noted that the Sondhi 
phenomenon of the ‘Thailand Weekly’ road show united a number of social groups in 
Thailand’s historical bloc to form the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The 
PAD, officially formed on 9 February 2006, at the first stage was directed by the five 
core leaders including Sondhi Limthongkul, a royalist and political analyst; Suriyasai 
Katasila, full time activist and PAD coordinator; Chamlong Srimuang, a former leader of 
the Phalang Dhama Party, ex-governor of Bangkok, and leader of the 1992 people’s 
movement against the military rule; Somsak Kosaisuk, a highly experienced Thai labour 
union leader; and Somkiat Phongpaiboon, a university lecturer (Kasian, 2006:7; Pasuk 
and Baker, 2009: 266-268; Asma, 2010: 107-120).  
The PAD/the Yellow Shirts is a broad social alliance of various social groups such as 
the organised labour unions led by Somsak, several NGOs led by Suriyasai and Somkiat, 
and Buddhist movement led by Chamlong that combine together to balance the power 
of Thaksinism in order to secure their own class interests by employing royalism-
nationalism as a hegemonic tool to tie social forces together as a social bloc. These 
social groups consolidated themselves under the PAD and promoted the ‘yellow’ colour 
as symbolic of their movement. In Thai ancient belief there is a colour-code for each day 
in the week. Yellow represents the person who born on Monday and King Bhumibol 
was born on Monday, therefore, yellow represents his own royal symbol and that colour 
has always been used for every royal activity that related to the king (McCargo, 2009: 
12).  
The PAD employed the colour yellow as a symbol of the movement to signify that they 
did everything for the sake of the king―which under the royalist perception means for 
the sake of the nation also. Protestors wore yellow shirts and other items such as yellow 
wrist bands, hats, and scarves to indicate that they were a social group that stood 
against Thaksinism. The so-called Yellow Shirts movement clearly expressed 
themselves as having an ultimate goal of toppling the TRT government and throwing it 
away from politics. The term ‘throw away from politics’ will be employed here rather than 
‘from power’ because in the perception of the yellow camp, they deeply believe that 
Thaksin and his allies are the only threat in the recent political conflict in Thailand. 
From this point of view, Thaksin is the worst germ which causes the nation’s sickness 
(Pavin, 2011). Even though the PAD was formed from different social groups, they 
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shared some ‘conception of the world’ which, in Gramsci’s terms, is the ‘common sense’ 
of Thai society. The politics of common sense of Thailand is not a new innovation in 
political movements, but has been employed since the 1950s when the Sarit government 
revitalised the significance of the monarchy in Thai society (see chapter four). The 
section below will deal with this issue.  
 
3.3 The Yellow Shirts, Politics of Common Sense, and Ideological Struggle 
Apart from economic incentives in different forms that brought social forces that lost or 
feared losing their own interests to identify as part of the PAD, political ideology was 
also crucial as a cohesive tool to gain high support from social forces against the 
Thaksin regime. The PAD had agitated the ideological struggle against Thaksinism by 
constructing the politics of ‘common sense’ as if Thaksinism was a threat to the 
monarchy. According to Gramsci, ‘common sense’ is the conception of the world that is 
uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the 
moral individuality of the average man is developed (Gramsci, 1971: 419, Q11§13). 
Common sense is the perception of the world that is established by the ruling class in 
order to secure its class interests and control subaltern world views. The process of 
building common sense operates through the functions of the intellect in the sphere of 
civil society (Bocock, 1986: 46; Robinson, 2005: 473). The politics of common sense of 
the PAD had revitalised the ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology―after it had been ignored 
under Thaksinism―and used it as an ideological apparatus to fight the TRT 
government. 
 
3.3.1 The Thai Version of Common Sense 
As shown in chapter four, Thailand’s historical bloc since the late 1950s has been deeply 
attached to the monarchy. The Thai monarchy plays crucial roles in Thai politics 
especially as a ‘moral leadership’ figure for the nation. It should be noted here that even 
though Thailand has a strong powerful monarchy, the monarchy in this sense is 
personalized to the current king rather than the monarchy as an institution (Handley, 
2006). Most Thai people were hegemonised to be under the grip of royalism-
nationalism through a number of hegemonic projects. Therefore, it is possible for social 
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forces in Thailand to believe that the king is the inevitable moral centre of the country 
and social forces seem always to look towards the king whenever the country is in crisis.  
The PAD, like most Thai people, has its own standard conception of the world that is 
under the domination of royal power. This conception of the world is not naturally 
occurring, rather it has been created through many ideological apparatuses for decades 
(Saichol, 2005; Hewison and Kengkij, 2010). The Yellow Shirts movement promoted the 
campaign of ‘returning political power to the king’ in order to ‘save the nation’ from the 
corrupt TRT and its capitalist allies through their almost year long protest. The crucial 
common sense that the PAD attempted to construct was that Thailand has its own 
unique political tradition under the king’s power. Through this constructed common 
sense, the PAD convinced audiences to go back to the king and request that he 
undertakes a royal intervention against the evil and corrupted (even though popularly 
elected) government. The PAD launched the campaign to return sovereignty to the 
king through ‘Article 7’ of the 1997 Constitution. They promoted this campaign as an 
innovation to rebel against the Thaksin government through many channels such as the 
protest at hydepark, the new media, and public intellectuals (Matichon Editorial Board, 
2008).  
Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution stated that: ‘whenever no provision under this 
Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional 
practice in the democratic regime of government with the king as Head of the State’ 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997). This Article 7 campaign was 
originally used by the Manager group before the uniting of the PAD in early 2006. 
When the PAD was formed, the idea of returning political power to the king was 
criticised even within the core leaders of the PAD (Connors, 2008 a: 148-151). Some 
PAD leaders argued that this royalist campaign could not provide any development to 
the country; rather it was a step backward from being democratic to being an autocratic 
regime. However, they eventually compromised between different standpoints and 
promoted this campaign in order to reach the ultimate goal, which was to oust Thaksin 
from his political authority. The PAD’s campaign of returning power to the king was 
widely accepted in Thai society as seen from high support of the urban middle class and 
massive donations from the Thai elites (WikiLeaks cable: 06BANGKOK4212).  
Royal intervention in politics may be perceived as a common sense phenomenon by 
those Thai people who do not possess critical minds. The Yellow Shirts request for 
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royal intervention in order to replace Thaksin’s government with a royal interim 
government confirmed the unique characteristic of Thai politics that there has always 
been a special authority external to parliamentary-constitutional politics. It is argued 
here that the demand for the King’s intervention in politics through article 7 of the 1997 
constitution was an attempt to conduct what Gramsci called ‘passive revolution’. In other 
words, this attempt by the PAD paved the way for ‘political change from above’ which 
eventually led to the King’s issuing of a signal of approval and the military coup in 
September 2006. The next section will provide a discussion of the events surrounding 
the coup d’état in 2006, which will be considered as ‘another crisis within the transition’ of 
the Thai historical bloc. Also, analysis of the aftermath of the coup will be provided. 
 
4. THE CRISIS WITHIN TRANSITION: 2006 MILITARY COUP AND THE REVERSION TO 
THE OLD HISTORICAL BLOC  
The Thai historical bloc was in crisis after the severe 1997 economic collapse. The 
historical bloc needed a transformation in the post-economic crisis period and 
Thaksinism took this chance and played a role as a cohesive factor that combined social 
forces together in the post-1997 period. Thaksinism’s social transformation was in 
progress and was an unfinished business when another crisis took place in 2006 and 
reverted the Thai historical bloc to the old regime of pre-Thaksinism period. The crisis 
within transition was led by the PAD or the Yellow Shirts as they had completely 
controlled the passive revolution―or change from above―that was manifested in the 
military coup in September 2006. This section will deal with this military coup and its 
political consequences.   
 
4.1 The Coup d’état of 19 September 2006  
Throughout the six-month long protest of the PAD against the Thaksin government, 
the movement consistently promoted the idea that the King should intervene in politics 
by installing a royal interim government to manage the crisis on behalf of the nation 
before holding a new general election. Besides this request to the King, the PAD also 
approached the King’s proxies or the network of monarchy (McCargo, 2005). There was 
a campaign to hand a petition signed by many Thais to Prem, the Chairman of the privy 
councilors and the King’s close advisor, in order to ask him to take any action possible 
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to remove the TRT government. From a Western point of view, this kind of campaign 
is strange and there is no place for it in Western democratic countries. However, in 
Thailand, where the patron-client system has been rooted for centuries, this is a common 
option for the subaltern to pursue by consulting the patron in order to request that it 
carries out their suggested way of escaping from the impasse. The Yellow Shirts non-
democratic idea could be seen as an attempt to present an ‘invitation card’ to the ‘old 
political elite’, the armed forces, to stage the coup d’état which is a common occurrence 
in modern Thai politics (Thanapol, 2006 a). Many scholars of Thai studies believed that 
it would be difficult for the army to conduct a coup in the age of globalisation because 
Thai politics had developed so far after 1997 and popular engagement with politics in 
various sectors had been growing by that time. Nonetheless, it could be seen that the 
Yellow Shirts movement had relentlessly attempted, many times, to engineer 
circumstances that would legitimate interference by the army. Therefore, it could 
clearly be seen that a number of conflicts and fights between the Yellow Shirts 
supporters and the pro-Thaksin supporters (later they formed the Red Shirts 
movement) emerged in Bangkok and other provinces. Later, this conflict between two 
camps of supporters was a crucial claim made by the coup maker in order to prevent 
further conflict which could escalate and worsen if it went unchecked.  
 
4.1.1 Before the Coup: Some Signals Appear 
Tension between the pro- and anti-government movements had been growing by mid-
2006. The Yellow Shirts attempted in many ways to create conditions that would pave 
the way for a coup. At that time, Sonthi Bunyaratklin, Commander-in-Chief, confirmed 
several times that the army would not be involved in politics and that it never 
considered carrying out a coup d’état (WikiLeaks cable:06BANGKOK1302). However, 
the attempt to conduct a passive revolution―revolution from above without mass 
engagement―led by the old political elite of the PAD had significant meaning because 
there were some signals appearing several months before the coup was staged. There 
were at least two obvious cases in which it can be assumed that the Thai elites had 
signaled to the army in order to retain its status quo from the Thaksin regime. The first 
signal was from the King’s speech and another was from Prem, the King’s closet proxy.  
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On 25 April 2006, the King had a chance to meet with the newly appointed judges and 
delivered a royal speech in the usual Thai tradition. However, the King’s speech that 
day was extraordinary because he clearly expressed two points. Firstly, the King 
publicly announced that he possessed no political authority under ‘article 7’ of the 1997 
constitution as the Yellow Shirts movement requested several months previously that 
he should be above politics.  
Secondly, the most important message from the 25 April 2006 speech was that the King 
himself stressed the importance of judicial power. He also suggested that whenever the 
checks and balances of the political system meets difficulties, when both parliamentary 
and executive powers are in doubt, the judge should play a role to resolve the crisis 
(Manager, 2006). The King’s speech that day was later labelled by academics the 
‘Judicialisation of Thai politics’.4 A few weeks later the Constitutional Court ruled the 
general election of 2 April 2006 5  to be a null election (WikiLeaks cable: 
06BANGKOK2688; Ockey, 2007). Even though the King did not directly sanction this 
political act, it could however be seen that the courts were responding to the King’s 
suggestion and that the event confirmed his extra-constitutional power in Thai society.  
Another signal that appeared before the coup was found in Prem. For decades, Prem 
established himself as the King’s proxy and the centre of the Thai armed forces. Even 
though he had long retired from his bureaucratic life, he still maintained much influence 
over the high ranks of the Thai army. By mid-2006, he signaled to the military by 
giving a metaphorical interview about his opinions on the Thaksin government’s annual 
reshuffle of the high rank of the army in which he stated that ‘the government is just 
only a jockey, not the owner of the horse’. The true owner of the horse (which means 
the military) can only be the King. This should be interpreted as Prem signaling to the 
                                                             
4 It means the political system in which the judges play a major role in politics (WikiLeaks 
cable: 06BANGKOK2425). Rather than checking and balancing the legislative and executive 
powers, the court in Thailand had transcended the principle of checks and balances of power and 
acted as a crucial political actor.  
5 Thaksin’s government dissolved parliament in order to avoid explanations of conflict of 
interest in the case of selling Shin Corporation’s stocks without paying taxes on 24 February 
2006. They set a new general election on 2 April 2006 that major political parties boycotted. On 
the day of election, the Election Commission organised election stalls differently to normal 
procedure so that no one could see other voters while they were casting their ballot. However, 
for the 2 April 2006 election the election stalls were turned to a different direction and the 
privacy of voters could therefore not be protected.  
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military to take action in politics, as this is usual in the common sense of Thailand 
(Thanapol, 2006 b; WikiLeaks cable: 06BANGKOK5463). 
Eventually, after the almost year long protest of the anti-government movement, the 
PAD or the Yellow Shirts movement which consists of various social forces (as shown 
above) successfully created the conditions for a ‘passive revolution’ led by the Thai 
military. The coup maker claimed that Thailand tended to descend into civil war and 
that there could have been a critical and bloody conflict due to the clashes between the 
pro- and anti-Thaksin government that had often ended up with bloodshed. Therefore, 
it was held that staging the coup on 19 September 2006 while an ousted-PM was in the 
United States was necessary to prevent all possible negative incidents (Plate, 2011: 141-
158). It was a bloodless coup d’état and it also was a good coup in many people’s 
perspective because it prevented violence in society (WikiLeaks cable: 
06BANGKOK5832, 5814; Connors and Hewison, 2008). The successful coup meant 
many things for Thai politics and this was a threshold for another upcoming crisis of 
the Thai historical bloc that later reached its peak in 2010. The chapter will now 
provide an examination of the political and ideological consequences of the coup d’état, 
which this thesis argues was the turn of the old elites to regain their hegemonic position 
from the Thaksin regime. To do that, they adopted a number of methods in both state 
and hegemonic apparatuses.  
 
4.2 Balancing of Class Forces: The Return of Thai Authoritarianism  
In a Gramscian perspective, each social group will struggle to gain a hegemonic 
position through various means. Thai politics in the post-coup period between late 2006 
and 2010 was, it is argued here, a turn for the authoritarian social groups to regain their 
hegemony over Thai society. However, it should be noted here that they were 
unsuccessful as the country faced harsh violence in 2010 after the attempt of social 
forces rallying against the old elite’s hegemonic projects. This subsection will analyse 
the hegemonic projects of the junta as a consequence of the coup which eventually led to 
the emergence of the Red Shirts movement, a key social force who tried to overcome the 
Thai common sense.  
After the coup, the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy, 
(CDRM) which later changed its name to the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), 
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the coup maker, appointed one of the King’s privy councilors General Surayud 
Chulanond as Prime Minister in order to form an interim government to lead the 
country to a normal situation and hold a clean election as soon as possible. This 
appointed PM was seen by most Thai people, who had formed their worldview as 
centred around the King, as a ‘good’ person because he is the King’s advisor (Thitinan, 
2008). Moreover, appointing the King’s person could be seen as an attempt to readjust 
social relations after they had been transformed by the Thaksin government for five 
years previously. Under the Surayud government there were some vital projects both in 
the terrain of consent building over civil society and in the terrain of state coercion over 
political society (Hewison, 2007 a; 2007 b).  
In civil society, the junta employed the King’s ‘Sufficiency Economy Philosophy’ (SEP) (see 
also chapter five), which had been largely ignored by Thaksinism for years, as a major 
framework for all government affairs (Ivarsson, 2007; Dayley, 2008; Chambers, 2013 b: 
93-94). Moreover, in this period the country under the junta returned its attention to 
‘moral politics’ and demands for good people to be engaged in politics rather than ‘evil’ 
and corrupt capitalists like Thaksin and his allies. Whilst in political society the junta 
enforced the interim constitution of 2006 and also drafted the new constitution of 2007 
in order to eliminate the opportunity for a strong government like Thaksin’s 
administration (WikiLeaks cable: 06BANGKOK2088). This military backed 
constitution has been crucially criticised by social forces who were against the coup as a 
not a fully democratic constitution.  
 
4.2.1 Ideological Re-Arrangement  
This thesis argued in the last chapter that the TRT government successfully established 
a new relation of force which was ideologically based on neoliberalism, Keynesianism, 
and economic nationalism through a number of methods (see chapter six). This new 
social relation created a new historical bloc or historical social relationship in which 
social forces in Thailand were dominated by the TRT party. This new social relation 
could be seen as a direct challenge to the old relation of force that centred on the King 
and royalty. Once the CDR appointed the Surayud government they announced that the 
country should be strictly run according to the guidance of the King’s SEP, which had 
been disregarded by the Thaksin regime for several years. Throughout its year in 
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charge the Surayud government promoted its politics of moral sentiment by employing 
the King’s SEP as a major framework for the government (Pruek, 2008).  
However, it should be noted that this government was an interim administration. 
Therefore, there were not any initiatives or projects in terms of political and economic 
development. The most obvious project of the junta was only the renaming of the ‘SML 
Project’ (see the previous chapter) of the TRT government to ‘The Well Living Project’ 
(Krongkarn Yu Dee Mee Suk) and labeling of the project with the suffix of ‘under the 
guidance of the King’s SEP’. Within a year of temporary government Thailand faced 
many attempts by the government to promote the King’s SEP through a number of 
projects. Nevertheless, this could be seen as only political rhetoric rather than concrete 
projects that could change any social relations in the country. This could be proved by 
the failed attempt by the Surayud appointed government to revitalise the royalist 
ideology based on the King’s SEP because at the next general election held in December 
2007, the People’s Power Party (PPP)―a nominated party of the TRT―still enjoyed a 
massive win over the royalist supported Democratic Party (Ockey, 2008). This victory 
of the PPP confirmed that the ideological struggle of the interim Surayud government 
did not succeed and that the majority of Thai social forces retained faith in the Thaksin-
style of neoliberal policies rather than the conservative SEP of the King.  
 
4.2.2 New Political Regulations and the New 2007 Constitution 
In the Gramscian conception of the integral state, it is held that the dominant social 
group maintains its power both in civil and political societies by creating consent 
alongside coercion.6 During the post-coup period there were a number of attempts by 
the CDR and the Surayud government to re-shape the social and political relations of 
the Thai state by enforcing the ‘new 2007 constitution’ and disbanding the TRT party. 
After the coup, the CDR enacted the 2006 Constitution of Thailand (Temporary) on 1 
October 2006.7In the period that followed the CDR formed the ‘National Assembly’ 
which recruited from a nationwide nomination process that included 2,000 people from 
various sectors. This short-lived National Assembly had a duty to recruit 200 people 
                                                             
6 See chapter three 
7 This short, with only 39 articles, temporary constitution set parameters for drafting the new 
constitution and paved the way for the CDR to be freed from any charges in the future (The 
Interim Constitution of Thailand 2006). 
191 
 
and forward the shortlist to the CDR which would then reach the final decision by 
selecting the last hundred people to form the Constitution Drafting Committee (Vitit, 
2009). While the new constitution was in the process of drafting the judge who had 
been selected following the King’s signal in early 2006 also played a very crucial role by 
ordering the disbanding of the TRT party in the controversial case of election fraud 
related to the general election of 2 April 2006. This judgment also banned the 111 core 
members of the TRT party from politics (Keerati, 2007). This could be seen as an 
attempt by the old elite to freeze every channel for the return to power of Thaksin and 
his allies.  
The new 2007 constitution 8  was completed around mid-2007 and the Surayud 
government held the first national referendum on the acceptance of the constitution on 
19 August 2007. While the result of the referendum was very clear, with the 
authoritarian social groups winning a majority of 57%, a huge number of people9 voted 
no to the constitution, which is a product of the Thai authoritarian (Suchit, 2009: 90; 
Ferrara, 2010: Ch. 3). Minorities in the referendum, on the one hand, came from the 
Thaksin supporters regardless of their regions. On the other hand, they also came from 
social groups who were against the coup and authoritarian power. These social forces 
later formed the Red Shirts movement in order to balance authoritarian power. The 
junta and the interim government attempted in many ways to freeze and destroy the 
‘newly established’ relation of force of the Thaksin government by replacing it with the 
                                                             
8The new, albeit military-backed, constitution of 2007 could be seen as a passive revolution in 
which the old social elites set up rules to regulate social classes without broad social inclusion. 
The elite-backed constitution mandated changes to some crucial political regulations found in 
the 1997 edition. On the one hand, the constitution provides some easier ways for people to 
propose new laws (change from 50,000 to 10,000) and only 20,000 persons are needed to 
petition the Senate to dismiss the Prime Minister and other office-holders. In addition, articles 
on rights of individuals and social groups are still protected and even greater. On the other 
hand, the constitution aims to demolish a condition for the ‘strong executive’—as it was present 
in the previous constitution. The new constitution expands the role of judges in order to balance 
the function of the legislature and executive. The protection means towards the Prime Minister 
(a vote of no confidence towards PM) in parliament is also changed from 200 (out of 500 MPs) 
to be only 96 (out of 480 MPs). In addition, the old social forces had replaced an all-elected 200 
person Senate with a mixed 150 person Senate —76 elected and 74 recruited by a selective 
committee with inputs from a variety of professional and other organisations. These changes to 
political regulations aimed to de-establish the strong state and open up chances for the old social 
elites to place their own allies in power through the Senate. For more discussion of the 2007 
constitution see Vitit, 2009; Suchit, 2009; Ginsburg, 2009.  
9 Obviously from the North and Northeast of Thailand, two major strongholds for the TRT 
party.   
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‘old’ social relation based on the King’s SEP and the politics of moral sentiment.10This 
led to the situation in which the ‘pro-Thaksin’ and the ‘anti-military’ coup forces 
established themselves to balance and struggle over the hegemonic power of the 
authoritarian regime in the form of ‘Red Shirts movement’. The section below will focus 
on the politics of the Reds camp.  
 
5. THE RED SHIRTS MOVEMENT AND THE CRITIQUE OF COMMON SENSE 
This section deals with another agency of social change―the Red Shirts 
forces―between 2008 and 2010. The Reds at the conjunctural level was only a protest 
against the Yellow Shirts and the Democrat government aiming to dissolve the 
parliament and trigger fresh elections. Nevertheless, at the broader level they attempted 
to subvert the dominant conception of the world through several political strategies as 
will be shown below. 
 
5.1 Political Uncertainties in 2008 and the Emergence of the Red Shirts 
Movement  
Thai political history during the period between late 2007 and 2010 was critical. There 
were three governments replaced in this short and unstable period. After the general 
election of December 2007,11the People’s Power Party (PPP)―a proxy of the TRT 
party―won a slight majority and formed a new government under Prime Minister 
Samak Sundaravej. The Samak government, known as a nominee of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, stayed in office for a short period of only seven months from February to 
September 2008 because he was ruled to be disqualified from his premiership due to a 
conflict of interest with his TV shows (Connors, 2008 b). The parliament then voted for 
the new Prime Minister and Somchai Wongsawat, brother in law of Thaksin, came to 
power. However, it should be noted that whilst the Samak and Somchai governments 
were in charge, they did not have peaceful conditions to run the country because they 
were challenged by anti-Thaksinist forces. The Yellow Shirts fought on a day-to-day 
basis through political protests for a long period of 193 days in order to oust any of 
                                                             
10They hegemonised Thai subaltern classes by popularising that Thaksinism was an evil regime 
that was absolutely corrupt and the cause of all conflicts in contemporary Thailand. 
11 The first general election under the new 2007 military backed the constitution.  
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Thaksin’s nominees from Thai politics. The most critical action of the Yellow Shirts in 
this period was the hijacking of Suvanabhumi International Airport for ten days 
between 24 November and 3 December 200812 (Askew, 2010: 31-82). 
Eventually, the Yellow Shirts, after its long period of daily protests, successfully 
stimulated the Thai elite to once again conduct a ‘passive revolution’ after they completed 
one that paved the way for the 2006 coup. The so-called ‘judicialisation’ of Thai 
politics―a morality engagement regime in which judges are involved in politics to 
provide justice to society―took action again in late 2008 in order to oust the Somchai 
government from political authority on the basis of its election fraud in 2007, and, at the 
same time, the People’s Power Party was disbanded due to the regulation of the new 
2007 constitution (Tipsuda, 2010). These uncertain political situations in 2008 paved 
the way to the entrance to political power of the Democrat party, for the first time since 
2000. It should be noted that it was highly possible that the PM, Abhisit Vejajiva, was 
pushed to his position in 2008 by the military and backed up by royalists (Chambers, 
2010: 215). Following its assumption of political authority the Democrat government 
critically urged social forces from both the supporters of TRT and the anti-military 
coup to take action and balance their class interests, which took place from early 2009 to 
the crackdown in 2010. 
 
5.1.1 From the Counter-Democrat Government Movement to the Red 
Shirts Social Forces 
Since the military coup of 2006 the conservative social forces led by the junta, the 
Democrat party, and the PAD were active in reshaping the social relations formed 
under Thaksinism during the early 2000s. In order to defend their own class interests 
against conservative social forces, the Red Shirts were formed to balance this political 
equilibrium. The so-called ‘Red Shirts movement’, during the first stage, was a politician 
backed movement in support of the Thai Rak Thai party and against the junta who 
conducted the coup in September 2006 (Forsyth, 2010). Initially, this movement labeled 
themselves as the ‘Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship; DAAD’ and later changed its 
                                                             
12Although the occupation of the airport by the Yellow Shirts caused a severe economic loss for 
the country, the leaders of the movement still have not been charged by the court. This paved 
the way for the Red Shirts to promote the discourse of ‘double standards’ which will be 
discussed below.  
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name to the ‘United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship; UDD’ (Ubonphan, 2010: 
Ch.3). The UDD began its official demonstration in 2007 together with other social 
forces such as the ‘19 September Network and the Saturday People against Dictatorship’ 
(Kon Wansao Mai Aow Padetkarn) in order to launch a social campaign convincing 
Thai people to vote no in the national referendum on the acceptance of the new 2007 
constitution (Prachatai, 3 August 2007; McCargo, 2008: 336-339). The first phase of the 
UDD ended after the People’s Power Party won the election in December 2007. 
However, they returned to take political action again in early 2009 after the Democrat 
party had been installed in power undemocratically.  
The UDD decided to choose the ‘red’ colour as symbolic of their protest. Nevertheless, 
at first the UDD did not officially employ this colour as a theme of protest; it was first 
employed by Sombat Bun-Ngamanong, leader of the Saturday People against 
Dictatorship, who promoted the colour red to struggle against the royalist yellow 
theme (Prachatai, 3 August 2007). During the second phase of their movement, which 
started around mid-2009, the UDD changed its political strategy of movement to 
expand its political involvement to wider audiences in remote areas by changing their 
name by adding the suffix ‘Red in the Land’ (Daeng Tang Pandin) to its name 
(Ubonphan, 2010: 73-83; Chairat, 2013). At this stage, from mid-2009 until the street 
confrontationsof2010,the ‘UDD-Red in the Land’ enlarged its support and membership 
throughout the country through a strategy of what Gramsci calls a ‘war of position’. 
The war of position that the UDD or the Red Shirts were striving to achieve was in 
providing ‘critical political pedagogy’ through informal and lifelong learning in local 
villages in most parts of the North and North East, two major strongholds of the Reds 
(Wipawadee 2012; Pruek, 2012; de Jong et al., 2012). With this political strategy the 
rural social forces remained in support of the Red Shirts movement and viewed the 
political situation more critically. 
To consider who exactly the Red Shirts are and what they represent, it is neccessary to 
consider both political economy and ideological instances. The Red Shirts forces do not 
constitute a unified social group. Rather, it is composed of many social classes and 
combines both the rich and the poor in the Weberian sense of income categorisation 
(Nithi, 2011; Apichat, 2011; Apichat et al., 2013 b). This is similar to the Yellow Shirts 
as it is a social bloc that is comprised of ‘broad social alliances’ of social forces that are 
able to continually expand and dwindle in terms of its alliances. However, it could be 
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seen that even though the Red Shirts were constituted by different socio-economic 
classes they did share some ‘economic incentives’ that were lost after the diminishing of 
by the conservative military coup in 2006. When the Red Shirts came out to protest 
against the junta and boycotted the new military led constitution most political 
commentators believed that the Reds were comprised mainly of the rural poor or the 
peasantry and those that loved Thaksin. However, the Red Shirts are not only the 
peasant poor13 but rather a broad alliance of, at least, three major social categories. 
Firstly, the majority of social groups who belong to the Red Shirts movement are the 
admirers of Thaksin who come from both rural and urban areas. Thaksin’s admirers are 
a broad social alliance and from various socio-economic categories. It was not only the 
rural peasantry or the workers that supported Thaksin’s hegemonic projects, but also 
the bureaucrats and the rich who lost their benefits in many ways after the military coup 
in 2006 had ousted the TRT government from power. However, recent studies have 
shown that even though the Red Shirts are not entirely composed of the poor, compared 
to the Yellow Shirts social group the majority of Red Shirts supporters have both lower 
income and educational qualifications (Apichat et al., 2013b: Ch 2; 2013c). 
 
Apart from the majority of Thaksin supporters, the second social category is determined 
by the ‘politico-ideological stance’ of social forces. The Red Shirts in this group are 
those who insist on democratic discipline and deny the coup d’état in 2006. These social 
groups became supporters of the Reds through politico-ideological incentives rather 
than the economy, which was the crucial driver in the first category. This social group 
could be viewed as active citizens who could not stand for the undemocratic means that 
the army employed to shutdown popular political participation as a means of resolving 
crisis. It can be seen that most of this category are the middle class from both urban and 
rural areas and also academic scholars in universities. The last social category of the Red 
Shirts, and it is the least numerous, is the social group known as the ‘Red Siam’ or those 
who were ex-radical activists and members of student movements of the 1970s 
(Kanokrat, 2012: Ch 7). These social groups are unclear about their positions on 
                                                             
13Apichat (2013 b; 2013 c) argues that even though the Red Shirts in general have lower income 
than the Yellow Shirts, they are not the poorest group in the country. Rather he argues, like 
Walker (2012), that the Reds are, in fact, new rural middle classes while Naruemon and 
McCargo (2011) label them as the ‘urbanised villager’. 
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Thaksin; however, these radical fractions are appreciative of a republican regime rather 
than the existing social relations that are closely attached to the monarchy.  
 
In short, the construction of the Red Shirts social groups emerged from several social 
forces that came from different social categories and various socio-economic statuses. 
Most of them appreciated and enjoyed economic growth under Thaksinism. Even 
though they have various political economy incentives, the Red Shirts share a vital point 
together which is to stand against the undemocratic means or the coup d’état in 2006. 
They also demanded that the Abhisit government dissolve the House of Representatives 
and return decision-making power to the Thai people as soon as possible. The ‘UDD-
Red in the Land’ or the Red Shirts movement shifted in the nature of their movement 
from one that takes action in supporting a given person (Thaksin) or political party 
(TRT and PPP) to become a movement that goes ‘beyond Thaksin’ and questions a 
number of complicated socio-economic-politico problems of the country. Next, the 
political strategies of the Reds will be examined in order to unveil the condition of 
subalternity that had been oppressed by the Thai authoritarian dominant social groups 
for a long period.  
 
5.2 The Red Shirts, Critique of Common Sense, and the Subversion of 
Subalternity 
 
It cannot be denied that, initially, the political practice of the UDD aimed only to 
counter the Yellow Shirts forces and the Democrat government regardless of broader 
ideological struggle. The purposes of the UDD were centred around demanding that 
the Democrat government dissolve the House of Representatives and attempting to 
bring ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra back home (Wipawadee, 2012: 42). Therefore, the 
UDD and some factions of the Red Shirts actively protested the Democrat government 
from 2009 to the crackdown in 2010. With these initial purposes of the UDD, the 
opposition, especially from the PAD and the Democrat party, therefore saw the Red 
Shirts as ‘money-driven’ protesters that supported (or were bought by) Thaksin and his 
allies (Voicetv, 17 June 2010).  
 
Rather, this study argues that the old elite’s conception of the world was a selective 
explanation that blamed Thaksin and his allies as the only threat to contemporary Thai 
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political conflicts. It is argued here that in order to gain a proper understanding of 
contemporary crisis in Thailand, it is important to overcome the common argument of 
the old elites by accepting that the crisis in Thailand between 2006 and 2010 was not a 
conjunctural phenomenon, but was rather an organic, or in other words, a ‘structural 
crisis’ which resulted from the clash between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ categories of social 
relationship. This clash of social relations was part of a ‘crisis-ridden transition’ of the 
Thai historical bloc that dated back to the 1997 economic crisis. The emergence of the 
Red Shirts forces and its several attempts to balance the old social relations confirmed 
the existence of ‘subalternity’ or the condition that the ordinary social groups have been 
oppressing for the long period of modern social and economic development.  
 
The subaltern social groups, in a Gramscian sense, are not only the poor, but can also be 
other social classes such as the middle class or even those rich in terms of socio-
economic status. Rather, what should be considered as the subaltern social groups are 
those who lack political autonomy and are excluded from the politics of social wealth 
(see chapter three; Green, 2002, 2012). In this sense, Thailand’s Red Shirts should be 
considered as the subaltern; even though they consisted of cross-social classes in the 
Weberian sense most of them, since 2009, transcended the pro- and anti-Thaksinism 
dichotomy and politicians backed the movement to become one that possesses ‘critical 
awareness’ on the questions of political and economic inequalities and the undemocratic 
regime of the Thai historical bloc (Taylor, 2012). The Red Shirts’ political practice 
shifted to the broader ideological struggle. This was apparent in their many attempts at 
subverting the condition of subordination over two critical years between 2009 and 
2010. Below is what the Red Shirts did as they attempted to reveal the ‘common sense’ 
in Thai politics which eventually led to the critical government crackdown in mid-2010 
and contributed a significant legacy for contemporary political studies which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.2.1 Subverting the Common Sense: Against Double Standards and Prai-
Ammat Metaphor 
 
Political strategies of the Red Shirts between 2009 and 2010 should be considered as a 
‘war of position’ or political strategies that attempt to construct critical perception in 
the sphere of civil society on the part of Thai social forces in a broader sense. The Red 
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Shirts as a subaltern social force expressed themselves as a contestant to the old social 
relations―those that are constructed around royalist-nationalist ways of thinking and 
that pursue exclusionary economic development―as it appeared in two major political 
strategies; the struggle against double standards in Thai society and the introduction of 
the Prai-Ammat metaphor. These two major strategies contributed to crucial 
perceptions that the subaltern social forces could feasibly challenge the dominant social 
class and could balance the class forces, thus overcoming it in the long run.  
 
The first political strategy of the Red Shirts in order to rally against the old social 
relations was to construct critical awareness in Thai society in order to reveal that 
social forces in the country had long been excluded from the pool of power. In doing so, 
the Reds focused on the struggle against the ‘double standards’ of the Thai ruling class. 
The term ‘double standards’ seems to be normal in its ordinary sense, however, the term 
was first signified by King Bhumibol in his annual speech in December 2001 with the 
aim of reminding the Thaksin government to run the country for the benefit of the 
whole nation (Matichon, 5 December 2001). Nonetheless, the more critical meaning that 
the Red Shirts employed in their movement from 2009 was in the aim of criticising the 
structural problem of the Thai historical bloc. Thailand, like other developing countries, 
is a society that lacks discipline and, also, good governance is not present at any level of 
social life. The Red Shirts as a subaltern social group contested the common sense in 
which people were led to believe that double standards are a normal aspect of Thai 
society. The event that led to the emergence of the Reds’ double standards campaign 
was the selective operations of the Democrat government which favoured the Yellows 
over the Reds.  
 
The Democrat government was known by Thai society as an undemocratic 
elite/military backed government and in this sense they had a very good relationship 
with the PAD because they shared the same goal of ousting the Thaksin regime 
(Prachatai, 26 August 2013). The Abhisit government as the state administration was 
clearly seen delaying the process of charging the PAD over the case of hijacking 
Suvanabhumi International Airport in late 2008 and finally refused to charge the PAD 
leaders (Prachatai, 10 April 2009). Compared to the Red Shirt movement during the 
critical period of April 2010, the Abhisit government ordered the police to launch 
warrants for the arrest of Red Shirt leaders as quickly as possible. Moreover, the feeling 
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of being treated with double standards among the Red Shirts protesters seemed to 
significantly rise after there were cases of doctors in a number of state hospitals refusing 
to provide medical services to Red Shirts patients— this was because, as Thongchai 
(2010) argues, they saw the Red Shirts like ‘germs’ that could harm others and were a 
threat to the nation. This may be compared with the case of the Queen and her daughter 
who donated huge funding to treat many Yellow Shirts protesters in 2008 and went to 
one of the victim’s funeral.14 This could be seen, from the Red Shirts perspective, as a 
double standard and an unfair situation (Matichon, 13 October 2008). From this point of 
view, amongst the Red Shirts members the hegemonic project of struggle against 
double standards sharply raised critical awareness through many Red Shirts new-social 
media outlets such as the Reds newspapers, CDs, websites (Naruemon and McCargo, 
2011: 1010). In short, although the terms ‘double standards’ is normal and nothing new 
in its definition, the Reds invested it with great significance by connecting it to the 
dominant conservative social groups. 
 
The second major war of position of the subordinate Red Shirts was the introduction of 
the metaphor of ‘Prai-Ammat’ social relations. The term ‘Prai’ means the ‘commons’ or 
the ‘subjects’ in English and ‘Ammat’ means the ‘elites’ or the ‘aristocrats’ (Naruemon 
and McCargo, 2011: 1006; Taylor, 2012). The Ammat-Prai social relationship in the 
Thai ancient sense is quite similar to the lord/vassal-slave relationship in Europe. The 
Ammat in the older sense could be various groups of elites such as the monarchy, the 
royal family, the landowner, and the high-ranked bureaucrat. Meanwhile Prai could be 
understood as the commoner who was tied to the authority of their Ammat and had no 
social and political autonomy. Officially, Thailand subverted the master-slave system 
over one hundred years ago (Feeny, 1989). Nevertheless, modern economic and social 
development brought a new sense of superiority and inferiority in the new social forces 
and the sense of being Ammat and Prai has never vanished from the Thai historical 
bloc.  
 
However, the political discourse of Prai-Ammat in contemporary Thai politics that was 
resuscitated by the Reds Shirts has a broader meaning than the older sense. The Red 
                                                             
14 It was the funeral of Miss Angkana Radubpanyawoot who died in the street clashes between 
the police and the Yellow Shirts protestors on 7 October 2008. The Queen praised Angakana as 
being a good person who died to protect the nation and the monarchy.  
200 
 
Shirt leader employed this metaphor as a leading strategy in the war of position in order 
to gain consent from various subaltern social forces. The Red’s political strategy is an 
attempt to advance a counter argument against the Thai ruling class who always claim 
that Thailand has no class conflicts and that everyone lives well together under the 
King’s supremacy (Borwornsak, 2009 a; 2009 b). The significance of this political 
strategy is that it could illustrate for the wider social groups the picture of the social 
inequalities between social classes in Thai society. In the broader sense, Prai could mean 
not only the poor or the working class, but also in the modern sense it could mean those 
who have been subordinated from inclusion in society with real political liberty. 
Nevertheless, what is interesting is that in terms of Ammat it remains the monarchy, 
royal family, and social elite e.g. high-ranked army officers and civilian bureaucrats.15 
 
The Reds as a subaltern social force―who were insulted from the Yellow urban middle 
class as ‘Kwai Daeng’ (the stupid Reds) and ‘Ban Nok’ (the countryside 
people)―propagandised the metaphor of Prai-Ammat social relations in order to raise 
the critical perspective of all Thai subaltern social forces and this attempt should be 
judged to be a successful political strategy based on the increasing numbers of Red 
Shirts members and the frequency with which this discourse was employed during 
street protests (Taylor, 2012: 130-134; Buchanan, 2013). In short, the Red Shirts 
introduction to the Prai-Ammat metaphor was a critical political strategy of expanding 
the political idea of contesting the old social relations. It is argued here that this Red 
Shirt politics of language was successful in terms of the construction of wider critical 
consciousness through the Red Shirts and non-Red Shirt social groups and the 
expansion of political engagement in street protests. These challenges to the common 
sense of Thai politics made by the Red Shirts as a subaltern social group eventually 
brought the country to the peak of the organic crisis/crisis of authority in 2010 and 
paved the way for the brutal crackdown in mid-May 2010. This issue and the results of 
the clash between the old and new social relations will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
                                                             
15 One of the major targets that the Red Shirts directly attacked was the head privy councillor, 
General Prem Tinasulanond. Because the monarchy has a special protection through the lèse 
majesté laws, it was therefore a strategic movement of the Reds to protest and criticise to the 
closet people to the King instead of the King himself in order to avoid being charged by the 




This chapter has illustrated the political landscape of the Thai historical bloc in the pre-
2006 coup and the pre-2010 crisis period. This period, it has been argued, should be 
seen as a ‘crisis within the transition’ of the Thai state. This period was a consequence of 
the prior era of Thaksinism which energetically dominated Thai society from 2001 to 
2006. As discussed in the last chapter, although the Thaksin government could not 
completely establish an entirely-new historical bloc, it did effectively build new social 
relations which transcended what Gramsci called ‘economic-corporate’, the relationship 
in which the subaltern rely on economic matters rather than political-ideological 
interests, to become ‘hegemonic’ or the relationship in which the dominant social group 
could maintain their hegemonic projects through broader aspects including social-
political-ethical matters rather than economic issues. This new social relationship that 
the Thaksin government created directly challenged the ‘untouchable’ social 
institutions, in particular the monarchy. It can be seen that the moral leadership that the 
King has held for more than five decades was threaten by Thaksinism (WikiLeaks cable: 
06BANGKOK2990).  
Looking through a Gramscian framework has provided an understanding that the old 
social elites should attempt to balance their class forces and regain its hegemony from 
the strong Thaksin regime. This analysis was presented in the first section of this 
chapter. The first section examines the emergence of various social forces that, to some 
extent, lost their interests due to a number of Thaksin’s state and hegemonic projects. 
This connected to the second section that dealt with the emergence of the PAD who had 
played cohesive roles in uniting several social groups to become a structured alliance to 
act against Thaksinism. The Yellow Shirts clearly displayed their conservative political 
ideology—closely attached to the King and submissive to the old social elites, such as 
the armed forces. Many attempts by the PAD demonstrated that they welcomed the 
military staging of the coup rather than resolving conflict through democratic means. 
The following section dealt with the 2006 coup d’état and its aftermath, which 
massively impacted upon the conflict between the two major forces from 2007 onwards. 
The so-called ‘good coup’ or the popularly supported coup could be seen as a ‘royalist-
backed up’ action which was extraordinary and distinct from a Western democratic 
point of view (WikiLeaks cable: 06BANGKOK5836). The coup in 2006 was a chance for 
the old social elites to interfere in various aspects of Thai politics. The junta attempted 
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to establish a new ‘political rule’ to prevent the emergence of an extra-strong 
government comparable to the previous Thaksin government. They passed the new 
2007 constitution in order to regulate many new political relations. At the same time, 
the junta brought back the ignored Sufficiency Economy Philosophy to the realm and 
employed it as a hegemonic tool against Thaksinism’s neoliberal economic projects. 
Amidst a number of uncertainties in 2008, the Red Shirts formed themselves as a 
counter-Yellow Shirt movement and took action as a pro-Thaksin interest group during 
the first stage. However, it is argued here that the Red Shirts transcended the 
‘pro/against Thaksin’ dichotomy to become a subaltern social force that revealed 
broader problems of the undemocratic means and social, political, and economic 
inequalities and aimed to subvert them. The next chapter will lead to the peak of 
political conflict in 2010 and the result of the clash between two distinct social 




CRISIS-RIDDEN AND UNFINISHED TRANSITION OF THE THAI 
HISTORICAL BLOC  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The transition of the Thai historical bloc following the crisis of the state in 1997 ended 
up with violent street fights and a government crackdown in April-May 2010. Political 
uncertainties and violent clashes between the Yellow1 and the Red Shirts social forces 
since 2006 do not represent the genuine picture of the organic crisis of the Thai 
historical bloc. Rather, the incomplete transition is manifested in ‘three’ underlying 
troubles of the Thai state in terms of political economy, political ideology, and juridico-
political features. These three underlying problems could be seen as what Gramsci calls 
the old is dying. Nevertheless, the unfinished transition of the Thai state is still ongoing 
because the new still cannot be born. This chapter will firstly describe the forefront of 
social unrest in Thailand between April and May 2010. Then, the three crisis-ridden 
characters of the Thai state—social disparity, royalism-nationalism, and lèse majesté 
laws—will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
2. THE PEAK OF ORGANIC CRISIS: SOCIAL UNREST IN APRIL – MAY 2010 
The crisis of the Thai historical bloc in 1997 was a crisis of the whole state including 
economic, political, and ideological elements. After the crisis in 1997 the Thaksin 
government attempted to transform the old historical bloc by creating alternative social 
relations. However, this social transition of Thailand was not finished and contains 
other crises within it that erupted in 2010. The Red Shirts movement started their 
demonstrations on 12 March 2010 when part of the movement from the countryside 
traveled to Bangkok. Initially, the Red Shirts occupied the area of Phan Fah Bridge on  
Ratchadamnern Street.2 The Reds declared their aims for the protest as including six 
proposals: 1) Establishment of a genuine democracy with the King as Head of State and 
                                                             
1It should be noted here that the Yellow Shirts social forces had limited their political role since 
the Democrat Party formed the government in 2008. During the early stage of the Red Shirts 
movement in late March 2010 the Yellow Shirts leaders announced their statement against the 
movement of the Red Shirts in Bangkok and demanded that the military intervene in order to 
restore peace and reform the country. However, the masses of the Yellow Shirts did not come 
out to fight directly with the Red Shirts on the streets. Severe damage to lives of the protesters 
in 2010 resulted from the clashes between the Red Shirts movement and the armed-military by 
order of the Democrat government.   
2Ratchadamnern Street is the major street in Bangkok close to the Royal Palace and it is a 
symbol of the history of the people’s victory against the dictatorship in October 1973. 
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where political power is held exclusively by the people. They rejected any attempt, past 
or future, at using the monarchy to silence dissent or advance a particular agenda 2) 
Dissolving the 2007 Constitution and restoring the 1997 Constitution, which may then 
be amended through a transparent, consultative, and democratic process 3) Bringing 
Thais together in order to resolve socio-economic and political problems in a process 
that respects the people as the source of power 4) Ensuring rule of law, due process and 
equal justice for all Thai citizens, free of any obstructions or double-standards 5) 
Uniting all Thais who love democracy, equality, and equal justice within all facets of 
society, in an effort to deconstruct and move beyond Amarthayathipathai (Aristocracy) 6) 
Using exclusively non-violent means to achieve these objectives (White Paper, 2010). 
Reception of the Red Shirts movement by Thai society in March 2010 was varied. On 
the one hand, they were welcomed and cheered by rural people working and living in 
Bangkok. On the other hand, the Reds were unwelcome and viewed by the middle class 
Bangkokians as a Thaksin-paid-mob, uneducated, brainwashed, and even as a barbaric 
and unintelligent movement (Stent, 2012: 27; Keyes, 2012: 175). However, the protest 
was considered peaceful for its first four weeks. The crisis intensified due to the 
declaration by the Democrat government on 7 April 2010 of a State of Emergency as 
mandated by the Emergency Decree3 of 2005.  
In order to deal with the Red Shirts movement, the Abhisit government established the 
‘Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation’ (CRES)4 that aimed to diminish 
the Red Shirts protest as quickly as possible (Askew, 2012: 77-81; Ferrara, 2012: 124-
125). The Red Shirts occupation of the central business district (CBD) forced the 
temporary closure of businesses in the Ratchaprasong district. This created a high 
degree of dissatisfaction amongst the capitalist and middle class social groups in 
Bangkok and boosted the antipathy towards the rural poor to a high level.  
                                                             
3This law was launched by the Thaksin government in order to resolve political violence in the 
Southern crisis at that time and was criticised by academics because it gave totalitarian control 
of the state agencies to the Prime Minister. 
4 The major reason that the government formed the CRES was because of the expansion of the 
protestors from Phan Fah Bridge to the Central Business District (CBD) of Ratchaprasong 
intersection, where a number of retailers and department stores are situated, in early April. 
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Under the Emergency Decree, the Abhisit government attempted to shut down the core 
communication channel of the Red Shirts by blocking the ‘People’s Channel’ (PTV)5 
from satellite broadcasting. Violence eventually broke out on 10 April 2010 after the 
government ordered an operation to clear the Phan Fah Bridge area. The operation 
began in the afternoon that day and the confrontation between the armed forces and the 
protestors took place at many sites around Phan Fah Bridge and Ratchadamnern Street. 
That night resulted in the deaths of 26 people (5 soldiers) and more than 800 injured 
(Askew, 2010: 309).6 
The political situation in Thailand after the clash of 10 April was uncertain and 
increasingly marked by tension between the government and the Red Shirts protestors. 
After two months the Red Shirts movement completely abandoned the first area that 
they occupied at the Phan Fah Bridge and altered their strategy remain in one place, 
which was the central business district of Ratchaprasong intersection. The 
demonstration occurred on a daily basis focusing on the undemocratic means of power 
exercised by PM Abhisit Vejjajiva and demanded that the government take 
responsibility for the clashes on 10 April (Fullbrook, 2012: 133). The violent clashes and 
confrontation between the armed forces and the Red Shirts began in the early morning 
of 14 May and lasted for five days. The armed forces were allowed to fire because they 
treated the Reds as terrorists who needed to be dispersed. This led to the protest by 
Human Rights Watch that the Thai government had violated the United Nations’ Basic 
Principle on the Use of Force.  
Attempts to negotiate between the Reds and the government still continued until the 
day before the final crackdown during which the government made it clear that they 
would agree to negotiate only after the Red Shirts terminate their demonstration. 
However, this termination did not take place. On 19 May 2010, the army launched its 
final violent operation to clear the Ratchaprasong and other areas around Bangkok. 
                                                             
5 The Red Shirts greatly benefited from the development of information technology and the 
emergence of the so-called new media such as Facebook, YouTube, local cable TV network, and 
satellite TV which offered alternative channels to audiences, for both the Red Shirts and others. 
6 The incident of 10 April 2010 remains unclear regarding the third party who wore the ‘black 
shirt’ or those who are known as the ‘men in black’. These men in black appeared in the video 
footage throughout a number of social media that showed the men firing at people from a long 
distance (on this see Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand, 2012). The Red Shirts 
believe that these men in black shirts were sniper of the Thai army. However, the government 
and the army denied that accusation and stated that the men in black might have come from the 




This eventually led to the chaos in Bangkok and in some provinces in the northeast. In 
Bangkok, there were thirty-seven buildings, including the Central World shopping 
centre7, that were burnt out. Meanwhile, in Khon Khaen, Ubon Ratchathani, Udon 
Thani, and Chiang Mai there were fires at each town hall caused by the Reds in the 
countryside who refused to accept their defeat (The Telegraph, 19 May 2010).  
In short, the section above illustrated the picture of the peak of Thailand’s crisis which 
emerged between April and May 2010. However, the deaths and injuries of people or 
the damage to buildings in Bangkok and other provinces were only just the tip of the 
iceberg. Rather, the Thai state contains genuine underlying conflicts that still could not 
be resolved. The section below will discuss the characteristics of the crisis-ridden 
transition of the Thai state.  
 
3. THE CRISIS-RIDDEN TRANSITION  
The organic crisis that reached its peak in 2010 manifests the ‘crisis-ridden’ character of 
the Thai state. Unlike what traditional Marxists consider to be the crisis-ridden feature 
of capitalist accumulation, the transition of the Thai historical bloc not only contains the 
tendency towards crisis in terms of political economy but also the tendency to clashes in 
ideological and political spheres. The transition of the Thai historical bloc from the old 
to the alternative social relations contains the tendency that conflicts over political 
economy and cultural-ideology could take place at any historical stage. The so-called 
‘Thaksinism’, this thesis argues, is not the sole cause of all political conflicts in Thailand 
since 2005. However, it acted as the accelerator that brought the underlying troubles of 
the Thai state to break out in the post-2006 era. The three sub-sections below will 
consider the crisis-ridden character of the Thai state in political economy, political 
ideology, and juridico-political terms.  
 
 
                                                             
7 In case of the Central World shopping centre at the Ratchaprasong intersection, the truth of 
this case has been investigated for two years. It could be seen that the burning of the Central 
World was an attempt to legitimise the government’s violent crackdown as the Reds would be 
seen as terrorists who destroyed their own country (see Taylor, 2011). However, the Thai court 
recently issued a verdict on the Central World Burning case that cleared the Red Shirts of 
responsibility for this crime.  
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3.1 Political Economy: Increasing of Social Disparity  
 
Structure (political economy)8 and Superstructure (culture, ideology) form a historical 
bloc, as Gramsci once argued.9 The crisis-ridden character of the transition of the Thai 
historical bloc manifests the underlying troubles of Thailand in both political economy 
and ideological terrains. In terms of political economy, the transition of the old 
historical bloc reveals the crucial feature of capitalist development in Thailand that is 
the increase in ‘social disparity’. 
Chapter four provides an illustration of the landscape of Thailand’s modern economic 
development since the 1950s, which was the milestone of modern capitalist 
development. It was argued in that chapter that Thai political economy and political 
ideology had created the condition of ‘subalternity’ in which subaltern social groups were 
excluded from the pool of political power and social wealth and suppressed by dominant 
social groups. Economic and social inequalities resulted from the US-led economic 
policies since the 1950s that mainly concentrated on industrialisation, but ignored other 
economic sectors, especially the rural poor. It also lacked concentration on improving 
the living conditions of the people. The inequalities in income distribution in Thailand 
are clearly indicated by the World Bank’s GINI index.10 
Modern capitalist development since the 1960s in Thailand accelerated and the more 
open economy of the country since the 1980s paved the way for the 1997 economic 
crisis, as shown in chapter five. The constant feature of social disparity in the Thai 
historical bloc since the late 1950s had been delivered through the economic crisis in 
1997. The crisis led to the reconfiguration of political power in the Thai state. The Thai 
Rak Thai (TRT) party, which benefited from the new 1997 constitution, entered into 
politics and offered new hope for Thai social forces in the post-1997 crisis era. However, 
this study argues that the TRT government and the rise of the so-called ‘Thaksinism’ 
had little impact upon the improvements in structural conditions that could have 
resolved the problem of social disparity over the long term such as the launching of a 
                                                             
8 Economic matters, in the first few decades of reception of Gramsci in the English speaking 
world, have been ignored by most Gramscian scholars. However, Kratke (2011) points out that 
Gramsci himself never ignored the importance of the relations of production in the sphere of 
what Marx called the structure. 
9See the theoretical chapter.  
10 Thailand had 47.86 in 1992 and 40.02 in 2009 (The World Bank Online). These GINI index 
figures are double those of a country with good income distribution, such as Denmark which 




land reform act, improvements to the tax system, and enhancing labour productivity 
(Lauridsen, 2009). As shown in chapter six, Thaksinism, in fact provided some concrete 
benefits to the rural peasants and labourers such as the implementation of a low-cost 
health care scheme and offering micro-credit to local communities. Nevertheless, the 
Thaksin government—as a coalition of capitalist factions—did not structurally change 
to a progressive tax system, that includes inheritance and land taxes, or address the 
matter of land reform for the rural poor. Rather, as a capitalist faction, Thaksinism 
emerged under a strong state in order to guarantee a free and peaceful market for 
investors at both domestic and international levels. This mean that, the Thai historical 
bloc under the catalytic role of Thaksinism during the transition period of 2001 to 2006 
still retained the problem of social disparity as was the case beforehand. 
While Thaksinism was transforming the old historical bloc—that carried the feature of 
social disparity—to become an alternative Thaksin-led bloc, it failed to offer benefits to 
all social groups in the state. As was seen in chapter seven, Thaksinism had been 
resisted by some other capitalist factions and, more specifically, the middle class and 
some of the working class. During the transition period of the Thai historical bloc 
which began when the Thaksin government came to power the crisis-ridden character 
of the Thai state entailed that social disparity was in a process of change that could have 
led to either better or worse scenarios. However, the project of the Thaksin-led 
alternative historical bloc could not be completed as the other ‘crisis’ of the Thai state 
took place in the military coup in 2006. During the three-years of the post-coup period 
the incomplete transition of the historical bloc eventually led to the organic crisis or 
crisis of authority of the state between 2006 and its peak in 2010. It remains the case 
that no Thai governments have dealt with the matter of social disparity over the long 
run.  
In addition, as part of the social disparity problem, the matter of poverty has been 
understood to be the main reason behind the uprising of the Red Shirts subaltern social 
forces over the past few years. However, it should be seen that poverty—more 
specifically absolute poverty—is not a major problem for Thailand’s economic 
development in recent years. Many studies have argued that the Red Shirts protestors 
are not the rural poor in the absolute sense as it was in the early 1950s. However, they 
could be seen as a ‘new’ type of social group; the ‘new lower middle class’ (Apichat, 
2011a; 2011b; 2013: 14-35). Walker (2012) argues that this new social group in rural 
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Thailand should be seen as the ‘middle-income peasants’ who are no longer poor in the 
absolute sense. Nevertheless, they enjoy consumer comforts similarly to the urban 
middle class and urban workers because they benefitted from the improvement in rural 
standards of living. Moreover, these middle-income peasants are part of a diversified 
economy rather than relying on subsistence cultivation, as was the case in the past. In 
contemporary rural Thailand agriculture remains important but peasant livelihoods are 
no longer predominantly agricultural livelihoods. They are no longer just farmers 
(Walker, 2012: 8). This coincides with what Sopranzetti (2012) argues; the gap between 
city and countryside in Thailand has been decreasing due to connections through the 
rural immigrants who are working in urban areas. Rural people who have the chance to 
live and work in urban and industrial cities seem to experience a sense of inequality 
between the two societies. These ‘urbanized villagers’ transmitted the sense of 
humbleness that is a product of the social disparity of the Thai state to their rural 
families and peers (Naruemon and McCargo, 2011). 
In short, the old historical bloc had concealed the problem of social disparity and carried 
the ‘tendency’ towards the clash between the dominant and the subaltern social forces in 
order to adjust these uneven social relations. The constructed sense of humbleness of 
the oppressed social groups in the Thai state eventually erupted following the post-2006 
military coup as most of the rural poor attempted to struggle in order to defend 
Thaksinism—a regime that advanced their concrete interests—and led to the formation 
of the Red Shirts movement. The next sub-section below will deal with another crucial 
crisis-ridden character of the transition of the Thai historical bloc; the overwhelming of 
the so-called ‘royalist-nationalist’ political ideology of the Thai state. 
 
3.2 Political Ideology: Overwhelming of Royalism-Nationalism 
 
The second crisis-ridden character of the transition of the Thai state is the problem of 
political ideology. Along with the matter of social disparity, the old historical bloc has 
also been carrying the tendency towards a clash in the ideological superstructure.The 
overwhelming of the dominant ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology in Thai politics configured 
social relations in which social forces in the Thai state have never challenged this 
dominant ideology. The royalist-nationalist ideology itself could not dominate and 
regulate over social forces. However, the ruling classes have been maintaining it 





The political confrontation between the old and new social relations manifested the very 
crucial unseen ideological problem of the Thai state. It is argued here that the profound 
troubles of Thai politics in the terrain of superstructure have been due to the 
overwhelming role of royalism-nationalism in politics. Royalism and nationalism do not 
naturally take place to regulate social forces. Rather, it has been a struggle that the Thai 
social elites constructed in order to preserve their own interests. The dominant political 
ideology of Thailand coheres the monarchy in all spheres of social and political life 
(Jory, 2003).  
As discussed in chapter four, the Thai monarchy had been weakened in its power and 
significance by the 1932 revolution. It was not until the coup d’état of 1957 that Field 
Marshall Sarit Thanarat, the coup leader, brought the monarchy back to its place (Thak, 
2007). After five decades of the revitalisation of power the monarchy has been a moral-
political centre of the state and actively involved in Thai politics at times of national 
crises in 1976, 1992, and 1997 (Dressel, 2010; Handley, 2006; Ji, 2007, 2010). Thai 
royalism-nationalism works along with other political ideologies such as liberalism and 
authoritarianism and is highly reflexive to the political situation in each historical 
period. In the late 1970s, royalism-nationalism was employed by the royalists against 
the longstanding authoritarianism of the Thai military along with the rise of student 
liberalism. Moreover, while the country was suffering from economic crisis in 1997, 
royalism-nationalism was maintained and employed as a factor of social cohesion at the 
time of crisis by the King himself. 
King Bhumibol took his chance to be the moral leader of the nation during the time of 
crisis and cohered social forces in the Thai historical bloc through his proposed notion 
of the ‘Sufficiency Economy Philosophy’11 (henceforth, ‘SEP’) expounded in his annual royal 
birthday speech on 4 December 1997.12 SEP has played crucial roles in the Thai state 
                                                             
11The King’s notion of the SEP is derived from the work of E. F. Schumacher’s ‘Small is 
Beautiful’ combined with the Buddhist beliefs on the medium way and self-sufficiency in 
consumption.  
12In the King’s birthday speech of 4 December 1997 he proposes his idea to the public as stated 
that:  
Sufficiency Economy is a philosophy that guides the livelihood and behaviour of people at all 
levels, from the family to the community to the country, on matters concerning national 
development and administration. It calls for a ‘middle way’ to be observed, especially in 
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since then and has dominated the spheres of life of all social groups. It is argued here 
that along with the King’s political interventions in 1973 and 1992 as a conflict trouble 
shooter, the King’s political action in late 1997 was also vital to emphasise his royal 
power as the moral leader of the country (McCargo, 2005). The SEP in 1997 can be seen 
as the confirmation of the extraordinary power of the King and the significance of 
‘royalism’ also increased after the crisis in 1997.  
The SEP, based on the King’s speech, has multiple levels of implementation. Navarat 
(2009: 16-17) describes that the concept of SEP contains four different levels of 
functions including individual, community, organisation, and national. At the smallest 
level, an individual gains benefit from this idea by using it as a ‘way of life’. People are 
encouraged to take any actions in moderation or following a middle way. This way of 
life is based on the Buddhist notion of moderation. The individual is created as a new 
economic man who should not be greedy and self-dependent, should not consume too 
much, should not take advantage of others, and should feel ‘enough’ in any activity they 
pursue (Isager and Ivarsson, 2010: 223).  
At the second level of the SEP, the community level, people should be co-operative in 
any decision-making processes in the local community. The community should promote 
people’s education and appropriately apply uncomplicated technology in social 
development. For the organisational level, the SEP offers that manufacturing firms 
should be encouraged to establish a strong foundation in order to grow effectively and 
efficiently. The SEP suggests that businesses do not grow too fast by over-borrowing 
because it risks an unforeseen event such as the crisis that took place in 1997. The 
concept explains that in order to expand businesses should do adopt a gradual approach 
by obtaining reasonable loans and should maintain the capacity to manage debts 
without going bankrupt. The last and the most significant level of the SEP is the 
national level. Theoretically, the SEP suggests that the country should aim to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
pursuing economic development in keeping with the world of globalization. Sufficiency 
means moderation and reasonableness, including the need to build a reasonable immune 
system against shocks from the outside or from the inside. Intelligence, attentiveness, and 
extreme care should be used to ensure that all plans and every step of their implementation 
are based on knowledge. At the same time we must build up the spiritual foundation of all 
people in the nation, especially state officials, scholars, and business people at all levels, so 
they are conscious of moral integrity and honesty and they strive for the appropriate 
wisdom to live life with forbearance, diligence, self-awareness, intelligence, and 
attentiveness. In this way we can hope to maintain balance and be ready to cope with rapid 




careful planning in all areas. At this level, the SEP offers itself as a general framework 
for the authorities to apply the SEP in many public policies, that is, in the national 
economic and social development plan. The SEP was the centre of the plans since the 8th 
plan in 1997 until the current 11th plan. Moreover, the SEP was deeply rooted in other 
social policies such as human development policy, environment and natural resources 
policy, and poverty reduction policy (Apichai et al, 2009). At the time of the crisis in 
1997, the SEP was respected as an alternative economic development strategy for the 
country in contrast to orthodox neoliberal projects (Chambers, 2013: 86-88).  
However, it should be noted here that the conception of SEP is not an anti-capitalist 
idea, rather it is a practicing guide of how to live consistently with the bourgeois 
ideology (Unger, 2009). The concept has been emphasised as a hegemonic common 
sense for social forces, communities, business firms, and bureaucratic authorities in 
Thailand’s historical bloc to follow the middle way. The SEP has even been taught in 
the primary curriculum for Thai pupils and published in various forms such as comics 
provided by the Thailand National Identity Board in order to gain wider support from 
people in every social strata (Isager and Ivarsson, 2010: 232). 
 In addition, the SEP framework is well regarded not only by Thai people but also at the 
international level. The concept was recognised in the tenth UN conference on trade 
and development (UNCTAD) in 2000 and the King was lauded as the ‘Developer King’ 
(Navarat, 2009:5). The SEP has functioned as one of the major hegemonic tools that the 
conservative social forces employ to configure social relations in Thailand from 1997 to 
the present except for the short period of five years under the TRT government. 
Thaksinism ignored the King’s SEP and implemented its own neoliberal policies; 
therefore after the military coup in 2006 the junta brought the SEP back and used it as a 
major ideological tool against Thaksinism. Then the SEP since 2006 has been insisted 
upon as a moral framework for the junta government and the successor Democrat 
government between 2008 and 2011 as a superior concept to the so-called ‘Thaksin’s 
populist policies’.  
The concept of SEP has been widely accepted and accommodated in various spheres in 
the Thai historical bloc during the post-1997 era (Apichai et al., 2006, 2009). However, 
this concept has been met with some criticism from scholars, as, firstly, it is only political 
rhetoric of the social elites and not applicable in real life, and it has been used as an 
ideological tool against political opposition. Following the crisis in 1997 the King 
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proposed the concept of SEP as a new path for Thai society, economy, and even culture. 
Based on Buddhist philosophy and moral principles, the SEP aims to create a new type 
of economic man who lives moderately, is not greedy, and is not over exploitative. 
However, these principles are hard to implement in real life under social relations of 
neoliberalism. Isager and Ivarsson (2010) argue that the SEP is only political rhetoric 
that is crucial in order to strengthen the ‘moral fibre’ of the nation rather than elevate 
people’s material living conditions.  
Secondly, the concept of SEP did not improve the concrete living conditions of the poor 
and other social forces as is evident in that poverty and income gaps in Thailand still 
exist and worsen every year (Unger, 2009: 154). However, scholars believe that another 
aspect of the SEP is that it can be inferred that it is an attempt by the royalist and 
capitalist social classes to keep the rural majority poor and happy (Unger, 2009: 145). 
Lastly, the massive bureaucratic budget spent on a number of projects entitled ‘following 
the King’s concept of SEP’ has never been questioned. Specifically, the Royal Project 
Foundation, which was established in order to administer any projects initiated by the 
King, spent huge amounts of money on the projects under the SEP framework without 
any declaration on the budget (Walker, 2010: 260). In short, the SEP has been 
challenged as only being political rhetoric or a campaign in order to build hegemony to 
configure social relations over social forces in the state. The maintaining of the SEP by 
the King and the conservative social groups created a regime in which moral leadership 
is attached to the King, the monarchy, and the royalism-nationalism ideology rather 
than the state and ordinary people. The over-involvement of the royalist-nationalist 
ideology employed by the monarchy and conservative social forces in modern Thai 
politics could not take place without the enforcement of legal power through the 




3.3 Juridico-Political: Lèse Majesté and Political Prisoners  
 
The third crisis-ridden character of the transition of the old historical bloc has been 
revealed to be the harsh application of the lèse majesté laws and the problem of political 
prisoners in Thailand. Working mutually with the royalist-nationalist ideology, the 
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juridico-political apparatus of the Thai state upholds the laws that mostly charge the 
political opposition as disloyal to the monarchy and have been employed against the 
freedom of speech of Thai social forces.  
 
The lèse majesté law and the Computer Crime Act serve this authoritarian objective 
highly effectively in the past few years through and beyond the crisis of 2010. 
Considering the number of cases where individuals have been charged with insulting 
the monarchy, there was a sharp increase after the 2006 military coup and there have 
been more than 500 cases since 2011 (Janya, 2011). This can be taken to imply that the 
royalist-nationalist ideology has been crucial during the time of intense conflicts and 
that the monarchy has been employed as a political weapon more in that period 
compared to previous decades of Thai politics.  
Thailand’s lèse majesté law has appeared in various forms over the last century since the 
emergence of a modern legal system. There are three vital stages in the development of 
lèse majesté laws in Thailand including firstly, the lèse majesté law in the pre-1932 
revolution period; secondly, lèse majesté law after the regime change; lastly, lèse 
majesté law after the 1950s. Firstly, the lèse majesté appeared in several forms in the 
absolute monarchy of Siam. The 1900 edict was the first lèse majesté law, which at that 
time was created in order to protect the reputation of royalty and the King’s officials. 
Injuring the reputation of the King could lead to three years imprisonment. Then in 
1908 the lèse majesté law was expanded in its scope to include the royal family and 
punishment was increased to seven years imprisonment for defamation of the King and 
three years for other members of the royal family (Streckfuss, 2010: 124-125).  
The second stage in the development of Thai lèse majesté laws took place after the 1932 
revolution. The overthrow of the absolute monarchy eventually led to some changes to 
the law itself. In 1934, the criminal code had been revised under the implementation of 
the first democratic constitution in late 1932. This law allowed people to express 
criticisms of the state and punishment was set at a maximum of seven years (Streckfuss, 
2011: 98). However, the most important stage of the lèse majesté law in Thailand is the 
period from the 1950s onward. In 1957 there was a major revision of the Thai criminal 
code. The result of this revision led to the current form of the lèse majesté law in 
Thailand which appeared in ‘article 112’that provided special coverage only for the 
King, Queen, heir apparent, and regent. However, the punishment remained the same 
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(Streckfuss, 2011: 103). The third stage, which is the most crucial step in the 
development of lèse majesté law in Thailand, took place just after the student massacre 
at Thammasat University on 6 October 1979. A coup d’état had been conducted in the 
same day and the coup maker launched the Coup order No. 41 in order to increase the 
punishment under all defamation-based laws. This led to a massive increase in 
punishment for those who insulted the King and royal family to a minimum of three and 
a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment (Streckfuss, 2011: 105). This lèse majesté law 
remains the same and functions very effectively until the present.  
In addition, along with the active application of article 112 of the criminal code, there is 
an emergence of the new, coup d’état heritage, Computer Crime Act of 2007 which 
addresses the very large number of lèse majesté crimes on the internet (Sawatri, 2011: 
54-61). In fact, the Computer Crime Act itself does not contain any clause specifically on 
crimes towards the monarchy. The law originally covers the security matters of the 
state. Nevertheless, the Thai state officials see the criticisms of any aspects related to 
the monarchy, whether or not it is for academic reasons, as the first priority of national 
security. The Computer Act had forced the termination of a very high number of 
websites related to any criticism of the monarchy with more than 80,000 sites closed 
between 2007 and 2011 (Sawatri, 2012: 137).  
The genuine ideological content underlying the 2010 political turmoil, this thesis 
argues, is the overwhelming employment of the royalist-nationalist ideology along with 
the harsh application of the state’s juridico-political apparatus via the lèse majesté law. 
This resulted in a significant rise in the number of political prisoners who have been 
charged with crimes against the monarchy in recent years. There are more than 50 
cases of lèse majesté charges each year for the past several years, especially after the 
military coup in 2006 (Prachatai, 21 August 2012). Some cases have been brought to 
public attention such as the case of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, director of the alternative 
news portal Prachatai website, who was accused in 2009 for allowing an open space in 
the format of the message board on the Prachatai website in order to allow comments 
on the lèse majesté laws (BBC News, 6 March 2009). In addition, there is the academic 
case of Giles Ungpagorn, a radical Marxist scholar at Chulalongkorn University, who 
sought asylum in England in 2009 after he had been charged following the launch of his 
controversial book ‘A Coup for the Rich’ (2006). Differently from the case of Giles, the 
case of Somsak Jeamteerasakul, a radical historian and scholar at Thammasat 
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University, was accused of violating the lèse majesté law in May 2011 when he 
expressed his views on the existence of the monarchy. Somsak did not exile himself, but 
stayed in Thailand in order to defend his academic standpoint and was met with much 
popular support (Bangkok Post, 25 April 2011).  
In the case of politician and activist, Jakrapob Penkair, former minister of the Prime 
Minister’s Office and one of the core leaders of the UDD, he was charged under the lèse 
majesté law because he commented on the status of the Thai monarchy while delivering 
a talk at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand in August 2007. Moreover, 
some Red Shirts activists were also arrested under the lèse majesté law, for instance, 
Suchart Nakbangsai, an anti-coup activist, who gave a speech at a public rally in 
December 2008. Suchart was sentenced to six years imprisonment, which was reduced 
by half due to his guilty plea.  He was imprisoned for approximately one year and 10 
months and has already been released (Prachatai, 29 August 2012). Darunee 
Chanchoengsilpakul, known as Da Torpedo who was a radical Red Shirts speaker, and 
was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for her aggressive criticisms of the King 
(Prachatai, 28 August 2009).  
The Thai lèse majesté law does not only apply to Thai citizens, but also to foreigners. 
Some foreigners have also been charged as committing lèse majesté such as Jonathan 
Head, the BBC correspondent in Bangkok, and also board members of the Foreign 
Correspondents’ Club of Thailand have been charged as they hosted Jakrapob Penkair’s 
talk in 2007 (The Nation, 23 March 2010). Furthermore, Richard Lloyd Parry, who 
works for the Times, has been charged for his interview with Thaksin in November 
2009 (New Mandala, 10 November 2009). The Australian Harry Nicolaides was jailed 
for six months for writing a book that referred to the uncomfortable private life of the 
Thai crown prince (The Economist, 2009). More recently, Joe Gordon, an American 
citizen, also violated the lèse majesté law when he provided a link on a website to a 
digital version of the crucial ‘The King Never Smiles’, a book banned in Thailand by Paul 
Handley (2006) (see Prachatai, 27 May 2011). Recently, and perhaps the most terrible 
application of the lèse majesté law in Thailand, is the case of Akong (which in Thai 
means the old man) Ampon Tangnoppakul. Akong was a 60-year-old ordinary person 
who was accused of sending an SMS (short message service) that insulted the King and 
royal family to the telephone of ex-PM Abhisit’s secretary four times (see Pavin, 2011a). 
There are a number of inappropriate logics and evidence in the proof that this old man 
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should be convicted under the lèse majesté law, however, the court sentenced him to 20 
years imprisonment. However, Akong died on 8 May 2012 in the Prison Hospital in 
Bangkok (The Economist, 2012). The case of Akong and also other voluminous political 
prisoners in recent years confirmed that the existing Thai historical bloc is in question. 
The attempts by the old social forces to enforce the coercive state apparatus to control 
those who have different ideologies and thoughts appear to be unsuccessful because the 
subaltern social forces have incrementally begun to discuss and question the existing 
social relations in the country.     
In short, this section has addressed the three major crisis-ridden characters of the 
transition of the Thai historical bloc—increasing social disparity, the overwhelming of 
the royalist-nationalist ideology, and the rising number of political prisoners due to the 
lèse majesté laws. These underlying problems have been created since the modern 
development of Thai politics from the late 1950s and have been transmitted through 
many decades. The transition that began following the crisis of the state in 1997 has 
been carried on by these three troubles through their acceleration under Thaksinism 
between 2001 and 2005. Eventually, it led to the eruption of all the latent conflicts in 
Thailand that were brought to the fore at the peak of crisis in 2010.  
 
4. THE UNFINISHED TRANSITION: THE NEW CANNOT BE BORN  
As was shown in the previous core chapters and the section above, the transition of the 
old historical bloc, this thesis argues, is an ‘unfinished process’. The liberal force of the 
Thaksin government as the agency of social change attempted to create a new social 
relation. However, with the three underlying conflicts that were carried through its 
short period in office between 2001 and 2006, the project to build a new hegemony of 
Thaksinism was not possible.  
In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci once describes the notion of ‘organic crisis’ as a 
historical situation in which ‘the old is dying, but the new cannot be born’ (1971: 275-276). 
What is dying in the Thai historical bloc is the erosion of the sacredness of royalism-
nationalism that centres on the monarchy, the growing demands of the subaltern for a 
fairer economy, and the increasing demand for protecting human rights and human 
dignity. The old social forces attempted to escape from the organic situation of the crisis 
of authority by enforcing the aggressive lèse majesté law towards the constructed 
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‘otherness’ who possess different ideologies and worldviews. In Gramscian theories, the 
area of ‘political society’, in which the state could operate its coercive practices, has a 
dialectical relationship with another theoretical terrain which is ‘civil society’ where 
hegemony is more crucial than force. Therefore, any political practices that might be 
operated in political society are definitely resonant with civil society at the same time. In 
the case of Thai politics, the forceful application of the juridico-political apparatus via 
the lèse majesté law has contributed to the politics of civil society in which there are 
growing of debates and greater critical awareness through several social institutions.  
In recent years, some Thai subaltern social groups seemed to realise that the 
overwhelming social roles of the monarchy and its ideological hegemonic projects along 
with the application of the lèse majesté law are the genuine obstructions to reaching the 
so-called liberal democracy.13 Political systems that could not provide spaces for 
minorities and that restrict freedom of speech represent a kind of authoritarianism even 
though they possess the legal form of democracy through constitutions and elections. At 
this stage, some critical social groups in Thailand—who can reveal to public attention 
the roles of the royalist-nationalist ideology and uncover the roles of the monarchy as 
an anti-democratic force—have been incrementally rising. The Nitirat (the enlightened 
jurists) group, the group of seven critical legal scholars at Thammasat University, plays 
a leading role in constructing critical awareness towards the existing role of the 
monarchy and the lèse majesté law since 2010. Moreover, some academic communities 
such as Fah Deaw Kan (the Same Sky) journal, Midnight University, and the alternative 
media of Prachatai Online also risk themselves by offering rare political spaces for the 
publication of critical writings (Chuwas, 2011). However, these movements are only tiny 
sectors of a whole civil society of the Thai state. Moreover, these movements did not 
have an affect upon social forces to a great extent due to the structural limitation of the 
lèse majesté law. Therefore, this situation could be seen as ‘the new’ or the 
alternative/critical/challenging social forces which have been growing, but are still not 
mature enough to change the system of thought and also not sufficient to construct a 
whole new democratic historical bloc at this historical stage. This means that the 
organic crisis of the Thai state is an ongoing process that could not be solved in a short 
period of time and that it will, definitely, require years to restructure a new type of 
social relation in the Thai historical bloc. 
                                                             




5. CONCLUSION  
The development of Thai politics in the last decade was based on the features of ‘history, 
crisis, transition, and crisis within transition’ as already shown in previous chapters. The 
politics of transition of the Thai historical bloc from the post-1997 economic crisis, it 
has been argued, led to the ‘unfinished transformation’ or the erratic situation of the old 
is dying and the new cannot be born, as Gramsci once stated. The organic crisis that 
reached its peak in 2010 was only the tip of the iceberg; this chapter revealed what 
precisely are the underlying problems of the Thai historical bloc. The clash between the 
old and new social relations was represented in the form of the politics of colour 
between yellow and red (Keyes, 2012). This clash reveals that the hegemonic royalism-
nationalism and its juridico-political practice of lèse majesté laws are no longer 
compatible with the more critical subaltern social groups in the Thai state (Fullbrook, 
2012). The transition also exposes the increasing problem of social-economic disparity 
that resulted from the uneven development of Thailand’s political economy. Social 
disparity is the underlying problem that imbued subaltern social groups with a sense of 
humbleness due to their exclusion from the pool of social wealth. The transition of the 
Thai historical bloc from the post-1997 period that was led by the strong Thaksinism 
was not completed and left ongoing conflicts in the Thai historical bloc that remain 
unresolved. The next chapter will provide the conclusion to these and will offer a 
summary of arguments, findings, and theoretical suggestions for further study and the 




1. HISTORY, CRISIS, TRANSITION, AND THE CRISIS WITHIN TRANSITION: 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
This thesis set out to understand the political turmoil in Thailand that emerged in 2010. 
In so doing, the thesis examined the underlying reasons of the crisis by looking at 
interrelations between social forces in the Thai historical bloc between the 1997 crisis 
and the turbulence in 2010. What this research has done, as shown in the previous 
chapters, is to offer an alternative understanding of the development of Thai politics 
over the recent decade. This research argues that political violence in April-May 2010 
was a social reflection of the unresolved restructuring and unfinished transition of the 
Thai historical bloc. This thesis’ arguments are based on four major features―history, 
crisis, transition, and crisis within transition of the Thai historical bloc. Traditional 
accounts of Thai political economy―as discussed in chapter two―analyse each feature 
out of historical context. Historical foundations of political economy and ideological 
hegemony have rarely been integrated into recent studies of Thailand’s crisis.  
 
In addition, the dominant approaches in Thai political studies usually analyse a given 
socio-political phenomena in an absolute sense without connection to broader social 
structures. To overcome these matters, this thesis developed the major theoretical 
framework―a Gramscian account―in chapter three. Employing a Gramscian 
perspective to grasp the politics of social transition of the Thai state could overcome the 
determinist explanation of social change and reveal the more complicated interrelations 
of social forces in both political economy and ideological terrains of the Thai historical 
bloc. In addition, the Gramscian framework can deal with social actors―which this 
work considers as social forces/social groups―and the balance of class forces in terms 
of both economic class interests and ideological-cultural practices.  
 
1.1 HISTORY  
 
The contribution of this study as provided in chapter four lies in showing that the crises 
of the Thai historical bloc over recent years were not stand alone from the ‘history’ of 
the Thai historical bloc itself in both political economy and ideological terrains. This 
thesis conceives of history as a sphere of human actions and social relations. History is a 
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manifestation of social relations that contain features of struggle to balance the class 
interests of each social force/social group. This chapter has provided the history of the 
changing conditions of the modern political economy of the Thai state from the late 
1950s as a basis to understand what this thesis called the ‘old’ historical bloc. The 
development of political economy in Thailand since the late 1950s has led to the 
emergence of new social forces and constituted the ‘configurations of social relations’ 
that shape political-economic-ideological lives of all social groups in the Thai historical 
bloc. The uneven economic development and socio-economic inequality and the 
dominant elite-constructed ‘royalist-nationalist’ ideology are the crucial bases to 
understand the politics of transition in Thailand over the recent decade.  
 
1.2 CRISIS  
 
This thesis analyses social transition dialectically. The old historical bloc that was 
constituted by the social elites and authoritarian military governments since the late 
1950s contained conflicts within itself and led to the rupture of the old historical bloc in 
1997. This study offers an alternative understanding that the crisis in 1997 was not only 
an economic crisis, but also a political and ideological crisis of the Thai state. This thesis 
has argued in chapter five that the crisis in 1997 created a great ‘opportunity’ to 
restructure the old historical bloc in both economic, political, and ideological aspects. At 
the very first stage of the crisis, this thesis argues, the monarchy had maintained its 
moral power and created equilibrium among social classes by offering the Self-
Sufficiency Philosophy as a cohesive tool. Moreover, the changes in political regulation 
such as the legitimating of the new 1997 constitution also laid the conditions to create a 
‘strong state’ to facilitate the country through the time of crisis.  
 
1.3 TRANSITION  
 
In chapter six the thesis dealt with the transition of the Thai historical bloc from the old 
to the new/alternative social relations under the leading roles of the TRT party. Rather 
than seeing the Thaksin/Thai Rak Thai party only as a strong political party, this 
research argues that it should be considered as a social force that acted as a ‘catalyst’ of 
social change through its numerous innovative social policies and its strong 
parliamentary base. The strong TRT government as a social force attempted to create 
its own hegemony over social forces in the country and this study argues that, to some 
extent, TRT successfully created a new relation of force in which social groups in the 
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bloc had gained interest from the new Thaksinist political economy and liberal political 
ideology. However, the thesis has shown that the transition of the Thai historical bloc 
was not a smooth transition. Although Thaksinism could secure concrete benefit to 
several social groups, some social forces had lost and feared losing their own class 
interests. Therefore, the new social equilibrium was required and led to the emergence 
of anti-Thaksinism from late 2005 onwards.  
 
1.4 TRANSITION AND THE CRISIS WITHIN TRANSITION  
 
The transition of the Thai historical bloc from the old―uneven and exclusionary 
political economy+royalism-nationalism ideology―to the alternative Thaksin-led 
power bloc was a rough transition. The conservative PAD or the Yellow Shirts forces 
had at first united in order to protect their own economic interests in various forms. 
However, this research argues that the ideological war agitated by the Yellows against 
Thaksinism facilitated the transition of the historical bloc and created the conditions 
that welcomed the return of the old-conservative royalist-nationalist conception of the 
world. This passive revolution of the Yellow Shirts paved the way to the military coup 
in September 2006―which is another crisis within transition of the Thai historical bloc.  
 
Overcoming traditional understandings of the coup as an undemocratic means to pursue 
the political power of the army, this thesis has shown in chapter seven that the coup was 
a result of the ‘balance of class forces’ between the old and the new social forces in which 
the old conservative forces forced their winning at this time. The junta, and later the 
Democrat government, attempted to restructure the relations of the social forces once 
again and brought back the royalist-nationalist ideology to consolidate its power in 
ideological terms. The coup in 2006 led the social forces that had gained benefit from 
the TRT government in various forms to organise themselves as the Red Shirts forces 
against the military and the conservative Democrat party. Although the Red Shirts 
initially emerged as a movement in support of TRT, it soon transcended the TRT party 
to demand a fairer economy and acceptance of its cultural-ideological heritage. In short, 
this thesis argued that the struggles between the Reds and the Yellows cannot be 
properly understood without the history of the old historical bloc, its coalition of social 
forces, its rupture, and crisis within transition towards the Thaksin government and 
beyond. That is the conflict between the Yellows and the Reds manifests the rupture 





1.5 UNFINISHED TRANSITION 
 
This thesis considers political conflicts of the Thai state since late 2005 as an ‘organic’ 
or structural crisis―a crisis that lasts for many years and has complicated social 
relations contributing to the conflict. It reached its peak with the severe government 
repression of April-May 2010, and remains fundamentally unresolved. The situation in 
Thailand is a forceful illustration of Gramsci’s point about an organic crisis that ‘the old 
is dying but the new cannot be born’. The contribution to knowledge that this research has 
made is, first of all, to identify the crisis in Thailand as a structural crisis and to explore 
it in the argument about the unresolved restructuring and unfinished transition of the 
Thai historical bloc that resulted from the clash between the old and the new social 
relations. This thesis reveals the three underlying factors of the Thai historical 
bloc―social disparity as a form of class rule, the overwhelming role of royalist-
nationalist ideology, and juridico-political roles of lèse majesté laws, that remain potent 
forces of entrenchment in opposition to the new social forces that this thesis identified in 
chapters seven and eight.  
 
‘The old is dying but the new cannot be born’ means that these three major factors of the old 
historical bloc still exist. Although the conservative social forces—for example, the 
monarchy, the military, and the rightist Democrat party—lost some of their political 
legitimacy1 as a consequence of the violent crackdown that led to a number of severe 
losses in lives and damage to public properties, they nevertheless remain potent as 
forces of reaction as evidenced by the political turmoil and violence during the 
demonstration against the Pua Thai government. However, the conservative social 
groups are yet still alive and actively attempting to balance their own class forces by 
conducting the demonstration against the Pua Thai government in Bangkok in late 
2013.2However, ‘the new cannot be born’ describes that the more progressive social force 
                                                             
1 The Democrat party lost in the general election in July 2011 while the Pua Thai party, a proxy 
of TRT, gained a majority win. Majority strongholds for the Pua Thai party are still the 
northern and the northeastern areas as it was when the TRT party was in power.  
2 The demonstration in early November 2013, initially, emerged from the leading roles of the 
middle class social groups led by many academic institutions in Bangkok to protest against Pua 
Thai’s attempt to launch the draft of the Amnesty bill. The middle class social forces in Bangkok 
believe that this law, to some extent, might clear the corruption cases of the former Thaksin 
government. However, the demonstration was transformed to be anti-Pua Thai and anti-
Thaksinism in late November 2013 under the name of the ‘People’s Democratic Reform 
Committee’ (PDRC). The PDRC was led by Suthep Tuagsuban, a former MP and executive of 
the Democrat party and the PAD (the Yellow Shirts). The movements and occupations of 
bureaucratic offices in Bangkok led the Pua Thai government to dissolve the Parliament on 9 
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or the Red Shirts themselves are still not strong enough to unravel the underlying 
problems of the old social relations to the public in order to create more critical 
consciousness towards social groups in the country. The politics of balancing and 
rebalancing of social power between the old and the new social relations in Thailand 
have been ongoing and it can be concluded that the transition of the Thai historical bloc 
since the post-1997 crisis is an unfinished transition with uncertain outcomes. 
 
1.6 Contributions to Gramscian Studies  
 
Apart from the contributions to understanding the politics of social  transition of the 
Thai state as mentioned above, this thesis also, to some extent, contributes to the study 
on Gramscian theories. The international studies on Gramsci in English speaking world 
had significantly been increasing since the publication of the Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks in 1971. Since then a voluminous studies on Gramsci and his social-political 
theories have been examined in various aspects in both English speaking world and 
beyond. However, as it is shown in the International Gramsci Society website3 on recent 
publications on Gramsci, while Gramscian studies is popular in several countries 
especially where the leftist and radical politics are strong such as Latin American 
countries, India, Turkey, and South Korea. Rather, for the case of Thailand and 
Southeast Asian countries, the applications of leftist theories such as Marxism (in 
various schools of thought) and Gramscianism have barely appeared.  
 
The reason behind this absence of critical studies in Thailand can be attributed to the 
strong influence of authoritarian regime and the overwhelming role of royalism (and its 
legal applications). As shown in chapter four above the Thai state has perpetuated a 
mode of thinking in which obedience to the ruler like the monarchy and authoritarian 
military government is normal and criticising their political roles risks being charged 
by lèse majesté and other laws. Therefore, it is difficult for radicals and the left in Thai 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
December 2013 and announce a new general election to be held on 2 February 2014. However, 
the Democrat Party boycotted this general election and the Election Commission could not 
peacefully held the election in some areas of the country especially in the South (a major political 
stronghold of the Democrat Party and the PDRC). The PDRC supporters obstructed the state 
officials to facilitate the election which eventually led to the annulment by the Constitutional 
Court as they ordered that the 2 February election was an illegitimate election. Up to May 2014, 
political situation in Thailand is still uncertain and is now in the deadlock as the Constitutional 
Court recently ordered the caretaker Prime Minister to step down on 7 May 2014 as she abused 
of power by transferring the head of National Security Commission in 2011. 
3 http://internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/recent_publications/index.html  
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academia to publish critical social and political studies even for an academic audience. 
For other countries in Southeast Asia, each of them has their own distinct social 
formation and political struggles. However, what they share with Thailand is the 
experience of being ruled by the authoritarian military regime especially in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Allowing radical theories to be applied 
in these political circumstances can aid political resistance by several social forces. 
Official suppression of dissenting views is the reason why the application of critical 
theoretical approaches of Marxism, Gramscianism, and others has barely taken in 
Southeast Asia and Thailand.  
 
The contribution of this thesis to the field of international Gramscian studies is its 
demonstration that conceptions of configuration of power and balance of class forces in 
Gramsci’s thought still matter and have powerful explanatory power in contemporary 
politics. Gramscian studies in the recent years have been interpreted from various 
schools of thought, including post-structuralist positions that diverge significantly from 
core a Marxist principles. This thesis had carefully employed Gramscian theories from a 
Marxist position in highlighting the importance of political economy along with 
considerations of ideological struggle. Therefore, the main contribution to Gramscian 
studies of this thesis showing how the conception of social forces and its shifting, 
balancing, and rebalancing of class interests can be analysed in the context of 
developing countries such as Thailand.  
 
2. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
This research has been conducted under the general directions regulated by central 
research questions as shown below.  
 
How can we grasp the complexities of the politics of transition of the Thai 
state over the last decade in Thailand? And how can we construct an 
understanding of the antagonistic relationships among social forces, their 
material connections, socio-ideological cohesion, and their contributions 
towards the crisis and the transition of the Thai historical bloc? 
 
Based on these set of questions, this research has found five major findings. First, the 
street fights and violent government repression in May 2010 was only the tip of the 
iceberg. The incident in 2010 itself did not reveal a genuine picture of the crisis of the 
Thai state. In order to grasp the crisis of the Thai state, political analysis cannot be 
reduced to any single political event because the cause of the crisis of the Thai historical 
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bloc between 2005 and its peak in 2010 did not only come from the Thaksin 
government and its allies―as the conservative social forces conventionally hold. 
Rather, the crisis of Thailand’s historical bloc resulted from the clash between two 
distinct ‘social relations’―old and new―and the clash is still ongoing. 
 
Second, the thesis found that Thaksin/TRT could be seen as a strong social force who 
acted as a ‘factor of social cohesion’ to cohere social forces together under its own attempt 
to build a new hegemonic bloc in the time following the 1997 economic crisis. The TRT 
party benefitted from the changing structural conditions of the new 1997 constitution 
that encouraged them to have ‘strong’ political authority. They employed this strong 
political power as a social basis to run their own hegemonic projects―the so called 
Thaksinism/Thaksin regime―in both political economy and ideological hegemony.  
 
Third, this research found that the TRT party should be seen as a ‘social catalyst’ that 
brought social change to the Thai state. They attempted to set up the ‘new’ social 
relations between the rulers and the ruled by changing the exclusionary and uneven 
economic development to be more inclusive and provided concrete interests to social 
groups. At the same time, the strong and aggressive TRT should be seen as a 
challenger to the old social relations. The longstanding hegemonic ‘royalist-nationalist’ 
ideology had been ignored under the new social relation of Thaksinism. Therefore, from 
the royalist/conservative point of view, Thaksinism is a threat to royal power. In the 
new social relation, in other words, the new historical bloc has the TRT party as a 
leading social force and this bloc seemed to continue for a long period―based on the 
popularity shown by social forces between 2001 and 2003―and could have been 
replaced by the significance of the old regime of political economy and royalist-
nationalist ideology. 
 
Fourth, the thesis found that the anti-Thaksinism movements from late 2005 and the 
politics of making conditions to the passive revolution by the Yellow Shirts was an 
attempt to ‘balance’ their own class interests that they had lost or might have lost in 
various forms by employing ‘moral politics’ to pursue wider public support and blaming 
TRT as a corrupted government and a threat to the King (and also the nation). With 
some points of economic conflict with some capitalist factions, they had agitated 
‘ideological war’ towards Thai social forces and caused the ‘passive revolution’ that paved 




Fifth, this study found that the coup d’état in 2006 was a passive revolution―a 
revolution from above without mass participation―and that the conservative social 
forces made conditions for this social change. This research argues that the return of 
authoritarianism in 2006 had overthrown the attempts to build new social relations of 
the TRT government and brought back the old social relations to regulate the Thai 
historical bloc. This thesis argues that political conflicts and violence between the 
Yellows and the Reds could be considered as the clash between the old and new social 
relations. The ‘old’ ideology and political economy that the junta and the Democrat 
government brought back to regulate the Thai historical bloc since late 2006 are no 
longer compatible with some social forces that require a fairer political economy and 
liberal democracy. The obsolete political economy and ideology of the old social elites 
were not welcomed by the majority of Thai social forces as confirmed by the result of 
the general election in 2011 when the Red Shirts supported Pua Thai party (former 
TRT) still won a majority vote over the Democrat party.  
 
3. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This thesis offered a critical perspective towards understanding of the politics of social 
transition of the Thai historical bloc in the last decade looking through the politics of 
social forces via a Gramscian perspective. However, this thesis still has some limitations 
as it has focused its study on the unit of analysis at a broad level including ‘social 
structures’―relations of production, political ideology, and the constitution―and 
‘group of actors’ which this thesis considers as ‘social force/social group’ including the 
TRT party, the Democrat party, the Yellows Shirts and the Red Shirts (and their social 
composition from various social factions). Having focused on a broad level of unit of 
analysis could be seen, especially from those who extensively relies on in-depth details 
of social actors, that this thesis provides lack of concentration on any single social actor.  
 
In addition, this thesis still holds another crucial limitation as it is barely consider the 
influence of global capitalism and its linkage to domestic case of Thailand. In the recent 
decades, the so-called neo-Gramscianism in International Political Economy 
(IPE)―based on the combination of Coxian critical ideas (Cox, 1981, 1983) and 
Gramscian theories―has been rising and employing to study a number of case studies 
in IPE. However, this thesis does not develop a theoretical approach in the direction 
that neo-Gramscianism in IPE normally do on the study of relationship between global 
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capitalism, transnational capitalist, other transnational social-political agencies, and the 
nation state. Rather, as this thesis has shown in previous chapters, it is argues that the 
organic crisis of the Thai state since the late 2005 has mainly driven by political and 
ideological matters along with economic conflicts as a form of imbalance of class 
interests among social forces in Thai historical bloc. This thesis does not deny the 
theoretical stance of neo-Gramscianism in IPE on the connection between global 
capitalism and internal politics. Nevertheless, as the influence of global economy did not 
significantly affects to the politics of balancing and rebalancing of class forces in the 
Thai historical bloc since late 2005, therefore this thesis had mainly developed its 
theoretical framework in order to grasp the complexities of shifting social relations of 
the Thai historical bloc in domestic level instead.  
 
Then, for future research in similar areas to this work, it is suggested research could 
take a step further than this thesis by analysing and researching the politics of social 
transition at other levels of study. To study the transformation of the conditions of 
political economy and the cultural-ideology of the Thai state from either a local 
perspective, such as looking at specific local sites of study in Thailand, or in the 
connection with global political economy, especially in relation to the 2008 global 
economic crisis and also in relation to some distinct transnational capitalist class, should 
be possible and could also enhance some understanding towards the crisis, the rupture, 
and the restructuring of the Thai state. Future study of the politics of transition at 
different levels of analysis could fulfill the gap that this work has left and could associate 
understanding of the transition of the Thai state in different ways.  
 
4.  Prospects for Thai Politics 
 
As shown above, the organic crisis over the last several years in Thailand came not only 
from the TRT party and its allies. In addition, the struggles between the Yellow Shirts 
and the Red Shirts in various forms since 2006 were not stand alone without social 
contexts. In other words, the conflicts between the Yellows and the Reds were reflected 
in the rough transition of the Thai historical bloc. This rough transition has been 
revealed by the Red Shirts subalterns to contain three major factors―political economy, 
political ideology, and juridico-political―underlying the fights of the Yellows and the 
Reds. Regarding the prospects for the Thai political economy in the post-2010 era, it 
can be seen that the crisis-ridden transition, social unrest, political uncertainties and 
violence are still ongoing. Considered against the matter of historical development, as 
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shown in this thesis, it is not easy to fix this organic crisis of the Thai state in a short 
period of time. Therefore, it should be seen that the prospects for the Thai historical 
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